Green v. Robertson ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 EUREKA DIVISION 7 8 DAMESHLO A. GREEN, Case No. 19-cv-08041-RMI 9 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 10 v. TO AMEND 11 JIM ROBERTSON, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He 15 has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 16 DISCUSSION 17 Standard of Review 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 21 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 22 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 23 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 24 Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement 27 need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 1 claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide 2 the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 3 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 4 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 5 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court recently 7 explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can provide 8 the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well- 9 pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 10 plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 12 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 13 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 14 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 15 Legal Claims 16 Plaintiff alleges that he fell out of his top bunk injuring himself. 17 The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 18 inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a prisoner 19 receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the 20 Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition of “cruel 21 and unusual punishment,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may 22 not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 23 (1992). The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners 24 with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and 25 personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment 26 when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently 27 serious. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the 1 Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference. See Farmer 2 at 835-37 & n.4. A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 3 an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, 4 i.e., the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See id. at 5 837. 6 “In a § 1983 or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants 7 – the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government 8 official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 9 U.S. at 677 (finding under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 10 Procedure, that complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead sufficient facts “plausibly 11 showing” that top federal officials “purposely adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 12 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin” over more likely 13 and non-discriminatory explanations). 14 A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal 15 involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the 16 supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 17 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly involved in the allegedly 18 unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this individual capacity for his own 19 culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 20 acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 21 indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 22 omitted). The claim that a supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable 23 actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional 24 conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v. 25 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that 26 conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional policies and procedures which 27 authorized unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to state a claim of supervisory 1 Plaintiff states that he notified the administration of Pelican Bay State Prison of the 2 dangers and unsafe conditions of having to do climb up and down from the top bunk without any 3 bars or safety rails. He submitted forms requesting a wall ladder or step to the warden and the 4 administration but received no response. Several weeks later he fell while climbing off the top 5 bunk and injured his hand. 6 The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information. The only 7 defendant is the warden, but Plaintiff has not demonstrated the warden’s personal involvement in 8 the constitutional deprivation. The fact that Plaintiff submitted a form to the warden, without 9 more, is insufficient. He must show that the warden was deliberately indifferent to his safety. In an 10 amended complaint, Plaintiff may wish to add defendants who denied his requests for the ladder 11 or step. Additionally, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the failure to provide a ladder or step 12 violated the Eighth Amendment. In one of his exhibits, a prison official states that ladders or steps 13 cannot be provided, however, Plaintiff may request a lower bunk. Compl. at 34. Plaintiff should 14 indicate if he requested a lower bunk or provide more allegations about how the denial of the 15 ladder or step was sufficiently serious and that the named defendants had a culpable state of mind. 16 CONCLUSION 17 The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set 18 forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this 19 order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 20 AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 21 the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. 22 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original 23 complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of 24 this case. 25 It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court informed 26 of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk titled “Notice of Change of 27 Address” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result 1 A1(b). 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: January 21, 2020 4 5 ROBERT M. ILLMAN 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 © 15 16 = 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28