Camilli v. Saul ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LINDA RENEE CAMILLI, Case No. 18-cv-06322-JSC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 9 v. ATTORNEY’S FEES 10 ANDREW M. SAUL, Re: Dkt. No. 22 Defendant. 11 12 13 Plaintiff’s counsel, Helen Zane, moves for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 14 for representing Plaintiff in her successful appeal of the Commissioner of the Social Security 15 Administration’s (“Commissioner’s”) denial of social security disability benefits. (Dkt. Nos. 22 & 16 23.) The Commissioner has not filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion and the time to do so has 17 run. After careful consideration of Plaintiff’s motion and the relevant legal authority, the Court 18 GRANTS the motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 406(b). 19 BACKGROUND 20 This case stems from Plaintiff’s appeal of the SSA’s denial of social security benefits for a 21 combination of mental and physical impairments, including: degenerative disc disease of the 22 lumbar spine, osteoarthritis, obesity, asthma, anxiety and depression. On July 29, 2019, the Court 23 granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 24 judgment, and remanded for an award of benefits. (Dkt. No. 17.1) On October 1, 2019, pursuant 25 to the parties’ stipulation, the Court awarded $5,900 in fees to Plaintiff’s counsel under to the 26 Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Dkt. No. 21.) 27 1 On November 13, 2019, Plaintiff was notified that she had been awarded disability 2 benefits and that she was owed $52,285 in past due benefits. (Dkt. No. 23-3.) Social Security has 3 withheld $17,075 from Plaintiff’s past due award for attorney’s fees. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel 4 thereafter filed the now pending motion for attorney’s fees. (Dkt. No. 23.) Pursuant to Plaintiff 5 and her counsel’s contingency fee agreement for this case, counsel may seek fees up to 25 percent 6 of any past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 23-2.) Counsel accordingly requests fees 7 in the amount of $17,075.00 which represents approximately 21% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits 8 when the $5,900 already awarded to counsel under EAJA is deducted. (Dkt. No. 23 at 6.) 9 Plaintiff’s counsel served Plaintiff with a copy of the motion for attorney’s fees and supporting 10 papers, but Plaintiff has not filed a response or raised any objections to the fee request. (Dkt. Nos. 11 25 & 26.) The Commissioner has not filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion and Plaintiff’s 12 motion indicates that the Commissioner takes no position on her request for fees. (Id. at 2.) 13 LEGAL STANDARD 14 Section 406(b) provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social 15 security] claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the 16 court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee” to claimant’s attorney; 17 such a fee can be no more than 25 percent of the total of past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 18 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). A court may award such a fee even if the court’s judgment did not 19 immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court has rendered a judgment 20 favorable to a claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ and remanding for further 21 consideration, the court may calculate the 25 percent fee based upon any past-due benefits 22 awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 23 Under Section 406(b), a court must serve “as an independent check” of contingency fee 24 agreements “to assure that they yield reasonable results.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 25 807 (2002). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory 26 ceiling; instead, [Section] 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by 27 those agreements.” Id. at 808-09. The court’s review of a fee agreement is based on the character 1 analyzing: whether counsel provided substandard representation; any dilatory conduct by counsel 2 to accumulate additional fees; whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the 3 benefits achieved; and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 4 1151-52. 5 A court must offset an award of Section 406(b) attorneys’ fees by any award of fees 6 granted under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 7 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012). 8 ANALYSIS 9 Plaintiff’s counsel has demonstrated that the amount of fees requested is reasonable for the 10 services rendered. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. First, while not dispositive, Plaintiff and 11 counsel’s contingency fee agreement is within the 25 percent threshold permitted under Section 12 406(b) as the agreement provides that counsel will not ask for a fee of more than 25 percent of 13 total past-due benefits awarded. (Dkt. No. 23-2.) Further, counsel in fact seeks an award of less 14 than that amount as counsel’s requested fees represent 21 percent of the total past-due benefits 15 awarded once the EAJA fees are deducted. Second, there is no indication that a reduction of fees is 16 warranted due to any substandard performance by counsel or that counsel delayed these 17 proceedings in an effort to increase the amount of fees awarded. To the contrary, counsel, who has 18 represented Plaintiff since 2018, provided substantial work and achieved favorable results for 19 Plaintiff as she succeeded in having the Court remand this matter to the Commissioner for an 20 award of benefits. Nor is the amount of fees, $17,075.00, excessive in relation to the past-due 21 benefits award of $52,285. See, e.g., Eckert v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-04461-JCS, 2017 WL 22 3977379, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2017) (awarding $16,566.25 in fees following an award of 23 $66,265 in retroactive benefits); Devigili v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-02237-SI, 2017 WL 2462194, at 24 *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2017) (awarding $15,278.00 in fees following an award of $76,391.00 in 25 retroactive benefits); Conner v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-03324-KAW, 2016 WL 5673297, at *3 (N.D. 26 Cal. Oct. 3, 2016) (awarding $17,746.00 in fees following an award of $94,987.60 in retroactive 27 benefits). Lastly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel assumed a substantial risk of not 1 agreement prior to the filing of this action. (Dkt. No. 23-2.) At that time, the Agency had 2 || completely denied Plaintiff any requested benefits, and counsel could not know that the Court 3 would remand to the Commissioner for an award of benefits. 4 Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of requested fees is reasonable. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for fees. 7 The Commissioner is directed to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of 8 $17,075.00, payable to the Law Offices of Helen R. Zane. Plaintiffs counsel is ordered to refund 9 the previously awarded EAJA fees, in the amount of $5,900.00, to Plaintiff. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. e 12 Dated: February 20, 2020 = § ne CQUYELINE SCOTT CORLEY IS United States Magistrate Judge 16 = 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28