Enea v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GIORGIO ENEA, Case No. 18-cv-02792-HSG 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE 9 v. UNDER SEAL 10 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 74 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s administrative motion to file documents under seal. 14 Dkt. No. 74. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s administrative 15 motion. 16 I. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal 18 documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana 19 v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the 20 common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 21 and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of 22 access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this 23 strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion 24 must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the 25 general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in 26 understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations 27 omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 1 vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public 2 scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. 3 Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records 4 may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, 5 without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. 6 The Court must “balance[] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to 7 keep certain judicial records secret. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal 8 certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual 9 basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5 10 supplements the compelling reasons standard set forth in Kamakana: the party seeking to file a 11 document or portions of it under seal must “establish[] that the document, or portions thereof, are 12 privileged, protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law . . . The 13 request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b). 14 Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of 15 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only 16 tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80 17 (quotations omitted). This requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm 18 will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 19 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of 20 harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman 21 Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiff seeks to file under seal Exhibits 1 and 3 attached to his opposition to Defendant’s 24 motion for summary judgment and portions in his opposition that reference the exhibits. Dkt. No. 25 74. The only proffered justification for sealing is that the information was designated as 26 “Confidential” by Defendant. Id. But a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish 27 that a document is sealable. See Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ 1 See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at 2 |} *5(N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015) (“But good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the 3 document is subject to a protective order or by stating in general terms that the material is 4 || considered to be confidential’”) (quoting Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL 5 || 482767, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). Thus, Plaintiff's motion does not comply with Civil 6 || Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A). In addition, as the designating party for the materials, Defendant did 7 || not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because it did not file a declaration within four days 8 of Plaintiff's motion. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1). 9 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's administrative motion to seal. 10 || I. CONCLUSION ll The Court DENIES Plaintiffs administrative motion to file under seal, Dkt. No. 74, and 12 || DIRECTS Plaintiff to file public versions of all documents for which the proposed sealing has 13 been denied within seven days of this order. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 || Dated: 2/19/2020 Apupurred 3 bbl). HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. Z 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28