Collins v. Social Security Administration ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JENNIFER COLLINS, Case No. 19-cv-06873-TSH 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR 9 v. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 10 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 11 Defendant. 12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 On September 16, 2019, Plaintiff Jennifer Collins filed a small claims court complaint in 15 Contra Costa County Superior Court against Defendant Social Security Administration, alleging 16 the administration improperly denied her application for benefits. The administration removed the 17 case to this Court on October 22, 2019, and filed an answer and the administrative record on 18 December 11, 2019. ECF Nos. 1, 7-8. Pursuant to the Social Security case procedural order, 19 Collins was required to serve and file a motion for summary judgment or for remand within 28 20 days of service of the administration’s answer. ECF No. 6. As Collins failed to file a motion or 21 otherwise respond, the Court ordered her to show cause by February 11, 2020, why this case 22 should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines. ECF 23 No. 12. The Court also provided notice to Collins that it may dismiss the case if she failed to 24 respond by the deadline. As of today, Collins has failed to respond. Based on this procedural 25 history, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 26 Procedure 41(b)1 27 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Under Rule 41(b), “the district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any 3 order of the court.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Oliva v. 4 Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss sua sponte for failure to 5 meet court deadline). “The Court must weigh the following factors in determining whether a Rule 6 41(b) dismissal is warranted: “‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) 7 the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 8 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 9 sanctions.’” Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Henderson v. 10 Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). Dismissal is appropriate “where at least four 11 factors support dismissal . . . or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” 12 Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 The first two Henderson factors strongly support dismissal. First, “‘the public’s interest in 15 expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 16 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). 17 Second, the Court’s need to manage its docket also weighs in favor of dismissal. Collins delayed 18 adjudication of the claims in this case by failing to prosecute and failing to respond to the show 19 cause order. Non-compliance with procedural rules and the Court’s orders wastes “valuable time 20 that [the Court] could have devoted to other . . . criminal and civil cases on its docket.” Ferdik, 21 963 F.2d at 1261; Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (“It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its 22 docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants”). 23 As for the third Henderson factor, the mere pendency of a lawsuit cannot constitute 24 sufficient prejudice to require dismissal. Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991. However, “prejudice . . . may . 25 . . consist of costs or burdens of litigation.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig., 26 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, “a presumption of prejudice arises from a 27 plaintiff’s unexplained failure to prosecute.” Laurino v. Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 1 meet a court deadline. Id.; Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991. Here, Collins failed to file a motion for 2 summary judgment or remand and failed to respond to the order to show cause. Therefore, the 3 Court concludes the third Henderson factor also supports dismissal. 4 The fourth Henderson factor, that public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, 5 normally weighs strongly against dismissal. See Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399 (“[T]he public policy 6 favoring resolution on the merits clearly counsels against dismissal.”) (citation omitted); 7 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643 (“Public policy favors disposition of cases on the merits. Thus, this 8 factor weighs against dismissal.”). “At the same time, a case that is stalled or unreasonably 9 delayed by a party’s failure to comply with deadlines . . . cannot move forward toward resolution 10 on the merits.” In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that this factor 11 ‘lends little support’ to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the 12 merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 13 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996)). Thus, although this factor weighs against dismissal, the Court 14 also recognizes that Collins has failed to move this case toward disposition and this factor 15 therefore lends little support to her cause. See Mack v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2019 WL 6251228, at 16 *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (Although public policy favors disposition on the merits, “this factor 17 lends little support” where Social Security plaintiff that fails to move case toward disposition.). 18 Finally, the Court has already attempted less drastic sanctions without success, including 19 issuing a show cause order and giving Collins an opportunity to explain the failure to prosecute. 20 “Though there are a wide variety of sanctions short of dismissal available, the district court need 21 not exhaust them all before finally dismissing a case.” Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 22 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). Further, as Collins failed to respond, another order requiring her to 23 respond is likely to be futile. See, e.g., Mack, 2019 WL 6251228, at *2 (finding dismissal under 24 Rule 41(b) appropriate where the court previously attempted the lesser sanction of issuing an order 25 to show cause and giving the plaintiff an opportunity to respond); Gleason v. World Sav. Bank, 26 FSB, 2013 WL 3927799, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2013) (same). Moreover, the order to show 27 cause warned Collins of the risk of dismissal; thus she cannot maintain the Court failed in its 1 F.2d at 1262 (“a district court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey the court’s order will 2 || result in dismissal can satisfy the consideration of alternatives requirement.”) (citation and 3 quotations omitted). Accordingly, the final factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 Based on the analysis above, the Court finds at least four of the five Henderson factors 6 || weigh in favor of dismissal. Collins failed to file a motion for summary judgment or remand and 7 failed to respond to the show cause order. Thus, she failed to prosecute this case and dismissal is 8 || appropriate. Typically, dismissal could be without prejudice, which preserves a plaintiff's ability 9 || to seek relief. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. However, this case is a Social Security appeal in 10 || which the time to file an appeal has expired (see Admin. Record at 1, ECF No. 8), so a dismissal 11 with or without prejudice is effectively the same thing. See Mack, 2019 WL 6251228, at *2 12 (dismissing Social Security case with prejudice for failure to prosecute where time to file appeal 5 13 had expired). Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to 14 || prosecute and failure to comply with the Court’s deadlines and orders. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 16 = 17 Dated: February 14, 2020 18 AY \ . Ly □ THOMAS S. HIXSON 19 United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28