Farrer v. ezCater, Inc. ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MATTHEW FARRER, Case No. 20-cv-01804-JCS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND 10 EZCATER, INC., Re: Dkt. No. 8 Defendant. 11 12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff Matthew Farrer originally filed this putative class action in the California Superior 14 Court for Alameda County, where it was assigned case number HG19047343, asserting wage and 15 hour claims against Defendant ezCater, Inc. on behalf of himself and other delivery drivers whom 16 Farrer contends were misclassified as independent contractors rather than ezCater employees. 17 ezCater removed to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and relying 18 on Farrer’s potential recovery of attorneys’ fees to satisfy the amount in controversy. Farrer 19 moves to remand, arguing that attorneys’ fees must be apportioned among the asserted class and 20 only his own individual share of such fees may be counted towards the amount in controversy. 21 The Court finds the matter suitable for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the 22 hearing set for May 8, 2020. For the reasons discussed below, Farrer’s motion is GRANTED, and 23 the case is REMANDED to state court.1 24 II. BACKGROUND 25 Farrer’s complaint asserts that ezCater misclassified him and similarly situated delivery 26 drivers as independent contractors rather than employees, and that ezCater failed to provide them 27 1 with employment benefits required under the California Labor Code. See generally Compl. (dkt. 2 1-1). Among other relief, Farrer seeks attorneys’ fees under several provisions of the Labor Code 3 and other California statutes. Id. at 17, ¶ 13 (prayer for relief). In its notice of removal, ezCater 4 relied on Farrer’s request for attorneys’ fees to show that the amount in controversy exceeds 5 $75,000, as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Notice of Removal (dkt. 6 1) ¶¶ 15–17. Farrer moves to remand, arguing that ezCater has not shown a sufficient amount in 7 controversy, in part because any award of attorneys’ fees is attributable to the putative class as a 8 whole and only Farrer’s individual share of those fees counts toward the amount in controversy. 9 ezCater does not dispute that principle and does not argue that it can show an amount in 10 controversy over $75,000 if there are any other class members, but contends that Farrer’s 11 allegations are not sufficient to show that there are any other class members, or “[s]tated 12 differently, despite the proposed class, and the characterization of the case as a Class Action, in 13 reality, the only claims asserted are on behalf of Plaintiff individually, and therefore the 14 aggregation rule should be disregarded.” Opp’n (dkt. 12) at 5. 15 III. ANALYSIS 16 A. Legal Standard 17 Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, and may only hear cases falling 18 within their jurisdiction. Generally, a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if 19 the action could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removal 20 statutes are construed restrictively so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. 21 v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108−09 (1941). The Ninth Circuit recognizes a “strong presumption 22 against removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal 23 quotation marks omitted). Any doubts as to removability should generally be resolved in favor of 24 remand. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The 25 defendant bears the burden of showing that removal is proper. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 26 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction, which ezCater asserts here as the basis for its 1 state as any defendant—and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); 2 see Matao Yokeno v. Sawako Sekiguchi, 754 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2014). Where a defendant 3 removes an action to federal court on the basis of diversity, the burden on a plaintiff seeking 4 remand under § 1447(c) depends on whether the amount in controversy is clear from the face of 5 the complaint. See Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007). 6 “Where a plaintiff’s state court complaint does not specify a particular amount of damages, the 7 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the 8 amount in controversy exceeds that amount.” Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 9 404 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine whether this standard is met, courts “may consider facts in the 10 removal petition, and may require parties to submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to 11 the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 116 12 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 13 B. ezCater Has Not Shown the Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000 14 Here, ezCater relies on Farrer’s claim for attorneys’ fees to bring the amount in 15 controversy above the $75,000 threshold. The Ninth Circuit has held that, where class claims are 16 asserted, “any potential attorneys’ fees award [under statutes awarding fees to prevailing parties] 17 cannot be attributed solely to the named plaintiffs for purposes of amount in controversy,” but 18 instead must be apportioned among members of the putative class, and at least one named 19 plaintiff’s claims must meet the amount in controversy requirement with only that plaintiff’s share 20 of attorneys’ fees included. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001); 21 see also Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 941–43 (9th Cir. 2001).2 While acknowledging 22 2 The Ninth Circuit’s rationale for this rule is not entirely clear. While the attorneys’ fees statute 23 discussed in Gibson only provided for fees if a significant benefit was conferred on a large class or the public generally, suggesting that class certification would be a prerequisite to such an award, 24 see Gibson, 261 F.3d at 942 (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5), the decision in Kanter extended the rule to a case where attorneys’ fees would have been available to a successful 25 individual plaintiff even if a class were never certified, see Kanter, 265 F.3d at 858 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1780). Neither case explains how a rule assuming future class certification for the 26 purpose of attorneys’ fees is consistent with the general principles that “subject matter jurisdiction depends only on the named plaintiffs,” Gibson, 261 F.3d at 941, that claims of absent putative 27 class members should not be considered on removal “because those members are free to opt out of 1 that holding, ezCater argues that it is of no consequence here because “[t]here are no allegations 2 that any other person—other than Plaintiff [Farrer]—was misclassified as independent contractors 3 or performed services for ezCater.” Opp’n at 5. That argument is incorrect. 4 Farrer alleges that there are “estimated to be greater than 100 individuals” who meet his 5 proposed class definition of “California citizens who performed work for Defendants in the State 6 of California as delivery drivers, or in a functionally equivalent position, who were misclassified 7 as independent contractors within four years prior to the filing of this action to the date the class is 8 certified.” Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21(a). He also alleges that his injuries—deprivation of employee 9 benefits despite “perform[ing] services for Defendants a delivery driver” and being “classified by 10 Defendants as an independent contractor”—are “typical of the injuries sustained by the Class 11 because they arise out and are caused by Defendants’ common course of conduct as alleged [in 12 Farrer’s complaint].” Id. ¶¶ 21(b), 22. He alleges that ezCater “failed to pay Plaintiff and class 13 members all minimum wages owed,” that “Plaintiff and class members did not receive” required 14 rest periods, and that “Defendants have intentionally and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff and 15 class members with complete and accurate wage statements,” among other charges. Id. ¶¶ 37, 45, 16 65 (emphasis added). And he alleges that “Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff 17 and class members” were entitled to employee benefits. Id. ¶¶ 25–33 (emphasis added). 18 Assuming, as ezCater does not contest, that Farrer sufficiently alleges his individual claims, 19 ezCater cites no case holding that such allegations are insufficient to plead class claims. 20 According to ezCater, the Court can conclude that there are no other class members based 21 on a declaration by an ezCater officer that ezCater did not contract directly with any delivery 22 driver in California, but instead contracted with a company by the name of Jobble, Inc., which in 23 turn contracted with individuals. See Opp’n at 3; Konjoian Decl. (dkt. 12-5). The evidence 24 submitted by ezCater proves too much, as ezCater also offers a letter that Farrer’s attorneys sent to 25 Jobble stating intent to amend the complaint to add Jobble as a defendant in this action, Khalsa 26 amount in controversy at the time of removal,” see Singer, 116 F.3d at 377, at which time, often, 27 no class has yet been certified. The rule could also produce unusual results if, say, a plaintiff ] Decl. (dkt. 12-1) Ex. C, and asserts that Farrer “worked for” Jobble, Opp’n at 3. Taking that 2 || evidence together, it becomes clear that the theory of Farrer’s complaint is that, despite formally 3 contracting with Jobble, he and other similarly situated drivers “performed work for” ezCater and 4 || were therefore legally ezCater employees. See Compl. [§ 17, 22. 5 The merits of that theory are not before this Court. The relevant question is whether, if 6 || Farrer succeeds in proving his case, the amount in controversy apportioned specifically to him 7 || would exceed $75,000. Under Kanter, the Court assumes that Farrer would succeed in certifying 8 a class of similarly situated drivers and that any attorneys’ fees recovered would be apportioned 9 || among them for the purpose of the amount in controversy. ezCater does not argue that Farrer’s 10 || share of apportioned attorneys’ fees would exceed the amount in controversy threshold if there are 11 any other class members. Even if the Court could determine as a matter of law on this motion to 12 || remand that the delivery drivers who contracted with Jobble have no claim against ezCater— 13 which, to be clear, the Court cannot—then based on ezCater’s own assertion that Farrer “worked 14 || for’ Jobble, Opp’n at 3, Farrer himself would have no claim, and the amount in controversy would 3 15 || be zero. Either way, ezCater has not met its burden to show that the amount in controversy for the 16 || only named plaintiffs claim exceeds $75,000, and the case must be remanded. 2 17 |) IV. CONCLUSION Z 18 For the reasons discussed above, Farrer’s motion to remand is GRANTED, and the case is 19 || REMANDED to the California Superior Court for Alameda County. The Clerk shall close the 20 || case in this Court. 21 IT ISSO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: April 24, 2020 23 Z- CZA- J PH C. SPERO 24 ief Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28