Castagnola v. County of Sonoma ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 MICHAEL L. CASTAGNOLA, et al., Case No. 19-cv-08290-JSC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE 11 v. ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 12 Re: Dkt. No. 12 13 COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al., 14 Defendant 15 16 Michael L. Castagnola and the Michael L. Castagnola Revocable Trust challenge 17 imposition of over $323,000 in fines for alleged violations of Sonoma County building, zoning, 18 and public nuisance laws on property located in Sonoma County. Michael L. Castagnola 19 (“Plaintiff”) brings claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Sonoma County, Sonoma 20 County Permit Resources and Management Department, Tennis Wick, and Does One through 21 Twenty (“Defendants”). Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rules 22 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, motion for a more definite 23 statement pursuant to Rule 12(e).1 After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing, the Court 24 concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and GRANTS 25 Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice based upon Younger abstention. 26 27 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. The Parties 3 A. Plaintiff 4 Michael L. Castagnola is “a natural person residing and domiciled” in Sonoma County and 5 is the “Trustee and sole Beneficiary” of the Michael L. Castagnola Revocable Trust. (Dkt. No. 8 6 at ¶ 2.2) Michael L. Castagnola Revocable Trust is “a revocable trust managed by Plaintiff 7 Michael L. Castagnola, and owns the real property” that is the subject of the permit violations. 8 (Id. at ¶ 3.) Since filing the amended complaint, Michael L. Castagnola has conceded that the 9 Michael L. Castagnola Revocable Trust is “not a proper party to this action.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 13 n. 10 5.) Accordingly, the Court proceeds as if the claims here are brought only by Michael L. 11 Castagnola. 12 B. Defendants 13 Sonoma County is a “County Government” in the State of California. (Dkt. No. 8 at ¶ 4.) 14 Sonoma County Permit Resource and Management Department is a Sonoma County agency 15 “responsible for enforcing all permit-violation proceedings in Sonoma County.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)3 16 Defendant Tennis Wick is the “Director of Defendant Sonoma County Permit Resource and 17 Management Department” and “responsible for controlling and overseeing all permit-violation 18 proceedings.” (Id. at ¶ 6.) Does One through Twenty are “individuals, agencies, companies, 19 businesses, government or other entities that are responsible for the acts and omissions” alleged in 20 the complaint. (Id. at ¶ 7.) 21 II. First Amended Complaint Allegations 22 On or around May 2017, Sonoma County received a complaint about an unpermitted 23 greenhouse being constructed on the property at issue. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Shortly after the complaint, a 24 “County Planning Department inspector” traveled to the property and requested to inspect the 25 greenhouse. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Castagnola told the inspector that she could inspect the greenhouse, but 26 27 2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 1 “explicitly withheld permission to inspect other portions of his property.” (Id. at ¶ 13.) Further, 2 the property is “wooded,” which “obstructs the plain view from one part of the property to 3 another.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) To inspect the greenhouse, the inspector had “to enter the property 4 through the front gate, park her vehicle, then walk down a short path to the greenhouse,” and “at 5 no point in the process,” would the inspector have been able to “inspect the other relevant 6 structures” of the property. (Id.) However, “despite being told by Plaintiff Castagnola that she did 7 not have permission to view or inspect anything other than the greenhouse,” the inspector 8 “traversed back and forth over the entire subject property—going to areas that she could not see 9 from any vantage point where she had permission to be—closely inspecting nine other structures.” 10 (Id. at ¶ 15.) During this inspection, Castagnola “repeatedly told the inspector that she did not 11 have his permission to conduct an inspection of his entire property,” but the inspector “ignored” 12 him. (Id.) 13 III. State Court Proceedings 14 On June 17, 2017, Sonoma County Permit and Resource Management issued a notice and 15 order to Plaintiff detailing several violations of County building and zoning laws on the property. 16 (See Dkt. No. 13 at 29-30, Ex. 3.4) The notice warned Plaintiff that violations “are subject to 17 mandatory civil penalties” and that “[f]ailure to comply could also result in a lawsuit” in Sonoma 18 County Superior Court. (Id. at 30.) The letter also stated it “[c]onstitute[d] final notice” unless 19 4 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of public records consisting of notices and 20 correspondence sent to Plaintiff in connection with Sonoma County building and zoning code 21 violations, as well as the state court complaint which preceded this action. (Dkt. No. 13.) Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a “judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 22 dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 23 reasonably be questioned.” A court may “take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris v. County. of Orange, 682 24 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 25 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” In addition, “[i]t is 26 well established that [a] court may take judicial notice of records and reports of administrative bodies, such as notices and opinion letters. Lundquist v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 27 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court 1 Plaintiff filed an appeal under the administrative process described therein. (Id.) Defendants sent 2 Plaintiff several notices and correspondence related to the violations over nearly a two-year 3 period. (See Id. at 29-46, Ex. 3-6.) 4 On December 17, 2019, Defendant Sonoma County sued Castagnola and the Michael L. 5 Castagnola Revocable Trust in the Superior Court of California, Sonoma County. The complaint 6 alleges numerous violations of Sonoma County building, zoning, and public nuisance laws; 7 requests abatement and injunctive relief in connection with those violations; and seeks payment of 8 assessed fines and penalties as a result of Plaintiff’s alleged violation of the building and zoning 9 laws. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 14-19, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff responded with a cross-complaint, and a 10 subsequent motion to stay the state court proceeding with a hearing scheduled for April 22, 2020. 11 County of Sonoma v. Michael Castagnola, Trustee of Michael L. Castagnola Revocable Trust, et 12 al. No. SCV-265714 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2020). 13 IV. Procedural History 14 Two days after Defendants filed the state court complaint, Plaintiff filed this action. (Dkt. 15 Nos. 1, 8.) Before Defendants answered, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (“First Amended 16 Complaint”) which seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and alleges constitutional violations 17 based on: (1) the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) the excessive fines clause 18 of the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. 19 No. 8 at ¶¶ 18-41.) On March 6, 2020, Defendants filed the now pending motion to dismiss, under 20 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for a more definite 21 statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). 22 DISCUSSION 23 Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint on several independent grounds: “(1) 24 the Younger Abstention Doctrine prohibits federal court jurisdiction over the on-going state court 25 code enforcement action; (2) the lawsuit was filed beyond the applicable statutes of limitation; (3) 26 the claims in the lawsuit are barred by collateral estoppel; (4) Defendant Tennis Wick is immune 27 from Plaintiff’s claims; (5) Plaintiff failed to adequately plead a cause of action for Monell 1 (“PRMD”), or Tennis Wick; and (6) Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of 2 action against Defendant Tennis Wick or the County.” (Dkt. No. 12 at 8-9.) The Court first 3 addresses Defendants’ Younger abstention argument because it is dispositive. 4 A. The Younger Abstention Doctrine Applies 5 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because the Younger 6 abstention doctrine precludes the Court’s jurisdiction. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Younger 7 abstention doctrine “does not arise from lack of jurisdiction in the District Court, but from strong 8 policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. 9 Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986); see also Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 10 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Younger abstention is not jurisdictional, but reflects a court’s prudential decision 11 not to exercise jurisdiction which it in fact possesses.”). The doctrine represents a “longstanding 12 public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings.” Younger v. Harris, 13 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). When there are ongoing state judicial proceedings, Younger and its 14 progeny require federal courts to exercise restraint for “comity” and “to avoid unwarranted 15 determinations of federal constitutional law.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 16 2004). “Most importantly, Younger abstention permits federal courts to preserve respect for state 17 functions such that the national government protects federal rights and interests in a way that will 18 not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 19 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under Younger, 20 a federal court can only abstain in three categories of cases: “(1) parallel, pending state criminal 21 proceedings, (2) state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, and (3) state civil 22 proceedings that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” 23 Id. (internal citation omitted.) 24 For state civil proceedings, Younger applies when the proceedings are (1) “ongoing,” (2) 25 “implicate important state interests,” and (3) provide “an adequate opportunity . . . to raise 26 constitutional challenges.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 27 423, 432 (1982). If a state civil proceeding meets the three Middlesex factors, “a federal court 1 enjoining the state proceedings.” Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1044 (internal citation and quotation marks 2 omitted.) 3 As an initial matter, Younger abstention applies because the proceeding against Plaintiff in 4 the Sonoma County Superior Court is a state civil enforcement action akin to a criminal 5 prosecution. Id. In Herrera, the Ninth Circuit held that a nuisance action pending against the 6 plaintiffs in state court was a civil enforcement proceeding within Younger’s scope. Id. at 1045. 7 Among the factors the court cited in reaching its conclusion were: the City of Palmdale’s 8 investigative actions that discovered hundreds of violations of state and local codes on the 9 plaintiffs’ property, the City’s issuance of notices to repair or abate the violations, the City’s filing 10 of a state court complaint for nuisance abatement and receivership which requested an injunction 11 to prevent plaintiffs from collecting rent or income on the property at issue, and imposition of civil 12 penalties. Id. The court declared that the “investigation, initiation, and requested sanctions of the 13 proceedings are [] consistent” with the Supreme Court’s guidance for a state civil enforcement 14 action in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-07 (1975) and Sprint Comm., Inc. v. Jacobs, 15 571 U.S. 69, 79-80 (2013). 16 Plaintiff here is similarly the subject of a state enforcement proceeding related to 17 investigation and enforcement of Sonoma County and state building, zoning, and public nuisance 18 laws. Plaintiff was notified of these violations and the County has filed a civil enforcement action 19 seeking abatement, injunctive relief, and civil penalties. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 5-47, Exs. 1-6.) 20 Therefore, consistent with Herrera, the state civil enforcement proceeding here falls within 21 Younger’s scope. 22 The three Middlesex factors are also met. First, the state civil proceedings against Plaintiff 23 are ongoing. (See Dkt. No. 13, Ex. 1 at 9-14). Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants, and each 24 of them, are now attempting to . . . impose over $323,000 in fines on Plaintiffs.” (Dkt. No. 8 at ¶ 25 16.) 26 Second, the Sonoma County Superior Court proceeding implicates important state interests 27 in enforcing building, zoning, and nuisance laws. See Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1045 (“we conclude 1 Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. City of Alameda, No. 18-16805, 2020 WL 1429320, at *2 (9th 2 Cir. Mar. 24, 2020) (“The abatement proceeding also implicated an important state interest, 3 namely the County’s strong interest in its land-use ordinances and in providing a uniform 4 procedure for resolving zoning disputes”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 5 Third, Plaintiff has made no showing of an inadequate opportunity to raise constitutional 6 challenges in the state court proceeding. See Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1046 (“[T]he burden on this 7 point rests on the federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of [its] 8 claims”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original); see also Juidice 9 v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (plaintiffs “need be accorded only an opportunity to fairly 10 pursue their constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings, and their failure to avail 11 themselves of such opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate”) 12 (internal citation omitted); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (“a federal court 13 should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of 14 unambiguous authority to the contrary.”). Moreover, as the Herrera court noted, under California 15 Code of Civil Procedure § 428.10, “[a] party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a 16 complaint or cross-complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth . . . [a]ny cause of action he 17 has against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him” in a state 18 court civil proceeding. 918 F.3d at 1046 (alterations in original). In fact, Plaintiff has filed a 19 cross-complaint in the state court proceeding that mirrors the complaint filed in the federal 20 action—it seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the due process clause of the 21 Fourteenth Amendment, the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the search and 22 seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. See Castagnola, No. SCV-265714, Cross-Complaint 23 (filed Feb. 3, 2020).5 Plaintiff is not barred from and is actively litigating his constitutional claims 24 25 5 The Court takes judicial notice of the cross-complaint Plaintiff filed in the state court proceeding. 26 See Harris, 682 F.3d at 1132 (A court may “take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts.”) (internal citation omitted); see also 27 U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (a court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 1 in state court. 2 Lastly, continuing the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state 3 proceeding. Plaintiff contends that the federal action would not enjoin or have the practical effect 4 of enjoining the state case because “the focus of the state case is abatement, not fines.” (Dkt. No. 5 19 at 6.) Citing to the Defendants’ state court complaint, Plaintiff argues that “[t]here is simply no 6 authority that Younger abstention deprives this Court of jurisdiction simply because this case will 7 resolve one of fifteen issues in a pending state case.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff further asserts that 8 whether he “wins or loses th[e] case, the state court action to abate the alleged permit violations 9 will proceed.”6 (Id.) Plaintiff, however, misunderstands the issue. 10 In Gilbertson, the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action seeking damages for 11 retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights and violation of his due process and equal 12 protection rights. 381 F.3d at 982. The court held that the Younger abstention doctrine applied to 13 the claim because “the constitutional issues raised in [plaintiff’s] federal complaint . . . go to the 14 heart of his opposition to the [defendant’s] action in the state proceeding, such that a federal 15 court’s decision on the merits of [plaintiff’s] claims would have the same practical effect on the 16 state proceeding as an injunction.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 982. Similarly, Plaintiff’s First 17 Amended Complaint raises claims that go to the “heart” of his opposition to Defendants’ case in 18 Sonoma County Superior Court, as evidenced by the cross-complaint Plaintiff filed in the state 19 court. In both the federal and state action, Plaintiff is alleging the exact same constitutional 20 violations resulting from Defendants’ imposition of fines and civil penalties. 21 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against fines 22 and penalties levied for code violations because the fines are based on evidence gathered during an 23 illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, violate the Due Process Clause of the 24 Fourteenth Amendment, and violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eight Amendment. (Dkt. 25 No. 8 at ¶¶ 18-41.) To adjudicate the fines and penalties issue, the Court must necessarily decide 26 whether Plaintiff’s Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendment rights were violated. In the prayer 27 1 for relief, Plaintiff requests a “declaratory judgment finding the conduct alleged above to be 2 unlawful” and for a “permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants, and each of them, from 3 engaging in the conduct alleged above.” Id. at 8. If this Court concludes that the fines violate 4 Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, such finding would have the practical effect of enjoining the state 5 enforcement proceeding because the claims in that proceeding are a result of conduct that Plaintiff 6 alleges violated his constitutional rights. See also Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 975 (“federal courts 7 should also refrain from exercising jurisdiction in actions for declaratory relief because declaratory 8 relief has the same practical impact as injunctive relief on a pending state proceeding as a result of 9 the preclusive effect of the federal court judgment.”). For instance, if the Court were to declare 10 that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated during the property inspection, it would 11 practically enjoin the state proceeding since Sonoma County brought its enforcement action as a 12 consequence of the structures discovered during the inspection. (See Dkt. No. 13 at 29-30, Ex. 3) 13 (letter sent to Plaintiff detailing the code violations found after the inspection.) In addition, the 14 Court’s adjudication of the merits of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims “would frustrate the state’s 15 interest in administering its judicial system, cast a negative light on the state court’s ability to 16 enforce constitutional principles, and put the federal court in the position of prematurely or 17 unnecessarily deciding a question of federal constitutional law.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 980. 18 Finally, the Ninth Circuit has disfavored attempts by parties to avoid the Younger 19 abstention doctrine by artificially limiting the scope of their claims. In San Jose Silicon Valley 20 Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, for example, plaintiffs argued 21 that because their federal case was a facial constitutional challenge to a local election statute, 22 rather than a challenge to the “judicial-in-nature” administrative proceedings of the Election 23 Commission in charge of implementing the statute, Younger did not apply. 546 F.3d 1087, 1095 24 (9th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiffs were to challenge the administrative proceedings, it would have 25 implicated an important state interest and thus Younger would have applied since “judicial 26 proceedings or disciplinary proceedings which are judicial in nature are the type of proceeding that 27 does implicate an important state interest.” Id. at 1094 (internal citations omitted). The court 1 Election Commission’s proceeding” since the plaintiffs requested that the Election Commission be 2 || enjoined from enforcing the statute against them. Jd. 3 Here, similarly, Plaintiff insists that his federal complaint is simply a constitutional 4 challenge to the fines alone, while “the focus of the state case is abatement, not fines,” and 5 therefore this action will not have any impact on state court proceeding. (Dkt. No. 19 at 6.) 6 However, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are “inextricably intertwined” with 7 the state court proceedings, and his request for declaratory and injunctive relief specifically asks 8 || the Court to declare conduct forming the basis of Sonoma County’s action against him unlawful. 9 See also Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Berman, No. 1810756PSGSSX, 2019 WL 4143306, at 10 *4 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2019) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that Younger did not apply because 11 “there is no ‘total identity between the issues in the Administrative [Matter] and the issues [in the 12 federal case].”). 13 Accordingly, Younger abstention applies and the Court should abstain from hearing 14 || Plaintiff’s constitutional claims in light of the pending state court proceeding. The Court is 15 dismissing the action as to all Defendants rather than staying the action because Plaintiff seeks 16 || declaratory and injunctive relief, as opposed to damages. See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 968 (holding 5 17 that under Younger, dismissal is appropriate for actions seeking “injunctive or declaratory relief 18 || because a determination that the federal plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been violated would 19 || have the same practical effect as a declaration or injunction on pending state proceedings. 20 || However, federal courts should not dismiss actions where damages are at issue; rather, damages 21 actions should be stayed until the state proceedings are completed.”). 22 CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss without 24 || prejudice based upon Younger abstention. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: April 22, 2020 | ea old 27 28 JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLE United States Magistrate Judge