Foster v. Crosby ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL BARKARRI FOSTER, Case No. 22-cv-00878-WHO (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ v. 13 MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL; 14 C. CROSBY, et al., ORDER SETTING BRIEFING Defendants. 15 SCHEDULE 16 Dkt. No. 22 17 INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Michael Barkarri Foster alleges that prison guards at Pelican Bay State 19 Prison entered his cell and beat and stabbed him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 20 Defendants move for partial dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on grounds that defendants 21 Puente and Sullenger were not integral participants in the attack and are entitled to 22 qualified immunity. They also contend that Foster has not stated facts sufficient to sustain 23 his request for injunctive relief. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED concerning the claims 24 against Sullenger, which are DISMISSED; Foster’s allegations show only that Sullenger 25 opened Foster’s cell door when told to do so--this does not indicate integral-participation. 26 The motion is DENIED concerning the claims against Puente, who ordered that the cell 27 door be opened. Defendants’ motion is also GRANTED concerning the request for 1 injunctive relief because Foster has been transferred to another prison, making his 2 injunctive relief claims moot. 3 On or before November 1, 2023, defendants shall file a motion for summary 4 judgment, or a notice regarding such a motion. Foster’s opposition to defendants’ 5 summary judgment motion shall be filed within 45 days after the motion is filed. 6 Defendants’ reply to the opposition shall be filed within 15 days after the opposition is 7 filed. The motion for summary judgment shall be deemed submitted on the day the reply 8 brief is due. 9 BACKGROUND 10 The following factual allegations are taken from Foster’s first amended complaint 11 and are assumed to be true for purposes of this Order. On February 1, 2021 Pelican Bay 12 Correctional Officers C. Crosby, D. Eades, M. Shaffer, and B. Tubbs allegedly entered 13 Foster’s cell and battered and stabbed him. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 10 at 5-6.) Foster 14 states that Sergeant Puente ordered that his cell door be opened and that Officer Sullenger 15 opened the cell door. (Id. at 5.) He does not allege that either Puente or Sullenger 16 participated in the beating or stabbing. 17 After Foster was handcuffed and removed from the cell to the hallway, he saw 18 Officer Shaffer obtain a bottle of bleach from a closet and heard him say, “It’s blood 19 everywhere on the floor in there.” (Id. at 6.) He then heard Puente say, “We’re just going 20 to say that the batteries were dead in the camera.” (Id.) 21 Foster’s request for injunctive relief is in full as follows: “I[’]m also seeking for an 22 injunction against all in suit.” (Id. at 5.) 23 Foster opposes defendants’ motion to dismiss Puente but said nothing about 24 Sullenger. (Opp., Dkt. No. 24 at 1.) His opposition was construed as a Notice of Appeal 25 as well; it appears that Foster mistook defendants’ proposed order as a court order and 26 asked to file an appeal. (Id., Dkt. No. 24-1 at 1.) The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal 27 for lack of jurisdiction because this Court had not issued any orders that were final or 1 STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be 3 granted if the complaint does not proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is 4 plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 5 Dismissal is appropriate also when pleadings show a “lack of cognizable legal theory,” or 6 “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory,” Balistreri v. 7 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), or when an 8 affirmative defense is premised on facts alleged in the complaint, Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 9 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994). 10 DISCUSSION 11 I. Claims Against Puente and Sullenger 12 Defendants contend that Puente and Sullenger cannot be held liable because 13 Foster’s allegations do not contain sufficient facts showing that they were integral 14 participants in the unlawful conduct. (Mot. to Dismiss (MTD), Dkt. No. 22 at 10.) A 15 person cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he 16 or she was an integral participant in the unlawful conduct. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 17 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). Under the integral-participation doctrine, a person can be held liable 18 “only if (1) the defendant knew about and acquiesced in the constitutionally defective 19 conduct as part of a common plan with those whose conduct constituted the violation, or 20 (2) the defendant set in motion a series of acts by others which the defendant knew or 21 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” 22 Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2022). 23 The motion is GRANTED concerning the claims against Sullenger, which are 24 DISMISSED. As defendants point out, Foster does not allege that Sullenger entered his 25 cell or participated in the beating or stabbings. Instead, he opened the door as instructed: 26 “C.O. Sullenger opened the cell door.” (FAC, Dkt. No. 10 at 5.) Nothing in the amended 27 complaint shows that Sullenger knew of or acquiesced in the conduct as part of a common 1 cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Because the claims against Sullenger have 2 been dismissed, it is unnecessary for me to consider defendants’ request to determine 3 whether he is entitled to qualified immunity. 4 The motion is DENIED concerning the claims against Puente. Though Puente did 5 not participate in the beatings or stabbings, he ordered that Foster’s cell door be opened. 6 His alleged statement that “We’re just going to say that the batteries were dead in the 7 camera” raises questions about his involvement that cannot be addressed through a Rule 8 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 9 II. Injunctive Relief 10 Foster’s request for injunctive relief is DENIED as moot. He has been transferred 11 to another prison. Accordingly, I need not consider at this time defendants’ contentions 12 that the injunction request is unspecific regarding the relief sought and that it does not pass 13 the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s “need-narrowness-intrusive” test. See Armstrong v. 14 Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Prison Litigation Reform Act 15 provides that courts ‘shall not grant or approve any prospective relief [with respect to 16 prison conditions] unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no 17 further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive 18 means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.’”) 19 CONCLUSION 20 Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED regarding the claims against Sullenger 21 and is DENIED regarding the claims against Puente. (Dkt. No. 22.) The claims against 22 Sullenger are DISMISSED. The motion also is GRANTED regarding Foster’s request for 23 injunctive relief, which is DENIED. 24 On or before November 1, 2023, defendants shall file a motion for summary 25 judgment, or a notice regarding such a motion. Foster’s opposition to defendants’ 26 summary judgment motion shall be filed within 45 days after the motion is filed. 27 Defendants’ reply to the opposition shall be filed within 15 days after the opposition is 1 || brief is due. 2 The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions. The Clerk also shall TERMINATE 3 || Sullenger as a defendant in this action. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. . 5 || Dated: August 17, 2023 \f CE ® 6 ILLIAM H. ORRICK 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 qa 12 © 15 16 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28