Brooke v. Grand Hyatt SF LLC ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 THERESA BROOKE, Case No. 19-cv-07630-MMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS AND DECLARE PLAINTIFF VEXATIOUS LITIGANT; 10 GRAND HYATT SF LLC, DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant. 11 12 13 Before the Court is defendant Grand Hyatt SF LLC's "Motion to Dismiss Complaint 14 and Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant," filed March 3, 2020. Plaintiff Theresa Brooke 15 has filed opposition,1 to which defendant has replied. Having read and considered the 16 parties' respective written submissions, the Court rules as follows.2 17 In her complaint, plaintiff alleges she "went online to [d]efendant's website to rent 18 rooms," that she "wanted to rent [d]efendant's Executive Suite or Presidential Suite," but 19 that she "did not reserve the room" as neither suite is "ADA accessible." (See Compl. 20 ¶ 10.) Based on said allegations, plaintiff asserts a claim under the Americans With 21 Disabilities Act ("ADA"), as well as a state law claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 22 A. Dismissal of Complaint 23 Defendant seeks dismissal of both claims asserted in the complaint. 24 25 1Plaintiff's "opposition" consists of a statement that, rather than file an opposition in this action, she has incorporated by reference her opposition to a motion to dismiss filed 26 in another case, specifically, Brooke v. IA Lodging Santa Clara LLC, Case No. 19-7558 NC. 27 1 1. ADA Claim 2 Defendant argues plaintiff's ADA claim is subject to dismissal for lack of standing 3 and for failure to state a claim. As set forth below, the Court finds the ADA claim is 4 subject to dismissal on both of those grounds. 5 First, as to standing, an ADA claim is subject to dismissal at the pleading stage 6 where the plaintiff does not allege what "barriers" exist at the defendant's place of 7 business and "how his disability was affected by them." See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports 8 (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (directing district court to dismiss complaint 9 for lack of standing, where plaintiff alleged he "encountered architectural barriers" at 10 defendant's store but "never allege[d] what those barriers were"). Here, although plaintiff 11 alleges that neither of the two suites she sought to reserve is "ADA accessible" (see 12 Compl. ¶ 10) and that each has a "barrier" or "barriers" (see Compl. ¶ 15), plaintiff fails to 13 allege any facts to support her conclusory statements, i.e., she has not alleged "what 14 those barriers were," let alone how her "disability was affected by them." See Chapman, 15 631 F.3d at 954. 16 Second, even assuming, arguendo, defendant's Presidential Suite and Executive 17 Suite are in some manner inaccessible, the ADA does not require a hotel "to offer an 18 accessible and non-accessible version of the same room type," such as "a Presidential 19 Suite"; rather, a hotel must "dispers[e]" accessible rooms "among the various classes of 20 guests rooms" it offers. See Brooke v. Rihh LP, 2020 WL 788889, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 21 February 18, 2020). Put another way, a hotel must offer "comparable, not identical, 22 choices for guests with accessibility needs." See id. Consequently, plaintiff's ADA claim 23 is subject to dismissal, as plaintiff fails to allege facts to support a finding that defendant's 24 other suites, none of which she asserts are inaccessible, are not "comparable" to the 25 suites she contends are inaccessible. See id. 26 Accordingly, plaintiff's ADA claim will be dismissed, with leave to amend to cure 27 the deficiencies identified above. 1 2. Unruh Civil Rights Act Claim 2 The Court's jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claim is supplemental in nature. 3 (See Compl. ¶ 5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367).) 4 Where, as here, the district court will "dismiss all claims over which it has original 5 jurisdiction," the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 6 remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In this instance, as the case 7 remains at the pleading stage, and there are no apparent considerations weighing in 8 favor of retaining jurisdiction over the state law claim, the Court finds it appropriate to 9 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to said claim. 10 Accordingly, plaintiff's state law claim will be dismissed, without prejudice to filing 11 in state court, or, in the event plaintiff amends her ADA claim, to realleging it in the instant 12 action.3 13 B. Vexatious Litigant 14 Defendant argues plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and should be subject to a pre- 15 filing order limiting her ability to file in the future any complaint asserting ADA claims. 16 (See Def.'s Mot. at 15:20-22.) In support thereof, defendant notes plaintiff has filed in the 17 past four and a half years hundreds of actions alleging ADA claims (see Def.'s Req. for 18 Judicial Notice Ex. 17), including, in this District, sixteen recently filed actions against 19 other hotels (see id. Exs. 1-16).4 20 Before a district court may issue an order finding a litigant to be vexatious and 21 imposing pre-filing restrictions, (1) "the litigant must be given notice and a chance to be 22 heard," (2) "the district court must compile an adequate record for review," (3) "the district 23 court must make substantive findings about the frivolous or harassing nature of the 24 plaintiff's litigation," and (4) "the vexatious litigant order must be narrowly tailored to 25 3Should plaintiff elect to amend her ADA claim, she may also amend her state law 26 claim. 27 4Defendant has provided a copy of the complaint filed in each of those sixteen 1 closely fit the specific vice encountered." See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 2 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 3 Here, the record presently before the Court is insufficient to support a vexatious 4 || litigant order. The Court has reviewed the dockets of the sixteen cases plaintiff recently 5 || filed in this District, and notes that none has been resolved on its merits; although some 6 || have been dismissed, no finding of frivolousness or harassment was made in connection 7 || with any such dismissal.* Further, the Court has not been provided with any documents 8 || pertaining to the other cases plaintiff has filed. Lastly, although the Court will dismiss the 9 instant action, the Court, as noted, will afford plaintiff leave to amend, and, consequently, 10 || itis, at best, premature to determine at this time whether the instant action is frivolous or 11 harassing. 12 Accordingly, defendant's request for an order finding plaintiff a vexatious litigant 13 || will be denied. © CONCLUSION O 8 15 For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion is hereby GRANTED in part and QO 16 || DENIED in part, as follows: Cc 17 1. To the extent the motion seeks dismissal of the complaint, the motion is 18 || GRANTED, and the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Any First Amended 19 |) Complaint shall be filed no later than May 22, 2020. 20 2. To the extent the motion seeks an order finding plaintiff a vexatious litigant, the 21 motion is DENIED. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: April 30, 2020 . MAXINE M. CHESNEY 24 United States District Judge 25 26 Half of the sixteen cases have been voluntarily dismissed, five unilaterally by plaintiff and three by stipulation; one case was dismissed by the district court for failure to prosecute after plaintiff did not appear at two case management conferences. The Court 27 has no information as to the circumstances underlying the voluntary dismissals, and the 2g || other seven cases remain pending.