Daria v. Sapient Corp ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 HALEY DARIA, 11 Plaintiff, No. C 21–02712 WHA 12 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION 13 SAPIENT CORP., et al., TO DISMISS AND GRANTING MOTION FOR A PREFILING 14 Defendants. ORDER 15 16 In multiple pro se lawsuits, plaintiff Haley Daria has litigiously attacked a corporation, its 17 2007 merger, and its officers and related individuals — and even some unrelated individuals 18 — since 1999. Defendants Sapient Corporation (as acquirer of World Wide Web Associates, 19 LLC), Rachel Adamski, Robin DeShayes, Robert G. Klein, Rancho San Roque, David La Fitte, 20 and Mack Staton move to dismiss the most recent complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 21 (6). The same defendants, minus Mack Staton, move to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant 22 and for imposition of a prefiling order (Dkt. Nos. 40, 42, 44, 56, 57, 58). 23 This is the seventh in a long line of failed litigation attempts related to and based on Ms. 24 Daria’s interest in common stock shares of World Wide Web Associates, Inc., a company that 25 has gone through a number of name changes and whose intellectual property rights Sapient 26 now owns. A comprehensive record of Ms. Daria’s litigation history can be found in Daria v. 27 Sapient, Inc., 2018 WL 1367322 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 1 To briefly summarize again, Ms. Daria initially filed claims against Sapient’s 2 predecessors and officers in state court in 1999. That action led to a settlement where she 3 received a portion of the company’s total common stock (less than 1%). She had a second 4 settlement opportunity, this time outside of court, in 2007, when a merger occurred and now- 5 deceased Michael Klein purchased 100% of Web Associates’s stock, Ms. Daria’s included. 6 Ms. Daria admits she received $50,000 (which she kept and spent) as a result of the 2007 7 settlement but now contends that she would have received it anyway as a shareholder. The 8 language of the 2007 settlement, however, provided broad terms of release, indicating that 9 Daria would “fully, finally and forever” settle all disputes, known or unknown, with “Web 10 Associates . . . and each of their past or present and future officers, directors, employees, 11 insurers, agents, attorneys, representatives, partners, members, owners, predecessors and 12 successors-in-interest” (Dkt. Nos. 40 at 2–3; 40-2 at 198–99). 13 Unhappy with the events surrounding the 2007 settlement, Ms. Daria filed lawsuits based 14 on that settlement in 2010 (dismissed, dismissal affirmed by California’s Second Appellate 15 District, petition for review denied by the California Supreme Court), 2013 (dismissed), and 16 2015 (dismissed and plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant). She filed complaints in the 17 Northern District in 2015 (before Magistrate Judge Donna Ryu, dismissed), 2017 (before the 18 undersigned, dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, with a vexatious litigant 19 warning; dismissal affirmed by our court of appeals; en banc rehearing denied), and in 2021, 20 again, all rooted in the events surrounding the 2007 merger and settlement. 21 Concerning the 2007 settlement, Ms. Daria has asserted duress, coercion, fraud, bait-and- 22 switch tactics, and now adds allegations of an enterprise of individuals that engaged in RICO 23 violations to get her to sign a document — not necessarily the four-page release entered into 24 the record as the 2007 settlement, but, allegedly, some other phony contract that neither side 25 can produce. At oral argument (in person), Ms. Daria insisted that she voided this document 26 by yelling (back in 2007) “Total duress!” and that she signed a document, allegedly “under 27 coercion” and “physically threatened with legal lawsuits.” She could not produce such a copy 1 Ms. Daria makes clear that she went to the law firm to sign documents, that she did in 2 fact physically sign the documents, and that she received $50,000 and spent it. 3 In light of these facts, this order begins with the motion to dismiss and concludes that the 4 complaint does not state a claim for relief. In an attempt to reach the gravamen of the 5 complaint, this order notes that RICO claims have been added to the list of other familiar 6 claims in an effort to circumvent this Court’s 2018 dismissal for lack of subject-matter 7 jurisdiction. Despite the presence of a federal ingredient, the complaint still fails. It does not 8 come close to the standards set out in the general rules of federal pleading under Rule 8(a), the 9 heightened standard for fraud in Rule 9(b), and the well-established precedent of Bell Atlantic 10 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 11 Furthermore, the face page of the complaint has an incomprehensible collection of words 12 and phrases such as “CIVIL R.I.C.O. EXTORTION;CASH-INTELL PROPERTIES,” 13 “FRAUD ON COURT,” and “INJUNCTIVE RELIEF;22K SHRS@BENCH.” While 14 these allegations incorporate common legal terms such as “Fraud,” “RICO,” and “Injunctive 15 relief,” the complaint’s presentation of these allegations has flabbergasted defendants — so 16 much so that they claim difficulty in constructing their defense. One set of defendants believes 17 the complaint raises eight claims; another believes it raises twelve (Compl. at 1, bold in the 18 original; Dkt. Nos. 40 at 11–12; 56 at 5). 19 The substance of the complaint proves just as difficult and revisits the “phony overall” 20 merger: 21 The enterprise, run by an elaborate “quad-triangulation” amongst the Plaintiff as a trained, registered with the CA State Board of 22 Accountancy as a C.P.A. candidate, potential auditor to benefit the founders and their families at the time, failed strictly by material 23 fabricated evidence by the group utilizing the Courts to gain orders, exclusive of any fact trying, as against all founders. 24 25 (Compl. at 11–12). This sentence epitomizes a majority of the complaint — perplexing, 26 rambling on for page after page of extravagant accusations, non sequiturs, and random 27 citations to case law. This case is barred by res judicata. Ms. Daria has repeatedly sued over 1 should have taken appeals. When she did appeal, she did not win. She does not get to start 2 over merely because she can now think of a new claim for relief. 3 * * * 4 With respect to a prefiling order, when Ms. Daria last argued in our federal court, she 5 gave her word to the undersigned that she would not bring another suit related to her previous 6 actions: 7 The Court: . . . [I]f I throw you out of court here, do I have your word that you will never come to the federal court again on suing 8 — 9 Plaintiff: I’ve never come to federal court — 10 The Court: Wait. Wait. Wait. 11 Plaintiff: Okay. 12 The Court: Because if you don’t, then I have to reach the — I have to go to the vexatious point. 13 Plaintiff: Yes, you have my word. You have my word . . . . 14 15 (Hearing Tr. at 29:17–25, 17-cv-05453 WHA Dkt. No. 100). Contrary to her statement (“I’ve 16 never come to federal court”), Ms. Daria actually had come to federal court before, in 2015 17 when Magistrate Judge Donna Ryu dismissed her suit. Now Ms. Daria has returned. Despite 18 her promise and despite the terms of her 2007 settlement, she sues a majority of familiar faces, 19 and adds a few newcomers as well, including Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye of the 20 California Supreme Court (Compl. at 64). 21 Consequently, this order makes good on the undersigned’s statement to consider a 22 prefiling motion should plaintiff break her own “promise to refrain from filing further 23 lawsuits.” Daria, 2018 WL 1367322 at *1. Prior to imposing a prefiling order, our court of 24 appeals requires (1) notice, (2) an adequate record for review, (3) substantive findings of 25 frivolousness, and (4) a narrowly-catered order. See De Long v. Hennessy, 912 F.2d 1144, 26 1147–48 (9th Cir. 1990). Before going through the required analysis, this order notes that Ms. 27 Daria has agreed she “has no problem filing any item heretofore as ‘provisional’ or only 1 allowed after approval by this Bench to streamline the Courts time on these matters” (Dkt. No. 2 65 at 6). 3 First, due process requires notice so that the litigant has an opportunity to oppose the 4 motion and eventual prefiling decision before the rendering of judgment. Here, Ms. Daria 5 received notice when defendants moved for a prefiling order. She had the opportunity to file 6 an opposition and exceeded the minimum procedural due process due to her by arguing her 7 case at a hearing. See Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 8 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the first element has been satisfied (Dkt. Nos. 42, 52, 76). 9 Second, the district court must create a record for review which, at least, shows in some 10 manner that the litigant’s activities were numerous or abusive. To reiterate, prior to this 11 lawsuit Daria filed four lawsuits in state court (in 1999, 2010, 2013, and 2015) and two in 12 federal court (in 2015 and 2017), all arising out of the same series of events. 13 Third, the district court must make substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing 14 nature of the litigant’s actions. Insistent that she has never had her day in court despite this 15 saga of litigation attempts, Ms. Daria continues to harass defendants and abuse the legal 16 system’s time and resources. Her suits have been duplicative and perennial: almost the same 17 group of defendants find themselves dragged into court every few years based on the same 18 disjointed claims derived from the previously-litigated 2007 settlement. None of these claims 19 have succeeded before. Yet, Ms. Daria continues to file lawsuits. 20 Fourth, the prefiling order must be narrowly tailored to closely fit the specific abuse 21 encountered. Here, this order will restrict its scope to restrain Ms. Daria from “reopen[ing] 22 litigation based on the facts and issues decided in” previous lawsuits brought against the same 23 or nearly the same group of defendants. Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 24 F.2d 1515, 1526 (9th Cir. 1986). 25 Ms. Daria has had full and fair opportunity to litigate her grievance. She has gone up on 26 appeal twice: once in state court, and once in federal. Enough is enough. If she decides to 27 bring a future action, whether pro se or represented by counsel, she must satisfy the prefiling 1 For the reasons above, this order dismisses the civil action and requires that future 2 lawsuits against any of these defendants or involving the same transaction by Ms. Daria first be 3 screened in accordance with this prefiling order. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 4 The motion for a prefiling order is also GRANTED. 5 The Clerk of the Court is instructed not to automatically accept any further filings from 6 plaintiff, whether via counsel or herself, if they are: 7 (1) brought against Sapient Corporation, as acquirer of intellectual properties of Word 8 Wide Web Associates, any of its current or former parents, subsidiaries, or affiliate 9 companies, and any of its current or former officers, directors, or employees, or 10 spouses of any of its current or former officers, directors, or employees; 11 (2) brought against any of the attorneys or law firms that formerly or presently represent 12 any of the parties in this or in past litigation; or 5 13 (3) brought against defendants and other parties named in this action and other actions 14 related to this action brought in federal court; and 3 15 (4) relate to World Wide Web Associates’ acquisition and merger; 16 (5) relate to the 2000 and 2007 settlements; 3 17 (6) arise from Daria’s interest in World Wide Web Associates’ acquisition and merger, 18 and now Sapient Corporation’s position as the acquirer of World Wide Web 19 Associates; 20 (7) arise from or relate to any lawsuit concerning such interests; or 21 (8) seek to relitigate issues plaintiff has previously raised in such a lawsuit. 22 33 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 95 Dated: August 4, 2021 26 {A= ALSUP 07 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28