Daniels v. Aponte ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JEREMY DANIELS, Case No. 21-cv-03794-RMI 8 Plaintiff, ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 9 v. AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE THE CASE 10 STEVEN APONTE, et al., Defendants. 11 12 13 Plaintiff, a detainee proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 14 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and Plaintiff has filed an 15 amended complaint. 16 DISCUSSION 17 Standard of Review 18 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 19 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 20 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 21 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 22 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1), (2). Further, 23 it should be noted that pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. 24 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 27 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 1 complaint does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the 2 grounds of entitlement to relief requires more than mere labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 3 recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient; instead, the factual allegations must 4 be enough to raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 5 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, a complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim 6 to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court has recently explained this 7 standard as such: “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 8 be supported by factual allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a 9 court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 10 entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 12 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 13 alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 14 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 15 Legal Claims 16 Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly arrested and subject to excessive force. An 17 allegation of the use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer in effectuating an arrest states 18 a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 19 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see also 20 Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2018) (pro se allegations that police 21 officers “beat the crap out of” plaintiff and caused him severe injury enough to support a legally 22 cognizable claim under § 1983). Excessive force claims which arise in the context of an arrest or 23 investigatory stop of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 24 standard. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95. 25 A claim of unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth 26 Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures if the complaint alleges that 27 the arrest was without probable cause or other justification. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555- 1 probable cause is essential element of a § 1983 false arrest claim). Further, a claim of unlawful 2 detention or imprisonment is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth 3 Amendment’s guarantee of due process if the arrest was without probable cause or other 4 justification and the defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff was entitled to release. 5 See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-145 (1979); Lee v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 6 684-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff stated due process claim where police allegedly arrested 7 plaintiff’s son without probable cause, detained him without verifying that he was the person for 8 whom police had an arrest warrant, despite his obvious mental incapacity, and detained him for 9 one day before an extradition hearing, which led to his incarceration in another state for two 10 years); cf. Gant v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2014) (because 11 plaintiff did not inform defendants of his mistaken identity and because he received a prompt 12 hearing, his due process claim based on unlawful post-arrest detention failed). 13 In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 14 or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 15 invalid under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 16 direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 17 such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 18 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). Consequently, such a claim for damages, that 19 is, one bearing such a relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated, is 20 not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. 21 In a different context, in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007), the Court held that the 22 “Heck rule for deferred accrual [of the statute of limitations] is called into play only when there 23 exists ‘a conviction or sentence that has not been . . . invalidated,’ that is to say, an ‘outstanding 24 criminal judgment.’” Id. at 391-93 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87). The Heck rule delays 25 accrual of the limitations period only if there is an existing conviction on the date the statute of 26 limitations begins to run, which in the case of wrongful arrest or wrongful imprisonment claims is 27 when the plaintiff’s confinement is no longer without legal process, but rather becomes a 1 arraigned on charges. Id. at 389-90. Although the Court was only considering when the statute of 2 || limitations began running on a false arrest or false imprisonment claim, the discussion quoted 3 suggests that Heck does not apply if there is no extant conviction — for instance, if a plaintiff has 4 || only been arrested or charged. 5 Accordingly, if a plaintiff files a § 1983 false arrest claim before he or she is convicted, or 6 || files any other claim related to rulings that likely will be made in a pending or anticipated criminal 7 trial, it is within the power of the district court, and accords with common practice, to stay the civil 8 action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. /d. at 393-94. If the 9 || plaintiff is thereafter convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck 10 requires dismissal; otherwise, the case may proceed. Id. at 394. 11 The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information. 12 || The Court noted that Plaintiff was in jail and if he was in custody related to this arrest, he could 5 13 not obtain money damages unless the charges were dropped, or the conviction expunged. If the 14 || prosecution was ongoing, the case must be stayed until the criminal case concluded. In the 3 15 amended complaint Plaintiff clarifies that he is currently being prosecuted for this incident and he 16 requests a stay. CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, this action is STAYED. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the 19 date on which he is acquitted, convicted, or charges are dismissed, Plaintiff must file a motion to 20 || lift the stay. If Plaintiff is convicted and if the claim would impugn that conviction, the action will 21 be dismissed; otherwise, his claim may then proceed. In light of the stay, Plaintiff should not file 22 any more documents in this action until the criminal proceedings have concluded. The Clerk shall 23 || ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE the case. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: August 18, 2021 26 Ml Z 27 28 ROBERT M. ILLMAN United States Magistrate Judge