M.T. v. Concesionaria Vuela Compania de Aviacion SAPI de CV ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 M.T., Case No. 22-cv-03901-HSG 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING: (1) MOTION TO APPROVE MINOR’S COMPROMISE 9 v. AND, (2) MOTION TO SEAL 10 CONCESIONARIA VUELA COMPANIA Re: Dkt. Nos. 36, 38 DE AVIACION SAPI DE CV, 11 Defendant. 12 13 Pending before the Court are the plaintiff’s unopposed (1) motion for approval of minor’s 14 compromise, see Dkt. No. 36 (“Mot.”); and (2) administrative motion to file under seal, see Dkt. 15 No. 38. The Court GRANTS the motion for approval of the minor’s compromise and GRANTS 16 the administrative motion to file under seal. 17 I. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF COMPROMISE 18 A. Legal Standard 19 “District courts have a special duty, derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), to 20 safeguard the interests of litigants who are minors.” Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181 21 (9th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (providing that district court “must appoint a guardian ad 22 litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is 23 unrepresented in an action”). When there is a proposed settlement in a suit involving a minor 24 plaintiff, this “special duty requires a district court to ‘conduct its own inquiry to determine 25 whether the settlement serves the best interests of the minor.’” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181, 26 (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1978)). As part of this inquiry, the 27 “court must independently investigate and evaluate any compromise or settlement of a minor’s 1 claims to assure itself that the minor’s interests are protected, even if the settlement has been 2 recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent or guardian ad litem.” Salmeron v. United 3 States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983). The district court must review “whether the net 4 amount distributed to each minor plaintiff in the settlement is fair and reasonable, in light of the 5 facts of the case, the minor’s specific claim, and recovery in similar cases.” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 6 1182. But the court must disregard the “proportion of the total settlement value designated for 7 adult co-plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ counsel” because the court has “no special duty to safeguard” their 8 interests. Id. 9 B. Discussion 10 Based on its review of the plaintiff’s submissions, the Court finds that the proposed 11 settlement is fair and reasonable and serves the best interests of the minor. The settlement provides 12 certain recovery, as opposed to the uncertainty and delays associated with a possible unfavorable 13 result in a case where liability is contested. The Court finds the settlement particularly fair and 14 reasonable given the substantial difficulties and uncertainties inherent in litigating these claims, as 15 well as the considerable efforts that went into settlement negotiations. For example, Defendant had 16 a colorable factual argument that plaintiff’s mother caused the accident to occur, or was at least 17 contributorily at fault, which could have resulted in a defense verdict at trial, or reduced the 18 judgment obtained at trial. Settling with the Defendant now and receiving the payment offered by 19 Defendant provides the minor child with funds to compensate him for his loss. 20 The Court therefore GRANTS approval of the minor’s compromise submitted by the 21 parties and the distribution of the settlement amount owed to the minor Plaintiff into a single 22 premium deferred annuity with Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company. The Court also 23 finds the request for approval of attorney’s fees and costs to be fair and reasonable in light of the 24 facts of this case, and approves the distribution of attorney’s fees as set forth in the motion to 25 approve minor’s compromise. 26 II. MOTION TO SEAL 27 A. Legal Standard 1 documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana 2 v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from 3 the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 4 records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in 5 favor of access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotation omitted). 6 To overcome this strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record 7 attached to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual 8 findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, 9 such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” 10 Id. at 1178–79 (quotation omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the 11 public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might 12 have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, 13 promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 14 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). However, documents 15 attached to non-dispositive motions are not subject to the same strong presumption of 16 access. See id. Because such records “are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the 17 underlying cause of action,” parties moving to seal must meet the lower “good cause” standard 18 of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Id. at 1179–80 (quotations omitted). This requires only a 19 “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is 20 disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 21 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 22 examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 23 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted). 24 B. Discussion 25 Because approval of the compromise of the action will terminate this suit, the Court will 26 apply the “compelling reasons” standard to the parties’ administrative motion to file under seal. 27 See Doe v. Mt. Diablo Unified Sch. Dist., No. 14-CV-02167-HSG, 2015 WL 5438951, at *2 (N.D. 1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (“[A] motion seeking the Court’s preliminary approval of the settlement 2 || of the case may be effectively dispositive. While the Court has not identified any authority 3 || discussing the appropriate standard for a motion of this type, the Court concludes that the 4 ‘compelling reasons’ standard is the appropriate standard.”). 5 The parties have entered into a confidential settlement agreement and seek to seal limited 6 || information related to the minor Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 38 at pp. 2-3. As the plaintiff notes, “If 7 sealing is denied, the information ...will be available to any member of the public, who could 8 potentially use it against the minor M.T. by exploiting his personal financial information and 9 || birthdate.” Jd. at 2. 10 The Court agrees, and finds that the information in the motion to seal and supporting 11 documents meets the compelling reasons standard and should thus be shielded from public 12 || disclosure. Plaintiff has made a narrowly tailored request and articulated a compelling reason to 5 13 seal each category of information identified. The redactions are modest, such that any interested 14 || observer would be able to understand these proceedings. The motion to seal identifies “a 3 15 compelling reason to seal [with] tailored redactions of only the information to which that a 16 || compelling reason applies.” Doe, 2015 WL 5438951, at *2. 3 17 || Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to seal is GRANTED. 18 || I. TL CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS the motion for approval of the 20 || compromise of the action and GRANTS the administrative motion to file under seal. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 6/13/2023 24 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. United States District Judge 26 27 28