American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Department of Justice ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Case No. 19-cv-00290-EMC FOUNDATION, et al., 8 Plaintiffs, AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN 9 PART AND DENYING IN PART v. CROSS-MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL 10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., 11 Docket Nos. 98, 108 Defendants. 12 13 14 Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and American Civil Liberties Union 15 Foundation of Northern California filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 16 (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to obtain records from seven federal agencies regarding those agencies’ 17 surveillance and monitoring of persons through social media. See Docket No. 1. (“Compl.”). 18 After the agencies allegedly failed to respond as FOIA requires, Plaintiffs filed this action to 19 compel the agencies to produce records responsive to Plaintiffs’ requests. Id. 20 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect 21 to the adequacy of the searches and withholdings of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 22 (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services 23 (USCIS) (collectively, “Defendants”).1 See Docket No. 98 (“Defs.’ Mot.”). Also pending before 24 the Court is Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment. See Docket No. 108 (“Pls.’ 25 Mot.”). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs 26 27 1 Plaintiffs also seek records from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of 1 and Defendants’ motions. 2 I. BACKGROUND 3 A. Factual Background 4 Plaintiffs contend Defendants “are taking steps to monitor social media users and their 5 speech, activities, and associations” and the agencies are pursuing the ability to engage in 6 “programmatic and sustained tracking of U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike.” Compl. Plaintiffs 7 also allege Defendants have specifically “ramped up the monitoring and retention of immigrants’ 8 and visa applicants’ social media information, including for the purpose of conducting what the 9 Trump administration has called ‘extreme vetting’ or ‘visa lifecycle vetting.’” Id. 10 B. Procedural Background 11 On May 24, 2018, Plaintiffs submitted identical FOIA requests to Defendants “for records 12 pertaining to social media surveillance, including the monitoring and retention of immigrants’ and 13 visa applicants’ social media information for the purpose of conducting ‘extreme vetting.’” See 14 Docket No. 98-6 (White Decl., Ex A (“FOIA Requests”)) at 2. Plaintiffs sought five categories of 15 records: 16 (1) social media surveillance-related policies and guidance; 17 (2) records concerning the purchase or acquisition of social media surveillance technologies; 18 (3) communications to or from private businesses concerning social 19 media surveillance products; 20 (4) communications to or from social media platforms concerning surveillance of social media content; and 21 (5) records concerning the use or incorporation of social media 22 content within systems or programs that make use of algorithms, machine-learning processes, or predictive analytics applications. 23 24 Id. at 6–7. After Defendants allegedly failed to produce responsive documents, Plaintiffs 25 exhausted their administrative remedies and filed this lawsuit seeking to compel production on 26 January 17, 2019. See Compl. 27 On September 6, 2019, Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment with 1 see Docket No. 39 (“FBI Order”). 2 Eventually the agencies produced some records. CBP produced 358 pages of records in 3 five tranches between June and October of 2019, and it withheld four pages entirely. Defs.’ Mot. 4 at 3. ICE produced records between May and August of 2019, with a supplemental production in 5 February 2020, for a total of 2,169 pages. Id. USCIS produced 2,645 pages of records in July and 6 August 2019, and April 2020. Id. It produced reprocessed versions of these records in October 7 2020. Id. Thereafter and in preparation for summary judgment, Defendants produced draft 8 Vaughn2 indices and Plaintiffs narrowed the redactions and withholdings challenged by their 9 cross-motion. Pls.’ Mot. at 6. 10 On January 28, 2021, Defendants filed their motion for partial summary judgment with 11 respect to CBP, ICE, and USCIS. See Defs.’ Mot. On March 25, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their cross- 12 motion for partial summary judgment. See Pls.’ MSJ. 13 During oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court ordered the 14 Defendants to submit unredacted versions of all the documents at issue for in camera review. See 15 Docket No. 137. Defendants complied shortly thereafter. After reviewing the documents, the 16 Court determined that it needed clarification on Defendants’ position regarding the applicability of 17 the deliberative process privilege under FOIA Exemption 5. See Docket No. 139. Accordingly, 18 on September 17, 2021, the Court conducted an ex parte, in camera hearing with Defendants’ 19 counsel to go over all the redactions related to the deliberative process privilege so that 20 Defendants could explain with specificity how they contend that privilege applies to each 21 redaction. The transcript of this hearing was filed under seal such that only Defendants’ counsel 22 and the Court have access to it. 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 2 A “‘Vaughn index’ identifies each document withheld and the FOIA exemption claimed and explains how disclosure would damage the interests protected by the claimed exemption.” Am. 27 Civ. Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation (“ACLU v. FBI”), 881 F.3d 776, 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a “court shall grant summary judgment 3 [to a moving party] if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 4 the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is 5 genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. 6 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). “The mere existence of a 7 scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 8 reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Id. at 252. At the summary judgment stage, evidence 9 must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences 10 are to be drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. See id. at 255.3 11 FOIA is animated by “the fundamental principle of public access to Government 12 documents.” John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989). It is “broadly 13 conceived,” and “disclosure, not secrecy” is its dominant objective. Id. at 151–52. At the same 14 time, Congress has exempted some information “under clearly delineated statutory language.” Id. 15 at 152 (citing Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–61 (1976)). These exemptions are 16 “limited” and “must be narrowly construed.” Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. “Furthermore, ‘the burden is 17 on the agency to sustain its action.’” John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 18 552(a)(4)(B)). In other words, “[g]iven FOIA’s overarching purpose, ‘the strong presumption in 19 favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested 20 documents.’” Civil Beat Law Ctr. for the Pub. Int., Inc. v. Centers for Disease Control & 21 Prevention, 929 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 22 173 (1991)). 23 The Ninth Circuit has observed that “[g]enerally, FOIA cases should be handled on 24 motions for summary judgment.” Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) 25 3 Evidence may be presented in a form that is not admissible at trial so long as it could ultimately 26 be capable of being put in admissible form. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be 27 admissible in evidence”); Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 1 (quoting Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir.1993)); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 2 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Most FOIA cases are resolved by 3 the district court on summary judgment.”). Given the limited nature of discovery typically 4 permitted in FOIA cases, district courts routinely “enter summary judgment on the basis of agency 5 affidavits.” Lane, 523 F.3d at 1134. Reliance on government affidavits is permissible “so long as 6 the affiants are knowledgeable about the information sought and the affidavits are detailed enough 7 to allow the court to make an independent assessment of the government’s claim.” Id. at 1135–36 8 (quoting Lion Raisins, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also 9 Hamdan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 772 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e also give considerable 10 deference to agency affidavits made in apparent good faith where the affidavits reasonably 11 describe the justifications for nondisclosure and show that the content withheld falls within one of 12 FOIA’s exemptions.”). “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is 13 sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Wolf v. C.I.A., 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 14 2007). In order to satisfy this burden, government declarations in support of withholding “must 15 describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the 16 information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemptions, and show that the 17 justifications are not controverted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of bad faith.” 18 Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 769. 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 This order will address, in turn, Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants’ redactions and 21 withholdings under Exemptions 7(E) and 5 are improper. 22 A. Exemption 7(E) 23 Exemption 7(E) protects from disclosure 24 “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement 25 records or information . . . would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or 26 would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 27 circumvention of the law.” 1 accomplishing a desired aim,” a “procedure” is “a particular way of doing or of going about the 2 accomplishment of something,” and a “guideline” is “an indication or outline of future policy or 3 conduct.” Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Hunan Rts. Project v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 626 F.3d 4 678, 682 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986)). The 5 statutory requirement that the government show disclosure “‘could reasonably be expected to risk 6 circumvention of the law’ applies only to guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 7 prosecutions, not to techniques and procedures.” Am. Civ. Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t 8 of Justice (“ACLU v. DOJ”), 880 F.3d 473, 491 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (citing Hamdan, 9 797 F.3d at 778 and Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Human Rts. Proj., 626 F.3d at 681). 10 “[T]echniques and procedures” refers to “how law enforcement officials go about 11 investigating a crime.” Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Hunan Rts. Project, 626 F.3d at 682. The 12 Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that “Exemption 7(E) only exempts investigative techniques not 13 generally known to the public.” ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d at 491 (quoting Rosenfeld v. U.S. Dep’t 14 of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 1995). Moreover, if a record discusses “the application of [a 15 publicly known technique] to . . . particular facts,” the document is not exempt under 7(E); if it 16 “describes a ‘specific means . . . rather than an application’ of deploying a particular investigative 17 technique, the record is exempt.” Id. (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777–78). Likewise, records 18 that provide a “‘detailed, technical analysis of the techniques and procedures used to conduct law 19 enforcement investigations’ may properly be withheld under Exemption 7(E).” Id. (quoting 20 Bowen v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 925 F.2d 1225, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 1991)). 21 Considering these standards, the Court reviewed the documents at issue in camera and 22 determined that Exemption 7(E) applies as follows: 23 1. CBP Documents 24 Document Application of Exemption 7(E) 25 Policy on Operational Use of Exemption 7(E) does not apply because the redacted portions 26 Social Media (the “Policy”) are simply procedures for obtaining authorization to use masked monitoring and undercover engagement. This 27 (CBP 125-136) information cannot reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. See ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d at 492 Document Application of Exemption 7(E) 1 obtaining location information” and “provid[ing] instructions 2 to investigators and prosecutors regarding how to lawfully obtain electronic location information . . . provide no 3 information that would assist criminals in conforming their behavior to evade detection or circumvent the law”). 4 CBP is instructed to re-produce the Policy without 5 redactions within fourteen (14) days of this order. 6 Information Issue Papers; CBP Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of these 7 Use of Social Media Papers; documents “describe a ‘specific means . . . of deploying a Social Media Briefing Papers particular investigative technique.” ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d 8 (collectively, the “Papers”) at 491 (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777–78). 9 (CBP 1-22) 10 Privacy Threshhold Analyses Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of these 11 (PTAs) documents “describe a ‘specific means . . . of deploying a particular investigative technique.” ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d 12 (CBP 23–39, 48–57, 149–60, at 491 (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777–78). 13 296–306, 337–48, 349–58) These documents also contain the names and descriptions of 14 “investigative techniques not generally known to the public.” Id. 15 Social Media Use Templates Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of these 16 (SMOUTs) documents refer to “investigative techniques not generally 17 known to the public.” ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d at 491. (CBP 161–69, 170–77, 178– 18 91) 19 Contract Documents Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of these documents refer to “investigative techniques not generally 20 (CBP 197-249) known to the public.” ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d at 491. 21 22 2. ICE Documents 23 Document Application of Exemption 7(E) 24 Visa Lifecycle Vetting Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of these Initiative (VLVI) documents “describe a ‘specific means . . . of deploying a 25 particular investigative technique.” ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d 26 (ICE 1680-81) at 491 (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777–78). 27 Open Source/Media Exploitation Document Application of Exemption 7(E) 1 (ICE 1812–13) 2 Counterterrorism and Criminal 3 Exploitation Unit Open Source/Social Media 4 Exploitation 5 (ICE 1818–26) 6 Email Communications Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of these 7 documents are a list of U.S. government oversees posts that (ICE 921, 1017) use the Visa Lifecycle Vetting Initiative (VLVI) to track non- 8 immigrant visitor’s social media. The Court concludes that this information is “a ‘specific means . . . of deploying a 9 particular investigative technique” that can be used to 10 circumvent law enforcement. ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d at 491 (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777–78). 11 Open Source Collection Tools Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of this 12 (PowerPoint presentation) document are a list of symbols ICE uses to identify specific 13 terrorist groups on social media. The Court concludes that (CBP 432–48) this information is “a ‘specific means . . . of deploying a 14 particular investigative technique” that can be used to circumvent law enforcement. ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d at 491 15 (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777–78). 16 3. USCIS Documents 17 18 Document Application of Exemption 7(E) 19 Guidance for Use of Social Exemption 7(E) applies because the redacted portions of these Media in Field Operations documents are a list of social-media-related questions asked to 20 Directorate Adjudications visa applicants under specific circumstances. The Court concludes that this information describes “a ‘specific means 21 (USCIS 1267–78) . . . of deploying a particular investigative technique” that can be used to circumvent law enforcement. ACLU v. DOJ, 880 22 Guidance for Use of Social F.3d at 491 (quoting Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 777–78). 23 Media in Syrian Refugee Adjudications by the USCIS’s 24 Refugee Affairs Division 25 (USCIS 2344 – 53) 26 Protecting the First Exemption 7(E) does apply to the redactions on USCIS 1888 27 Amendment in Social Media to USCIS 1906 because those pages “describe a ‘specific Research means . . . of deploying a particular investigative technique.” Document Application of Exemption 7(E) 1 777–78). 2 (USCIS 1888–1906) B. Exemption 5 3 Exemption 5 authorizes an agency to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency 4 memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in 5 litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). The Supreme Court has held that Exemption 5 6 encompasses records “normally privileged in the civil discovery context.” NLRB v. Sears, 7 Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975). “These include records that would be protected in 8 litigation by the attorney work-product, attorney-client, and deliberative process privileges.” 9 ACLU v. DOJ, 880 F.3d at 483 (quoting Sears, 421 U.S. at 150–54). 10 1. Deliberative Process Privilege 11 The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the deliberative process privilege “protects 12 from disclosure documents generated during an agency’s deliberations about a policy, as opposed 13 to documents that embody or explain a policy that the agency adopts.” U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. 14 v. Sierra Club, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 777, 783 (2021). More specifically, the deliberative process 15 privilege protects from disclosure “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and 16 deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are 17 formulated.” Id. (quoting Sears, 421 U.S. at 8–9). Conversely, the privilege “does not apply . . . 18 to documents that embody a final decision, because once a decision has been made, the 19 deliberations are done.” Id. The key distinction is between “predecisional, deliberative 20 documents”—which are covered by the privilege—and “documents reflecting a final agency 21 decision and the reasons supporting it”—which are not. Id. at 785–86 (citing Renegot. Bd. v. 22 Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 186, 95 (1975)). 23 “Documents are ‘predecisional’ if they were generated before the agency’s final decision 24 on the matter.” Id. at 786. Additionally, “[a] ‘predecisional’ document is one prepared in order to 25 assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, and may include recommendations, 26 draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the 27 1 Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 979 (9th Cir. 2009). 2 On the other hand, a document reflects a final agency decision and the reasons supporting 3 it if “it communicates a policy on which the agency has settled.” Id. Importantly, “[a] document 4 is not final solely because nothing else follows it” because during agency deliberations “some 5 ideas are discarded or simply languish.” Id. Instead, to determine if a document is final, Courts 6 must evaluate “whether the agency treats the document as its final view on the matter.” Id. If so, 7 the document will have “real operative effect” and will not be subject to the privilege because it 8 “reflects ‘the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process’ and not a ‘merely tentative’ 9 position.” Id. (first quoting Sears, 421 U.S. at 161; then quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 10 177–178 (1997)). On the other hand, the document is not subject to the privilege if it “leaves the 11 agency decisionmakers ‘free to change their minds.’” Id. (quoting Grumman, 421 U.S. at 189– 12 190). 13 Documents “are ‘deliberative’ if they were prepared to help the agency formulate its 14 position.” Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. at 786 (emphasis added). In other words, a document is 15 deliberative if it “is a part of the ‘deliberative process,’ if the disclosure of the materials would 16 expose an agency’s decision-making process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion 17 within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.” Lahr, 569 18 F.3d at 979–90. A document cannot be deliberative unless it is predecisional. Sierra Club, 141 S. 19 Ct. at 786. 20 The first step in the inquiry into whether materials are part of the deliberative process “is to 21 examine the context in which the materials are used.” Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of 22 Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Wolfe v. Department of Health & Human 23 Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (en banc)). Courts have recognized that “[t]o fall 24 within the deliberative process privilege, materials must bear on the formulation or exercise of 25 agency policy-oriented judgment.” Id. at 1435; Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 26 2008 WL 5000224, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The deliberative process privilege ‘does not protect a 27 document which is merely peripheral to actual policy formation; the record must bear on the 1 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1994)). The 2 D.C. Circuit further explained the importance of framing the deliberative process inquiry around 3 whether a document is related to the agency’s policy-oriented judgment to the purpose of 4 Exemption 5: 5 Homing in on, and sheltering material implicating officials' exercise of judgment about policy matters secures the internal agency “give- 6 and-take” Congress meant to protect when it enacted Exemption 5. Our decisions recognize that the process of selecting among 7 alternative policies can be delicate and audience-sensitive, susceptible to distortions and vulnerable to fudging when the 8 deliberators fear or expect public reaction. Inquiring whether the requested materials can reasonably be said to embody an agency's 9 policy-informed or -informing judgmental process therefore helps us answer the “key question” in these cases: whether disclosure would 10 tend to diminish candor within an agency. 11 Petroleum Info. Corp., 976 F.2d at 1435 (citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, “the 12 deliberative process privilege has been held to cover all ‘recommendations, draft documents, 13 proposals, suggestions and other subjective documents which reflect the personal opinions of the 14 writer rather than the policy of the agency,’ as well as documents which would ‘inaccurately 15 reflect or prematurely disclose the views of the agency.’” Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 16 861 F.2d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of 17 Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 18 Considering these standards, the Court reviewed the documents at issue in camera and 19 determined that the deliberative process privilege in Exemption 5 applies as follows: 20 a. CBP Documents 21 Document Application of Exemption 5 22 Privacy Threshold Analyses The deliberative process privilege applies to the redacted 23 (PTAs) portions of this document because they discuss CBP’s draft plans, policy recommendations, and pilot programs. 24 (CBP 23–39, 48–57, 149–60, 296–306, 337–48, 349–58) 25 Issue Papers The deliberative process privilege does not apply to the portions of CBP 2, 17 and 19 that list the acronyms of sub- 26 (CBP 1-22) agencies that reviewed the Social Media Working Group’s 27 draft Social Media Strategy. The redacted language identifies sub-agencies involved in the review of the draft strategy. The Document Application of Exemption 5 1 draft or the views of any of the sub-agencies (let alone “the 2 personal opinions” of any particular “writer,” see Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 861 F.2d at 1118). The fact that sub-agencies 3 were involved in reviewing the draft strategy cannot, at least in the absence of any explanation by the government, 4 “reasonably be said to embody [CBP’s] policy-informed or - informing judgmental process[.]” Petroleum Info. Corp., 976 5 F.2d at 1435 (quotation marks omitted). 6 The identity of participants in a discussion of draft policy may 7 be appropriately subject to the deliberative process privilege if disclosure of the fact of a participant’s involvement “would 8 tend to diminish candor within an agency.” Id. It is Defendants’ burden to make such a showing in order to assert 9 the deliberative process privilege under Exemption 5 and 10 overcome FOIA’s “strong presumption in favor of disclosure[.]” Civil Beat Law Ctr., 929 F.3d at 1084. 11 Defendants have not met their burden here. They provide no rationale for why the disclosure that sub-agencies within DHS 12 were involved in reviewing DHS’s draft policy for Social Media Strategy would chill honest discussion within the 13 agency. And the redacted materials are certainly not based 14 upon “personal opinions” of an agency official. National Wildlife Fed’n, 861 F.22d at 1118. 15 Defendants’ Vaughn Index asserts the deliberative process 16 privilege for these materials principally to protect 17 “[d]escriptions of analyses” and “[d]escriptions of content and status of a draft . . . report.” Docket No. 127-1. The 18 government does not justify why the fact of the participation of particular sub-agencies in the review of the draft policy is 19 privileged. Indeed, elsewhere in these same materials, Defendants disclose the existence of the DHS Social Media 20 Task Force, collaboration between the Task Force, CBP and 21 DHS Oversight bodies, and the creation of a CBP-wide working group to assess social media strategy. CBP 2-3, 16- 22 17. Defendants fail to explain why the nature of the redacted information is different from the information Defendants 23 already disclosed about sub-agency involvement in the crafting of the Social Media Strategy. Defendants do not 24 describe why the fact of the involvement of the sub-agencies 25 mentioned in CBP 2, 17 and 19 warrant exemption under the deliberative process privilege. Thus, the deliberative process 26 privilege does not apply. 27 CBP is instructed to remove redactions from the following Document Application of Exemption 5 1 order: 2 CBP 2 and 19: Remove redactions from the 3 following: “The Social Media Working Group drafted a Social Media Strategy which has been reviewed and 4 signed by OI, OFO, USBP, AMO, PDO, OIT, OPR, and OTD and is currently under final review with CBP 5 OCC. This draft strategy proposes paths forward to 6 advance the operational use of social media” 7 CBP 17: Remove redactions from the following: “The Social Media Working Group drafted a Social Media 8 Strategy, which has been reviewed by OI, OFO, USBP, AMO, PDO, OIT, OPR and OTD” and “This 9 draft strategy highlights the areas of focus and 10 proposes paths forward to advance the operational use of social media” 11 The deliberative process privilege applies to the remaining 12 redacted portions of this document because they discuss CBP’s draft plans, policy recommendations, and pilot 13 programs. 14 15 b. ICE Documents 16 Document Application of Exemption 5 17 Contract Email The deliberative process privilege applies to the redacted portions of this document, which appear to be draft language 18 (ICE 62-63) for a potential contract for a particular project. 19 Tasking Request Emails The deliberative process privilege applies to the redacted 20 portions of this document, which include draft (ICE 1012–14) recommendations for inclusion in a request for information to 21 develop an internal briefing paper regarding DHS’s use of Facebook data. The redacted emails relate to an internal 22 request for information in order to develop an internal 23 briefing. 24 The documents in question are unlike early-stage compilations of facts that have been found to be insufficiently substantive 25 to qualify as “deliberative.” See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 648 F. Supp. 2d 26 152, 159 (D.D.C. 2009). 27 Document Application of Exemption 5 1 Performance Work Statement portions of this entire document because it appears to be a 2 Visa Lifecycle Vetting draft of policy. Initiative 3 (ICE 596–640) 4 5 c. USCIS Documents 6 Document Application of Exemption 5 7 First Amendment Email (Subject The deliberative process privilege applies to the redacted 8 Line: “USCIS authority to portions of this email, which appear to be draft responses to collect/use social media potential questions about a USCIS policy on the use of social 9 information relating to the media. exercise of First Amendment 10 protected activities (draft).”) 11 12 (USCIS 1571) 13 Procurement Email (Subject line: USCIS reprocessed and disclosed previously redacted portions 14 “DHS procurement of SM of USCIS 1711-12. Docket No. 143-1. services in Enhanced Vetting 15 initiative”) The deliberative process applies to the remaining redacted 16 portions of these emails, which appear to include the opinions of agency officials involved in policymaking and upcoming 17 (USCIS 1711–12) decisions regarding the policy discussed, the Enhance Vetting Initiative. See Docket No. 129 § 9. 18 19 20 2. Attorney-Client Privilege 21 Not all communications with lawyers are privileged. See United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 22 988, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g (Mar. 13, 2002) (citing United 23 States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Because it impedes full and free discovery 24 of the truth, the attorney-client privilege is strictly construed” to the following circumstances: “(1) 25 When legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his or her capacity 26 as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, 27 (6) are, at the client's instance, permanently protected (7) from disclosure by the client or by the 1 Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981); then quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev.1961)); see also United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1379 n. 1 3 (9th Cir. 1990) (same elements). The burden is on the party asserting the privilege to establish all 4 these elements. Id. 5 Considering these standards, the Court reviewed the documents at issue in camera and 6 determined that the attorney-client privilege in Exemption 5 applies as follows: 7 a. USCIS Documents 8 Document Application of Exemption 5 9 Summary Paper The attorney-client privilege applies because the withheld 10 document is a memorandum with legal advice about potential (USCIS 1475–77) constitutional issues that might arise from USCIS’s use of 11 social media. 12 First Amendment and The attorney client privilege applies to USCIS 1571, which is Procurement Emails an email communication with legal advice about the first 13 amendment implications of USCIS’s use of social media. 14 (USCIS 1571, 1711–12) USCIS reprocessed and disclosed previously redacted portions 15 of USCIS 1711-12. Docket No. 143-1. The attorney-client privilege does not apply to USCIS 1711 to 1712 because there 16 is no legal advice at issue in those emails. As discussed above, the remaining redactions are appropriate under the 17 deliberative process privilege. 18 19 C. CBP’s Vaughn Index 20 “Specificity is the defining requirement of the Vaughn index.” Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979. It 21 “afford[s] the FOIA requester a meaningful opportunity to contest, and the district court an 22 adequate foundation to review [de novo], the soundness of the withholding.” Id. at 977; see also 23 Lahr, 569 F.3d at 989 (a Vaughn index “must be detailed enough for the district court to make a de 24 novo assessment of the government’s claim of exemption”). To serve that purpose, it must contain 25 “a particularized explanation of how disclosure of the particular document would damage the 26 interest protected by the claimed exemption.” Wiener, 943 F.2d at 977–78. “Categorical 27 description of redacted material coupled with categorical indication of anticipated consequences of 1 Similarly, “boilerplate explanations,” that do not “tailor the explanation to the specific document 2 withheld,” are insufficient and pose an “obvious obstacle to effective advocacy.” Wiener, 943 3 F.2d at 978–79. On the other hand, an agency “must disclose as much information as possible 4 without thwarting the purpose of the exemption claimed.” Citizens Comm’n on Human Rts. v. 5 Food & Drug Admin., 45 F.3d 1325, 1328 (1995); see also Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 775 (“Wiener 6 demands that the government disclose what it can without ‘thwarting the claimed exemption’s 7 purpose.’” (quoting Weiner, 943 F.2d at 979)). 8 Plaintiffs bring a general challenge to CBP’s Vaughn index because it “repeats non- 9 specific recitations of the standard for the FOIA exemptions at issue, followed by multiple non- 10 specific bullets drawn from a master list of reasons for withholding content that are set forth in 11 [Mr. Howard’s declaration].” Pls.’ Mot. at 33. Indeed, the CBP’s Vaughn index is unworkable. 12 That being said, after conducting an in camera review of the documents, the Court need not ask 13 CBP to update its Vaughn index in order to rule on the parties’ disputes. 14 IV. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the parties 16 cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants are instructed to produce unredacted versions 17 of certain documents identified above within fourteen (14) days of this order. 18 This order disposes of Docket Nos. 98 and 108. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 Dated: September 30, 2021 23 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27