Wilson v. City of Walnut Creek ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MICHAEL GEARY WILSON, Case No. 20-cv-02721-PJH 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 10 CITY OF WALNUT CREEK, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 25 11 Defendants. 12 13 14 Before the court is plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve new defendants. On April 15 20, 2020, plaintiff filed his initial complaint. Dkt. 1. After the court granted plaintiff’s 16 motion to proceed in forma pauperis, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 17 on June 10, 2020. Dkt. 12. On July 13, 2020, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint 18 (“FAC,” Dkt. 24) and the pending motion to add new defendants pursuant to Federal Rule 19 of Civil Procedure 15(d), Dkt. 25. The court then ordered defendants to file a response to 20 the present motion as well as a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. 21 30. 22 Plaintiff moves the court to serve his FAC on the new defendants that he names in 23 the FAC pursuant to Rule 15(d). Dkt. 25 at 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) 24 provides the mechanism for supplemental pleading: “On motion and reasonable notice, 25 the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out 26 any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be 27 supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Rule 15(d) enables a plaintiff to “introduce[ ] a 1 original complaint was filed.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th 2 Cir.1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “While leave to permit supplemental 3 pleading is favored, it cannot be used to introduce a separate, distinct and new cause of 4 action. Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) 5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The standards for granting a motion for 6 leave to serve a supplemental are the same as those for granting a motion to file an 7 amended complaint under Rule 15(a). See Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 8 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[L]eave need not be granted where the amendment of the 9 complaint would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, 10 constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay.”). 11 In turn, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 requires that a plaintiff obtain either 12 consent of the defendant or leave of court to amend its complaint once the defendant has 13 answered, but “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 15(a); see, e.g., Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (leave to 15 amend granted with “extreme liberality”). Leave to amend is thus ordinarily granted 16 unless the amendment is futile, would cause undue prejudice to the defendants, or is 17 sought by plaintiffs in bad faith or with a dilatory motive. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 18 182 (1962); Smith v. Pac. Properties & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004). 19 While courts should consider all such factors, “the crucial factor is the resulting prejudice 20 to the opposing party.” Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). 21 Here, the conduct alleged in the original complaint related to an April 20, 2018 22 incident that took place at the Heather Farms Skate Park where seventeen teenagers 23 and adults allegedly conspired to deny the use of the skate park to plaintiff. Plaintiff 24 further alleged that defendants made false reports concerning child abuse by plaintiff. 25 Plaintiff’s FAC includes some of the allegations from the complaint concerning the skate 26 park but also includes hundreds of pages of separate incidents occurring in 2018 through 27 2020 and involving dozens of new defendants who plaintiff wants to add to this action. 1 the pleading to be supplemented. In this case, plaintiff’s original pleading was filed on 2 April 20, 2020, so the only relevant conduct for purposes of Rule 15(d) is that which 3 occurred after that date. It appears that the conduct occurring after April 20, 2020 begins 4 at paragraph 407 and continues to paragraph 444 of the FAC. Generally, the conduct 5 alleged involves several other lawsuits to which plaintiff is a party. See, e.g., ¶ 408 6 (discussing new lawsuit against various persons); ¶427 (alleging intentional falsification 7 of record); ¶ 432 (discussing notice regarding a June 22, 2020 hearing); ¶ 441 8 (discussing remand of case back to state superior court). What is clear is that this new 9 conduct has nothing to do with the events that transpired in April 2018 and at the very 10 least could be characterized as separate, distinct causes of action.1 11 Amendment under Rule 15(d) is favored and the fact that supplemental conduct 12 may involve new claims is not a reason by itself to deny the motion. See Keith v. Volpe, 13 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The clear weight of authority, however, in both the 14 cases and the commentary, permits the bringing of new claims in a supplemental 15 complaint to promote the economical and speedy disposition of the controversy.” (citation 16 omitted)). The problem here is that permitting new claims and new defendants would not 17 promote an economic and speedy disposition of this case.2 Adding new defendants 18 would dramatically expand the scope of this case to events and transactions that have no 19 apparent relation to the original conduct alleged in the complaint. Moreover, plaintiff has 20 apparently already instituted an action, currently proceeding before Judge Chesney, 21 against the defendants he seeks to serve. See Wilson v. Mount Diablo Unified Sch. Dist., 22 et al., Nos. 19-cv-3441-MMC, 20-cv-3368-MMC. Thus, adding new defendants here 23 would only serve to delay the proceedings. 24 25 1 The court only assumes for purposes of this order that the newly alleged conduct could constitute a new cause of action. As defendants point out, plaintiffs allegations are 26 largely a chronological diary of his interactions with other parties and relating to events and transactions that have no relation to the original complaint. Dkt. 33 at 8. 27 2 The court is in receipt of an administrative motion from plaintiff requesting the court 1 Defendants argue that they will suffer prejudice if the court were to grant plaintiff’s 2 motion because it would require extensive investigation into the various matters alleged 3 in the more than 600 pages of the FAC. Dkt. 33 at 11.3 The court agrees with 4 defendants. Because plaintiff is already proceeding on claims before other courts in this 5 district, it would be prejudicial to permit him to duplicate those proceedings here. 6 For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve 7 new defendants. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: August 7, 2020 10 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27