Chamberlin v. Hartog, Baer & Hand, APC ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHRISTOPHER CHAMBERLIN, Case No. 19-cv-08243-JCS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS IN PART FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 HARTOG, BAER & HAND, APC, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 47 Defendants. 11 12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff Christopher Chamberlin, pro se, brings this action against his former attorneys, 14 Defendants Hartog, Baer & Hand, APC (“HBH”) and its three named partners David Baer, John 15 Hartog, and Margaret Hand, asserting claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of fiduciary duty 16 and the duty of loyalty, malpractice, and declaratory judgment that his retainer agreement with 17 HBH is void. Most of Christopher Chamberlin’s claims are based on his theory that Defendants 18 failed to disclose a purported conflict of interest with respect to Michael Levin, who is Christopher 19 Chamberlin’s uncle, served as the executor of Christopher Chamberlin’s mother Jane 20 Chamberlin’s estate, and was his adversary in the underlying probate litigation for which 21 Christopher Chamberlin engaged HBH. The Court previously granted Defendants’ motion to 22 dismiss those claims, as well as a claim for negligent legal malpractice against Hand, with leave to 23 amend. Christopher Chamberlin filed an amended complaint reasserting the dismissed claims, and 24 Defendants move once again to dismiss. The Court found the matter suitable for resolution 25 without oral argument and vacated the hearing set for August 14, 2020. For the reasons discussed 26 below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED, and the claims at issue are DISMISSED WITH 27 PREJUDICE. 1 claims against HBH, Baer, and Hartog, which may proceed. Defendants shall file their answer no 2 later than September 15, 2020.1 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 Because a plaintiff’s factual allegations are generally taken as true in resolving a motion to 5 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this order summarizes Christopher Chamberlin’s allegations as if 6 true. Nothing in this order should be construed as resolving any issue of fact that might be 7 disputed at a later stage of the case. 8 A. Allegations of the Original Complaint 9 The Court’s previous order includes a more detailed summary of the alleged facts of this 10 case. See Order re Mot. to Dismiss, Mot. to Strike, & Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“1st MTD 11 Order,” dkt. 44)2 at 2–5. In brief, after Christopher Chamberlin’s mother Jane Chamberlin died in 12 2015 and his uncle Michael Levin was named in her will as executor, Christopher Chamberlin 13 sought to contest a sale of Jane Chamberlin’s houseboat and remove Michael Levin as executor. 14 Compl. (dkt. 1) ¶¶ 26, 28, 51, 95–97. In July of 2016, Christopher Chamberlin retained Defendant 15 HBH as his counsel, and HBH attorneys Defendant Baer and non-party Julie Woods appeared on 16 his behalf in state court probate proceedings. See id. ¶¶˜118, 126, 136, 138. Christopher 17 Chamberlin alleged that Defendants made a number of errors in representing him that led, among 18 other consequences, to Christopher Chamberlin being held liable for Michael Levin’s costs on 19 appeal. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 157–66, 195–202. 20 According to Christopher Chamberlin, those errors were not mere negligence, but stemmed 21 from Defendants’ desire to protect Michael Levin’s family because—unbeknownst to Christopher 22 Chamberlin at the time—Michael Levin’s cousin is married to Defendant Hartog’s sister. See id. 23 ¶¶ 62, 220–21, 253. Christopher Chamberlin relied on Defendants to disclose that relationship, 24 which, in his view, created a conflict of interest. E.g., id. ¶¶ 101–02, 295. Christopher 25 26 1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 27 2 Chamberlin v. Hartog, Baer & Hand, APC, No. 19-cv-08243-JCS, 2020 WL 2322884 (N.D. Cal. 1 Chamberlin had mentioned to Baer at the time he retained HBH that Jane Chamberlin and Michael 2 Levin were related to former U.S. Senator Carl Levin and then-U.S. Representative Sander Levin. 3 Id. ¶ 107. 4 Christopher Chamberlin asserted claims for: (1) declaratory judgment that his retainer 5 agreement with HBH “is void against public policy because it created an undisclosed, unwaivable, 6 and irreconcilable conflict of interest,” id. ¶ 292–301; (2) fraudulent inducement, id. ¶¶ 302–39; 7 (3) breach of fiduciary duty, id. ¶¶ 340–53; (4) breach of the duty of loyalty, id. ¶¶ 354–74; 8 (5) “intentional legal malpractice,” id. ¶¶ 375–98; and (6) “negligent legal malpractice,” id. 9 ¶¶ 399–414. 10 B. The Court’s Previous Order 11 The Court previously dismissed with leave to amend Christopher Chamberlin’s claim for 12 fraudulent inducement because Christopher Chamberlin did not allege that any particular 13 defendant actually knew that Michael Levin was Defendant Hartog’s sister’s husband’s cousin, 14 and without such an allegation it was not clear: 15 (1) whether Christopher Chamberlin believes any defendant actually had such knowledge or whether he relies only on a theory of 16 constructive knowledge or what Defendants’ should have known; (2) whether Christopher Chamberlin believes that all Defendants 17 knew of the relationship or that only some of them did; and (3) whether Christopher Chamberlin believes that Defendants knew 18 of the relationship at the time that the parties entered the retainer agreement, or only learned of it at some point thereafter. 19 20 1st MTD Order at 11–12. Lacking clarity on Christopher Chamberlin’s theory of fraud, the Court 21 declined to reach questions of whether any of those possibilities would support a viable claim for 22 fraudulent inducement. Id. at 12. The Court also noted that Christopher Chamberlin did not 23 allege with sufficient particularity the circumstances in which Defendants assured him there was 24 no conflict of interest, and that Christopher Chamberlin had not alleged a breach of any California 25 Rule of Professional Conduct. Id. at 12–13. Because Christopher Chamberlin’s claims for breach 26 of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, intentional legal malpractice,3 and declaratory 27 1 judgment rested on his theory of fraudulent inducement, the Court dismissed those claims as well. 2 Id. at 13–15. The Court dismissed or struck Christopher Chamberlin’s prayer for punitive 3 damages for the same reason. Id. at 15–16. 4 Defendants did not seek dismissal of Christopher Chamberlin’s claim for negligent legal 5 malpractice against Defendants HBH, Baer, and Hartog, and the Court allowed that claim to 6 proceed against those defendants. Id. at 15. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 7 negligent malpractice claim against Defendant Hand with leave to amend, because Christopher 8 Chamberlin had not alleged that Hand represented him. Id. The Court denied Christopher 9 Chamberlin’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 16–18. 10 C. The First Amended Complaint 11 Christopher Chamberlin’s first amended complaint asserts the same claims as his original 12 complaint: (1) declaratory judgment that the “retainer agreement is void as against public policy 13 because it created an undisclosed, unwaivable, and irreconcilable conflict of interest,” 1st Am. 14 Compl. (“FAC,” dkt. 47) ¶¶ 337–47; (2) fraudulent inducement, based on concealment, id. 15 ¶¶ 348–404; (3) breach of fiduciary duty, id. ¶¶ 405–28; (4) breach of the duty of loyalty, id. 16 ¶¶ 429–48; (5) “intentional legal malpractice,” id. ¶¶ 449–72; and (6) “negligent legal 17 malpractice,” id. ¶¶ 473–87. The factual allegations of Christopher Chamberlin’s first amended 18 complaint are similar to his original complaint, with relevant new allegations addressed in context 19 in the Court’s analysis below. 20 D. The Parties’ Arguments 21 Defendants move once again to dismiss Christopher Chamberlin’s fraudulent inducement 22 claim, arguing that his new allegations that Baer “must have been aware” Hartog’s brother-in-law 23 was related to former Senator Carl Levin and former Representative Sander Levin (and thus also 24 to Michael Levin) are too speculative to be credited. Mot. (dkt. 48) at 9–10. Defendants also 25 “intentional legal malpractice” as distinct from a general malpractice claim, which requires only 26 negligence, but held that addressing Christopher Chamberlin’s claim based on intentional misconduct (i.e., Defendants allegedly choosing to act in Michael Levin’s interest rather than 27 Christopher Chamberlin’s) separately from his claim asserting negligent error furthered the federal 1 argue that even if Baer knew that Hartog’s brother-in-law Daniel Levin was Michael Levin’s 2 cousin, the relationship between Baer and Michael Levin was too attenuated to create a conflict of 3 interest or duty to disclose under applicable rules of professional conduct. Id. at 10–12. 4 Defendants move to dismiss Christopher Chamberlin’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach 5 of the duty of loyalty, declaratory judgment, and intentional malpractice for the same reasons. Id. 6 at 12–13. Defendants also move to dismiss again Christopher Chamberlin’s malpractice claims 7 against Hand, arguing that he still has not alleged that Hand herself represented Christopher 8 Chamberlin and breached her professional obligations. Id. at 14. 9 Citing caselaw discussing the general principles of conflicts of interest in representation, 10 Christopher Chamberlin argues that “any reasonable person would perceive an actual (not 11 apparent) conflict of interest in doing what’s best for a sister and her family (Daniel Levin, and 12 those supported by him) on the one hand; and Chamberlin’s litigations goals—exposing Mike 13 Levin’s fraud and seeking legal redress for it—on the other.” Opp’n (dkt. 49) at 12–14.4 14 Christopher Chamberlin asserts that upon a “verbal request to go easy on Mike Levin from 15 Hartog’s and Hand’s brother-in-law . . . to miss an appellate deadline or wait until it was too late 16 to serve discovery . . . it would be done,” id. at 13, although his first amended complaint does not 17 allege any such request. Christopher Chamberlin notes that he explicitly conditioned his retention 18 of HBH on the lack of conflict of interest, and cites California cases recognizing that an attorney 19 may not recover fees for services rendered in violation of professional responsibilities. Id. at 14. 20 Christopher Chamberlin also cites former California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310(B)(3), in 21 effect at the time of the events at issue, which required a client’s written consent where an attorney 22 had a relationship with someone the attorney knew or should have known would be substantially 23 affected by the representation. See id. at 16–19. According to Christopher Chamberlin, the 24 4 Christopher Chamberlin submits a declaration with his opposition brief. See Chamberlin Decl. 25 (dkt. 50). Motions under Rule 12(b)(6) are generally resolved solely on the allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint and legal arguments presented in the parties’ briefs, without reference to 26 extraneous evidence. Regardless, and taking into account that such a declaration might in some cases shed light on whether a pro se plaintiff could amend a deficient complaint to state a valid 27 claim, nothing in the declaration informs the dispositive question of whether any defendant had a 1 purported conflict of interest and errors in representation warrant rescission of the retainer 2 agreement, id. at 19–20, as well as a claim for fraudulent inducement based on either intentional 3 concealment or constructive concealment, because Defendants breached a fiduciary duty in failing 4 to disclose their relationship with the Levin family, id. at 21–28. Christopher Chamberlin also 5 argues that such a breach supports his claim for malpractice and his prayer for punitive damages, 6 id. at 28–30, and that Hand’s alleged supervision of Woods’s work representing Christopher 7 Chamberlin supports his malpractice claim against Hand, id. at 30–31. Christopher Chamberlin 8 requests leave to amend once again if the Court grants Defendants’ motion. Id. at 31. 9 Defendants argue again in their reply brief that Christopher Chamberlin has not alleged 10 that any defendant knew of any relationship with Michael Levin or intentionally concealed that 11 relationship from Christopher Chamberlin, and that the Court should disregard Christopher 12 Chamberlin’s “implausible speculation that attorney David Baer ‘must have’ or ‘would have 13 known’ of this attenuated and legally irrelevant relationship.” Reply (dkt. 51) at 2–3. Defendants 14 also argue that allegations of what any defendant should have known are not sufficient to show 15 fraud. Id. at 3–4. Defendants contend that Christopher Chamberlin has not asserted a claim for 16 “constructive fraud” in his first amended complaint, and should not be granted leave to do so 17 because he cannot allege either any duty to disclose or any defendant’s actual knowledge of the 18 purportedly disqualifying relationship. Id. at 5–9. According to Defendants, Christopher 19 Chamberlin’s claims for declaratory judgment, breach of fiduciary duty and the duty of loyalty, 20 and intentional malpractice fail for the same reasons. Id. at 9–10. Defendants also argue that 21 Christopher Chamberlin still has not alleged any involvement or error by Hand sufficient to 22 support his negligent malpractice claim against her. Id. at 10–11. 23 III. ANALYSIS 24 A. Legal Standard 25 A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted 26 under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The purpose of a motion to dismiss 27 under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. 1 is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a “pleading which 2 sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing 3 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 4 In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court takes “all allegations of 5 material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 6 Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal may be based on a 7 lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. 8 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A pleading must “contain 9 either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain 10 recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) 11 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A pleading 12 that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 13 will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 14 “[C]ourts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Nor does a 16 complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 17 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, the claim must be “‘plausible on its 18 face,’” meaning that the claimant must plead sufficient factual allegations to “allow the court to 19 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 21 Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets a heightened pleading standard for 22 claims based on fraud. “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 23 circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Ninth Circuit has held 24 that in order to meet this standard, a “complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places, 25 benefits received, and other details of the alleged fraudulent activity,” Neubronner v. Milken, 6 26 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993), or in other words, “‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the 27 misconduct charged,” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 1 enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct . . . so that they can defend against 2 the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.’” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124 3 (quoting Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)) (ellipsis in original). 4 Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the case here, courts must 5 “construe the pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. 6 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “A district court should not dismiss a 7 pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 8 complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 9 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203−04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 10 When it dismisses the complaint of a pro se litigant with leave to amend, “‘the district court must 11 provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the 12 litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.’” Id. (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 13 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). 14 B. Fraudulent Inducement 15 California law requires the following elements for a claim for fraudulent inducement based 16 on concealment: 17 (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to 18 the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the 19 plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and 20 (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. 21 22 Kaldenbach v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 178 Cal. App. 4th 830, 850 (2009). To establish a 23 duty to disclose, Christopher Chamberlin relies on former California Rule of Professional Conduct 24 3-310(B)(3), which was in effect at the time he retained Defendants as his counsel, and which 25 required written consent for representation where “[t]he member has or had a legal, business, 26 financial, professional, or personal relationship with another person or entity the member knows or 27 reasonably should know would be affected substantially by resolution of the matter.” 1 Christopher Chamberlin still has not alleged that any defendant “had a legal, business, financial, 2 professional, or personal relationship” with Michael Levin. Nothing in Christopher Chamberlin’s 3 first amended complaint or opposition brief alters the Court’s previous conclusion that “an 4 attorney’s sister’s husband’s cousin is [not] the sort of ‘personal relationship’ contemplated by the 5 rule.” See id. at 12. Nor has Christopher Chamberlin plausibly alleged that any person more 6 closely related to any defendant—e.g., Hartog’s sister Fay Levin, who is Michael Levin’s cousin’s 7 wife—“would be affected substantially by resolution of” the dispute between Christopher 8 Chamberlin and Michael Levin, much less that any defendant knew or should have known of such 9 an effect. 10 Christopher Chamberlin alleges that “Daniel Levin, Ambassador Fay Levin, and Mike 11 Levin share an interest in protecting Mike Levin’s personal and professional reputation” and “in 12 protecting the Levin name, generally.” FAC ¶ 267–68. Even taking that allegation as true for the 13 purpose of a motion to dismiss, none of those people represented Christopher Chamberlin, and 14 none of them is named as a defendant in this action. Looking to the named defendants, 15 Christopher Chamberlin still does not allege that Hartog or Hand knew that Michael Levin was 16 Hartog’s brother-in-law’s cousin.5 To the extent he alleges that Baer had some knowledge of a 17 relationship between Michael Levin and Hartog’s brother-in-law—because Christopher 18 Chamberlin told Baer that Michael Levin was related to the Levins who served in Congress, and 19 Baer “must have been aware” that Hartog’s brother-in-law was also related to those Levins, FAC 20 ¶¶ 133, 284—there is still no indication that Baer knew any details of that relationship, or that 21 even if he had, he would have considered such an attenuated connection relevant to the 22 representation. In any event, despite the assertions of Christopher Chamberlin’s opposition brief, 23 some vague extended familial relationship between an adverse party and a law partner’s sister’s 24 husband does not, in itself, create a “profound personal conflict of interest.” Cf. Opp’n at 18. The 25 5 The first amended complaint states that Christopher Chamberlin “believes that John Hartog 26 provided [another lawyer’s] name for Mike Levin through Daniel Levin.” FAC ¶ 265. Assuming for the sake of argument that Christopher Chamberlin’s belief is sufficiently plausible to be taken 27 as true, that allegation does not address whether Hartog actually knew who Michael Levin was, as 1 Court concludes that the familial relationship alleged in the first amended complaint does not 2 constitute a conflict of interest under California law. 3 Christopher Chamberlin appears to put much stock in Hartog’s sister Fay Levin’s 4 appointment as an ambassador in 2009, alleging that Hartog and his wife Hand were required to 5 disclose their political contributions that year as a result. See Opp’n at 18 (citing FAC ¶¶ 269–79, 6 281–85). But Fay Levin’s status as a public figure does not indicate that any defendant knew that 7 Michael Levin—who is not alleged to have held any public office or otherwise been in the public 8 eye—was her husband’s cousin, much less support a conclusion that such a relationship, had they 9 been aware of it, would have influenced how any defendant carried out their professional 10 responsibilities in representing Christopher Chamberlin. Nor does Hartog and Hand’s attendance 11 at their niece’s and nephew’s weddings, see FAC ¶ 280, evince that they would hold loyalty to 12 anyone bearing the fairly common surname “Levin.” 13 The Court therefore concludes once again that Christopher Chamberlin has not plausibly 14 alleged a violation of former Rule 3-310(B)(3). Christopher Chamberlin has identified no other 15 potential source of legal duty to disclose any defendant’s several-steps-removed relationship with 16 Michael Levin. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Christopher Chamberlin’s claim for fraudulent 17 inducement is GRANTED. 18 Despite the Court previously granting leave to amend this claim to cure the same defect in 19 the original complaint, nothing in Christopher Chamberlin’s first amended complaint, opposition 20 brief, or declaration suggests that Christopher Chamberlin could state a claim based on any 21 conflict of interest or loyalty of Defendants to Michael Levin if granted leave to amend again. The 22 Court therefore concludes that further leave to amend would be futile, and dismisses this claim 23 with prejudice. 24 C. Remaining Claims Based on Conflict of Interest 25 Christopher Chamberlin’s claims for declaratory judgment voiding the retainer agreement, 26 see Opp’n at 11–20, breach of fiduciary duty, see id. at 267–28, breach of the duty of loyalty, see 27 id. at 28, and intentional malpractice, see id. at 28–30, are all based on the same purported conflict 1 Chamberlin has not plausibly alleged any conflict of interest under California law, and there is no 2 indication that he could do so if granted further leave to amend, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 3 these claims with prejudice is GRANTED. 4 D. Negligent Malpractice Claim Against Hand 5 “In a legal malpractice action arising from a civil proceeding, the elements are (1) the duty 6 of the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of his or her profession 7 commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection 8 between the breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the 9 attorney’s negligence.” Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 Cal. 4th 1194, 1199 (2001). The Court 10 previously dismissed Christopher Chamberlin’s claim for negligent malpractice against Hand, 11 holding that “[n]either Christopher Chamberlin’s allegation that ‘HBH’ oversaw the matter in 12 which it represented him when Baer was unavailable, nor the suggestion in his opposition brief 13 that Hand might have supervised Julie Woods in the latter’s representation of Christopher 14 Chamberlin, is a substitute for factual allegations in the complaint that Hand herself represented 15 Christopher Chamberlin and acted in a manner that fell short of her professional obligations, to 16 Chamberlin’s detriment.” 1st MTD Order at 15.6 17 Although Christopher Chamberlin’s first amended complaint is replete with allegations 18 describing Hand’s twice-by-marriage relationship to members of the Levin family, it still includes 19 little in the way of allegations regarding malpractice on her part. Christopher Chamberlin now 20 alleges only that Hand “supervised and worked with associate, Julie R. Woods, who was assigned 21 to work on Plaintiff’s case,” and that “Hand directed Woods’ legal work and had access to 22 Plaintiff’s confidential material.” FAC ¶¶ 384–85. Christopher Chamberlin does not allege that 23 Hand even worked on his matter, made any particular error with respect to his case, or that her 24 conduct had any particular effect on him. Based on Christopher Chamberlin’s failure to cure the 25 defect identified in the Court’s previous order, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim against 26 Hand, with prejudice, is GRANTED. 27 1 || IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part Christopher 3 Chamberlin’s first amended complaint is GRANTED, and all of Christopher Chamberlin’s claims, 4 || except for negligent malpractice against Defendants HBH, Baer, and Hartog, are DISMISSED 5 || with prejudice. Defendants shall file their answer no later than September 15, 2020 6 Christopher Chamberlin, who is representing himself, is encouraged to contact the Federal 7 || Pro Bono Project’s Pro Se Help Desk for assistance. Lawyers at the Help Desk can provide basic 8 assistance to parties representing themselves but cannot provide legal representation. In-person 9 || appointments are not currently available due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, but 10 || Christopher Chamberlin may contact the Help Desk at 415-782-8982 or FedPro@sfbar.org to 11 schedule a telephonic appointment. 3 12 IT ISSO ORDERED. Dated: September 1, 2020 CZ J PH C. SPERO 15 ief Magistrate Judge 16 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28