Tanseer Kazi v. PNC, Bank, N.A. ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TANSEER KAZI, et al., Case No. 18-cv-04810-JCS 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS 10 PNC BANK, N.A., Re: Dkt. No. 144 Defendant. 11 12 This action was originally filed by Plaintiff Tanseer Kazi. In November of 2018, the 13 parties stipulated to Plaintiffs filing an amended complaint naming Linda Scheid as an additional 14 plaintiff. See Order on Stipulation (dkt. 30). Although Plaintiffs originally moved for both Kazi 15 and Scheid to serve as class representatives, Plaintiffs conceded in their reply brief on class 16 certification that only Scheid qualified as a class representative due to Kazi’s bankruptcy, and the 17 Court certified a class represented only by Scheid. See generally Order re Mot. for Class 18 Certification (dkt. 96).1 19 Plaintiffs now move under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 20 voluntarily dismiss Kazi as a named plaintiff, without prejudice to Kazi (or his bankruptcy trustee) 21 recovering as an absent class member. See generally Mot. (dkt. 144). The bankruptcy trustee 22 does not object to Kazi’s dismissal on those terms. Sitkin Decl. (dkt. 144-2) ¶ 3. Defendant PNC 23 Bank, N.A. (“PNC”) opposes Plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that because Rule 41 only permits 24 dismissal of an “action” in its entirety, Kazi cannot be dismissed as a named plaintiff under that 25 rule while retaining any right to recover as part of the class—and such a result “probably cannot 26 be accomplished any other way,” either. Opp’n (dkt. 147) at 1–2. The Court finds the matter 27 1 suitable for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for September 4, 2 2020. 3 As PNC notes, the Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 41(a) is not a vehicle for a plaintiff to 4 dismiss some but not all claims against a particular defendant, which must instead be 5 accomplished by amendment under Rule 15(a). Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 6 403 F.3d 683, 687–88 (9th Cir. 2005). The Hells Canyon court further held that the “‘fact that a 7 voluntary dismissal of a claim under Rule 41(a) is properly labeled an amendment under Rule 15 8 is a technical, not a substantive, distinction,’” and that the plaintiff’s abandonment of a claim in an 9 earlier case (which the defendant argued should have preclusive effect) was best construed as an 10 amendment allowed by that court under Rule 15, to which prejudice did not attach. Id. at 689–90 11 (quoting Nilsson v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 784 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The Ninth Circuit has 12 also held that Rule 41(a)’s limitation to dismissal of an “action” is not so strict as to prevent a 13 plaintiff from dismissing all claims against a given defendant while retaining claims against other 14 defendants. Id. at 687 (citing Pedrina v. Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 609 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1993)). 15 The dismissal plaintiffs seek here comports with Rule 41(a)(2). Plaintiffs propose to 16 dismiss all of Kazi’s claims, such that Kazi will no longer be a named party in the case. True, 17 Kazi (or the bankruptcy trustee) might still recover as an absent class member, but such is the 18 nature of dismissal “without prejudice,” which Rule 41(a)(2) specifies as the default effect of 19 dismissal thereunder. To the extent that the possibility of recovery in the same action (albeit not 20 as a party) deviates from a typical dismissal, Rule 41(a)(2) grants the Court discretion to dismiss 21 “on terms that the court considers proper.” Here, the Court finds the terms that Plaintiffs have 22 requested to be proper, in order to permit efficient resolution of the case without requiring parallel 23 proceedings between the class and Kazi’s individual claims, nor need for active involvement by 24 the bankruptcy trustee. Courts in this district have routinely granted motions to dismiss named 25 plaintiffs without prejudice to recovery as class members under similar circumstances.2 PNC cites 26 2 Huynh v. Quora, Inc., No. 18-cv-07597-BLF, 2020 WL 4584198, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 27 2020) (“The Court does not find it would be inequitable or prejudicial to Defendant to allow ] no case to the contrary. 2 PNC argues that it “has been prejudiced by Mr. Kazi’s conduct” in that Plaintiffs’ counsel 3 failed to disclose Kazi’s bankruptcy and acted on his behalf after Kazi had entered bankruptcy. 4 || Opp’n at 3 (heading capitalization omitted). PNC suggests that Plaintiffs’ counsel therefore might 5 || not have had authority to stipulate to adding Scheid as a second plaintiff, which PNC believes 6 || warrants discovery and might serve as grounds for a future motion for summary judgment. □□□ 7 || The Court does not rule on this question at this time—although, given that the Court has approved 8 Scheid as a plaintiff and as a class representative, and that the bankruptcy trustee has stated their 9 || lack of objection to Kazi being dismissed from this action while the bankruptcy estate retains 10 || Kazi’s rights as a class member, there is likely no merit to PNC’s argument. In any event, 11 whatever merit that position might have, it is not a reason to keep Kazi in the case, because Kazi’s || dismissal under the terms proposed will not prejudice PNC. Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore . GRANTED, and all of Kazi’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, including without Y 14 || prejudice to any relief he or his bankruptcy estate might recover as an absent class member.* Oo 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. Q 16 || Dated: September 2, 2020 C Zn 17 J PH C. SPERO Z 18 ief Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 94 || Chem Ltd., No. 13-md-02420-YGR (DMR), 2015 WL 8269448, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2015) (“With their dismissal, the departing representatives will no longer be part of this case, or at most, 25 || will become absent class members to the extent they have any class claims.”), objection to recommendation denied as moot, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2016); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11-cv- 26 || 91726-LHK, 2012 WL 893152, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012) (“[T]he Court does not find it would be inequitable or prejudicial to Defendant to allow Fraley and Wang to become absent class 27 || members should the putative Class be certified.”); see also Reply (dkt. 148) at 2-3 (citing these cases and others in accord from other districts). 28 3 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).