Johnson v. Peppin Properties LLC ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SCOTT JOHNSON, Case No. 21-cv-06406-JST 8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT 9 v. PREJUDICE 10 PEPPIN PROPERTIES LLC, et al., Re: ECF Nos. 19, 22, 23, 25 Defendants. 11 12 13 Plaintiff Scott Johnson brings this action against Defendants Peppin Properties LLC and 14 Panda Dumpling Inc. alleging violations of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 15 and state Unruh Act. The property at issue is now vacant, which the parties agree renders 16 Johnson’s ADA claim moot. ECF Nos. 19, 22, 23, 25. 17 “Federal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.” 18 Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting B.C. v. Plumas 19 Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999)). To establish standing, ADA plaintiffs 20 “must demonstrate . . . an injury-in-fact, that the injury is traceable to the Store’s actions, and that 21 the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 22 F.3d 939, 946 (2011) (en banc). Plaintiffs must have standing to sue “at each stage of the 23 litigation.” Id. Johnson concedes that he no longer has standing to seek injunctive relief under the 24 ADA because, “with the closure of the subject business property, his injunctive relief sought is no 25 longer redressable by this action.” ECF No. 25 at 1. Because Johnson no longer has standing to 26 sue for injunctive relief under the ADA, his ADA claim must be dismissed. See United States v. 27 Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 747 (1995) (remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing). 1 law claim. A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” where “the district 2 || court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 3 “The Supreme Court has stated, and [the Ninth Circuit has] often repeated, that ‘in the usual case 4 in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point toward 5 || declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.’” Acri v. Varian Assocs., 6 Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 7 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed Johnson’s sole federal-law claim — the only claim over which 8 || the Court has original jurisdiction — the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 9 || Johnson’s remaining state-law claim. 10 Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Johnson’s remaining 11 Unruh Act claim, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. “If the court 12 || determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). This action is accordingly dismissed without prejudice. 14 The clerk shall close the file. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 Dated: December 8, 2022 . . M JON S. TIGAR O 18 nited States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28