California Beach Co., LLC. v. Du ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division 11 Case No. 4:19-cv-08426-YGR (LB) THE CALIFORNIA BEACH CO., LLC., 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING SEALING 13 v. Re: ECF No. 45 14 15 HAN XIAN DU 16 Defendant. 17 18 On September 3, 2020, the plaintiff filed an administrative motion to seal the entire 19 Supplemental Fourth Declaration of Austin Wright.1 Generally, the declaration has sealable 20 information, but sealing the entire declaration does not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5. The 21 court thus denies the motion to seal without prejudice to the plaintiff’s submitting a more narrowly 22 tailored redaction. 23 Sealing is governed by Civil Local Rule 79-5. Among other requirements, a party must submit 24 “[a] declaration establishing that the document sought to be filed under seal, or portions thereof, 25 are sealable.” N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A), (e)(1). Local Rule 79-5 also provides that 26 27 1 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal (“Mot. to Seal”) – ECF No. 45; Fourth Declaration of Austin Wright in Support of Motion for Award of Damages, Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Fourth 1 requests to seal “must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing of only sealable material” and that 2 “[r]eference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents 3 as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.” 4 N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 79-5(b), (d)(1)(A)–(B). Under Local Rule 79-5, a party must file (1) a sealed 5 document that has all proposed sealed portions highlighted in yellow and (2) a redacted, public- 6 record document. 7 The following is a summary of the standards for sealing. 8 “A party seeking to seal a document filed with the court must (1) comply with Civil Local 9 Rule 79-5; and (2) rebut the ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ that applies to all court 10 documents other than grand jury transcripts and pre-indictment warrant materials.” Icon-IP Pty 11 Ltd. v. Specialized Bicycle Components, Inc., No. 12-cv-03844-JST, 2015 WL 984121, at *1 (N.D. 12 Cal. Mar. 4, 2015) (citing Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 13 2006)). 14 With respect to the first prong, Local Rule 79-5 provides that a sealing order may be issued 15 only upon a request that (1) “establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are privileged, 16 protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under the law” and (2) is “narrowly 17 tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material.” N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 79-5(b). 18 With respect to the second prong, “[h]istorically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to 19 inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” 20 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 21 (1978)). “This right is justified by the interest of citizens in ‘keeping a watchful eye on the 22 workings of public agencies.’” Id. (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). 23 Two standards generally govern sealing motions. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 24 677 (9th Cir. 2010). The “compelling reasons” applies to most court documents, including those 25 filed in connection with dispositive motions, while the “good cause” standard applies to private 26 materials “unearthed during discovery,” including those filed in connection with non-dispositive 27 motions. Welle v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No.: 3:12-cv-3016 EMC (KAW), 2013 WL 1 “Nondispositive motions ‘are often “unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying 2 || cause of action,’” and, as a result, the public’s interest in accessing dispositive materials does ‘not 3 apply with equal force’ to non-dispositive materials.” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (9th Cir. 2010) 4 || (quoting in part Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). For this reason, a “particular showing” of good 5 cause as contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) is sufficient to seal such motions. 6 Kamakana, 437 F.3d at 1180; Welle, 2013 WL 6055369, at *1. “Broad allegations of harm, 7 || unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” 8 Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). If a court finds 9 || particularized harm will result from disclosure, then it balances the public and private interests to 10 decide whether a protective order is necessary. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, ll 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Glenmede Trust Co. vy. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)). 12 Sealing may also be appropriate if necessary to prevent filings from being used “as sources of 5 13 || business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; || Welle, 2013 WL 6055369, at *1. 3 15 Because the declaration relates to a dispositive motion, the “compelling reasons” standard 16 applies. There are no compelling reasons to seal the entire declaration. Also, the declaration has 3 17 some information that is similar to information in a previously filed third declaration, which was 18 || not filed under seal.” For example, both declarations address “revenues, sales history, and profit 19 margins.” The earlier declaration also stated the loss explicitly: $316,991.4 20 The plaintiff may resubmit the sealing request within two weeks. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. LAE 22 Dated: September 14, 2020 LAUREL BEELER 23 United States Magistrate Judge 24 ? See Third Wright Decl. — ECF No. 35. 26 || 3 Declaration of Jared B. Briant in support of Plaintiff’s Administrative Motion to File under Seal — 27 ECF No. 45-1 at ¥ 3; Compare Fourth Wright Decl. —- ECF No. 45-3, with Third Wright Declaration in support of Motion for Default Judgment (“Third Wright Decl.”) — ECF No. 35. 28 “Fourth Wright Decl. — ECF No. 45-3 at § 10; Third Wright Decl. — ECF No. 35 at § 7.