Johnson v. Monterey & Rancho Plaza ( 2020 )


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  • 1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 SCOTT JOHNSON, Case No. 18-cv-05718-BLF 8 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING FEBRUARY 4, 9 v. 2021 HEARING ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT; AND 10 MONTEREY & RANCHO PLAZA, et al., GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 11 Defendants. [Re: ECF 42] 12 13 Plaintiff Scott Johnson brings this action against Monterey & Rancho Plaza and Tony 14 Dimaggio’s Stromboli & Pizza, Inc. (together, “Defendants”), alleging violations of the 15 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the California 16 Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53. See Compl. ¶¶ 54–83, ECF 17 1. Mr. Johnson seeks injunctive relief along with statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 18 Defendants answered the Complaint on October 23, 2018. See Answer, ECF 11. 19 Defendants and Mr. Johnson also jointly stipulated to extend the site inspection deadline on 20 February 19, 2019 and, according to Mr. Johnson, initially reached a global settlement on June 24, 21 2019. See Joint Stipulation, ECF 14; Notice of Settlement, ECF 21. However, Defendants 22 abandoned the case after the June 2019 notice of settlement. Thereafter, upon Plaintiff’s 23 advisement that Defendants had failed complete the settlement process, the Court attempted to 24 reinstate the case schedule leading up to trial. Over the course of almost one year, the Court issued 25 five orders compelling Defendants to respond and appear for hearings, which were ignored and 26 disobeyed. See Order Striking Answer, ECF 36. At Mr. Johnson’s request, this Court stuck 27 Defendants’ answer and entered default on July 30, 2020. See Order Striking Answer. The Clerk 1 the Court is Mr. Johnson’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Corrected 2 Application for Default Judgment (“Motion”). Mot., ECF 42-1. Defendants were notified of Mr. 3 Johnson’s Motion on September 9, 2020. See Notice of Filing, ECF 43; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 55(b)(2). Defendants did not oppose or otherwise respond to the Motion. Briefing on the matter is 5 now closed. See Civ. L.R. 7-3(a). Finding this matter suitable for submission without oral 6 argument, the Court VACATES the hearing set for February 4, 2021 at 9:00 a.m. See Civil L.R. 7- 7 1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Default 8 Judgment with the terms stated below. 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 According to his Complaint, Mr. Johnson is a level C-5 quadriplegic who cannot walk and 11 has significant manual dexterity impairments. Compl. ¶ 1. Mr. Johnson says that he uses a 12 wheelchair for mobility and has a specially equipped van. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendants are the alleged 13 owners of the real property and business (the “Restaurant”) open to the public located at or about 14 3852 Monterey Street, San Jose, California. Id. ¶¶ 2–9, 15. 15 Mr. Johnson alleges that barriers at the Restaurant prevented him from enjoying full and 16 equal access to the facility. Compl. ¶¶ 16–46. Specifically, Mr. Johnson alleges that he visited the 17 Restaurant on several occasions, including once in May 2018, twice in June 2018, and once in July 18 2018. Compl. ¶ 14; Mot. 1. During each of those visits, Mr. Johnson claims that he personally 19 encountered the following types of access barriers: 20 1. Mr. Johnson claims that Defendants failed to provide accessible parking. 21 Compl. ¶ 17. Mr. Johnson claims that the Restaurant used to have two marked 22 accessible parking spaces but they are now faded and there is no “NO 23 PARKING” warning in the access aisles. Compl. ¶¶ 18–19. Mr. Johnson also 24 claims that there is an insufficient number of accessible parking spaces—the 25 Restaurant has 64 parking spaces but only two are reserved for persons with 26 disabilities. Compl. ¶ 23. In addition, Mr. Johnson claims that the parking stalls 27 and access aisle potentially reserved for persons with disabilities are not level 1 2. Mr. Johnson claims that, on the dates of his visits, Defendants had a transaction 2 counter that was crowded with menus, a tip jar, and a card reader, which 3 narrowed the clear width of the counter to less than 36 inches. Compl. ¶¶ 25– 4 26. Therefore, Mr. Johnson claims that the transaction counter was not 5 maintained in a manner that was readily accessible and useable to him. See 6 Compl. ¶¶ 24–26. 7 3. Mr. Johnson claims that Defendants fail to provide accessible door hardware. 8 Compl. ¶¶ 29–31. Particularly, during each of his visits, both the entrance door 9 at the hallway leading to the restroom and restroom door hardware were 10 traditional style round knobs that required the tight grasping and twisting of the 11 wrist to operate. Compl. ¶¶ 29–31. 12 4. Mr. Johnson claims that Defendants have failed to provide accessible 13 restrooms, mainly an accessible restroom sink. Mot. 11; see Compl. ¶¶ 33–41. 14 According to Mr. Johnson, Defendants’ failure to provide accessible facilities created 15 “difficulty, discomfort, and embarrassment” for him. Compl. ¶ 44. Mr. Johnson claims that he will 16 return to the Restaurant once it is represented to him that the Restaurant and its facilities are 17 accessible. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 52; Mot. 3. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Default may be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend an action, 20 and against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 21 After entry of default, a court may, in its discretion, enter default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In deciding whether to enter 23 default judgment, a court may consider the following factors, known as the Eitel factors: (1) the 24 possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the 25 sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a 26 dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) 27 the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 1 allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true, except those relating to damages. 2 TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). When the damages 3 claimed are not readily ascertainable from the pleadings and the record, a court may hold a hearing 4 to conduct an accounting, determine the amount of damages, establish the truth of any allegation 5 by evidence, or investigate any other matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 6 III. JURISDICTION AND SERVICE OF PROCESS 7 “When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise 8 defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject 9 matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 10 A. Subject matter jurisdiction 11 District courts have subject matter jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the laws of 12 the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further, in any civil action where the district courts have 13 subject matter jurisdiction, the district courts will also have supplemental jurisdiction over all 14 other claims that are so related to claims in the action, such that they form part of the same case or 15 controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Mr. Johnson’s claim for relief pursuant to the ADA presents a civil 16 action arising under a law of the United States. Therefore, this Court has subject matter 17 jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s ADA claim. Moreover, Mr. Johnson’s claim for relief pursuant to 18 the Unruh Act is related to the ADA claim because it arises out of the same “case or controversy,” 19 namely Mr. Johnson’s visits to the Restaurant where he encountered alleged violations of both 20 laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Therefore, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. 21 Johnson’s Unruh Act claim. 22 B. Personal jurisdiction and service of process 23 Serving a summons establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant, who is subject to the 24 jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located. Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 4(k)(1). “With respect to a corporation [or partnership], the place of incorporation and 26 principal place of business are paradigm bases for general [personal] jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. 27 Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 1 the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a 2 corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”). 3 Pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a domestic 4 corporation may be served: by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an 5 officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized 6 by appointment or by law to receive service of process and—if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by 7 also mailing a copy of each to the defendant. 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Alternatively, Rule 4 provides that service on a corporation may be 9 made by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general 10 jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. 11 P. 4(e)(1), (h)(1)(A). 12 California Code of Civil Procedure § 416.10 provides that a corporation may be served by 13 “delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint ... [t]o the person designated as agent for 14 service of process” or “[t]o the president, chief executive officer, or other head of a corporation, a 15 vice president, a secretary or assistant secretary, a treasurer or assistant treasurer, a controller or 16 chief financial officer, a general manager or person authorized by the corporation to receive 17 service of process.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 416.10(a), (b). In lieu of personal delivery, California 18 law permits substituted service on a person to be served under § 416.10 by (1) “leaving a copy of 19 the summons and the complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place 20 of business, or usual mailing address . . . in the presence of a competent member of the household 21 or a person apparently in charge” and (2) “thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and 22 complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy 23 of the summons and complaint were left.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b). 24 Mr. Johnson has submitted public records indicating that Defendants are domiciled in 25 California and that they own the real property in San Jose, California on which the Restaurant is 26 located, thereby establishing that personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants. See Mot. Ex. 5, 27 Public Rs., ECF 42-9; see also Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. In 1 October 2018 by delivering copies of the summons and complaint via substituted service to 2 Defendant Monterey and Rancho Plaza’s General Partner’s home and thereafter mailing a copy of 3 summons and complaint at the place where the copies were left. See Proof of Service of Summons, 4 ECF 10. Defendant Tony Dimaggio’s Stromboli & Pizza, Inc. answered the Complaint on October 5 23, 2018 without raising issues of service of process. See Answer. As such, the Court is satisfied 6 that Mr. Johnson gave Defendants proper service of process under both the Federal Rules of Civil 7 Procedure and the California Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Court has personal 8 jurisdiction over the Defendants. 9 IV. EITEL FACTORS 10 For the reasons to be discussed, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default 11 judgment. 12 A. The possibility of prejudice to Plaintiff 13 The first Eitel factor requires the Court to consider whether Mr. Johnson would be 14 prejudiced if default judgment is not entered. Unless default judgment is entered, Mr. Johnson will 15 have no other means of recourse against Defendants. As such, Mr. Johnson will be prejudiced if 16 default judgment is not entered. See, e.g., Ridola v. Chao, No. 16-cv-02246-BLF, 2018 WL 17 2287668, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2018) (finding that plaintiff would be prejudiced if default 18 judgment was not entered because she “would have no other means of recourse against Defendants 19 for the damages caused by their conduct”). 20 B. The merits of Plaintiff’s claims and the sufficiency of the complaint 21 Pursuant to the second and third Eitel factors, this Court concludes that the Complaint 22 alleges meritorious substantive claims for relief under the ADA and the Unruh Act. 23 i. Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. 24 Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability within places of 25 public accommodation: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 26 the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 27 accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases 1 discrimination includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . 2 where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). “Readily achievable” 3 is defined as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or 4 expense.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). 5 a. Plaintiff’s Article III Standing 6 In order to bring a claim under Title III of the ADA, Mr. Johnson must establish Article III 7 standing. To establish Article III standing, Mr. Johnson must demonstrate he suffered an injury in 8 fact, traceable to Defendants’ conduct, and redressable by a favorable court decision. Ridola, 2018 9 WL 2287668, at *5 (citing Hubbard v. Rite Aid Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1162 (S.D. Cal. 10 2006)). Mr. Johnson claims that he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Mot. 11 8–9. Mr. Johnson alleges that he personally encountered access barriers at the Restaurant with 12 respect to the parking lot, transaction counter, door hardware, and restrooms. Compl. ¶¶ 14–43. 13 Further, Mr. Johnson claims that he will return to the Restaurant once its facilities are made 14 accessible. Compl. ¶ 45, 52; Mot. 3; see Vogel v. Rite Aid Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1008 (C.D. 15 Cal. 2014) (“Indeed, ‘[d]emonstrating an intent to return to a non-compliant accommodation is but 16 one way for an injured plaintiff to establish Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief.’” 17 (quoting Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2011))). 18 Because Mr. Johnson’s factual allegations are accepted as true, and an award of statutory 19 damages and injunctive relief would redress Mr. Johnson’s alleged injuries caused by Defendants’ 20 conduct, the Court finds that Mr. Johnson has Article III standing to sue under the ADA. 21 b. ADA Claim Elements 22 To prevail on his Title III discrimination claim, Mr. Johnson must show that (1) he is 23 disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) Defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public 24 accommodation; and (3) he was denied public accommodations by Defendants because of his 25 disability. See Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). To succeed on an 26 ADA claim based on architectural barriers, Mr. Johnson “must also prove that: (1) the existing 27 facility presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA; and (2) the removal of the 1 Mr. Johnson has adequately alleged an ADA claim. First, Mr. Johnson has established that 2 he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Under the ADA, a physical impairment that 3 substantially affects a major life activity, such as walking, qualifies as a disability. 42 U.S.C. 4 §§ 12102(1)(A), (2)(A). Mr. Johnson is a C-5 quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility. 5 Compl. ¶ 1; Mot. 1, 8. Second, Mr. Johnson alleges that Defendants own the Restaurant, a place of 6 public accommodation. Compl. ¶¶ 2–9, 15; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A) (listing “an inn, 7 hotel, motel, or other place of lodging” as a place of public accommodation). Third, Mr. Johnson 8 alleges that during several visits to the Restaurant, he personally encountered access barriers with 9 respect to the parking lot, transaction counter, door hardware, and restrooms. Compl. ¶¶ 14–43; 10 Mot. 9. 11 Next, with respect to the architectural barriers, Mr. Johnson contends that Defendants’ 12 parking lot, transaction counter, door hardware, and restroom are architectural barriers that violate 13 the 1991 and 2010 Standards of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (the “ADAAG”). Mot. 9–12. 14 The ADAAG provide “objective contours of the standard that architectural features must not 15 impede disabled individuals’ full and equal enjoyment of accommodations.” Chapman, 631 F.3d 16 at 945. As such, “a violation of the ADAAG constitutes a barrier under the ADA.” Ridola, 2018 17 WL 2287668, at *7. However, Mr. Johnson incorrectly applies the 2010 Standards to his claims. 18 The 1991 Standards apply to construction completed before March 15, 2012, while the 2010 19 Standards apply to construction or alterations after that date. See id. (“Alterations to facilities 20 undertaken after March 15, 2012 must comply with the 2010 Standards.” (citing 28 C.F.R. 21 § 35.151(c)(5)(i))). Here, Mr. Johnson submits public records showing that the Restaurant was 22 constructed in 1954, prior to March 2012, but does not submit evidence that construction or 23 alteration has been made to the Restaurant since 1954. See Public Rs. 6. Accordingly, the Court 24 applies the 1991 ADAAG Standards. However, the 2010 Standards govern any injunction that the 25 Court issues, as all remedial work will be undertaken after March 15, 2012. 26 Mr. Johnson claims that the Restaurant’s failure to provide accessible parking violates the 27 ADAAG Standards. Mot. 9–11. First, Mr. Johnson argues that the Restaurant fails to provide 1 accessible parking spaces. Mot. 9–10. Rather than contending the deficiencies violated any 2 express ADA or ADAAG provision, Mr. Johnson argues, “[u]nder the ADA, the method, color of 3 marking, and length of the parking space are to be addressed by State or local law or regulations.” 4 Mot. 9. And because the identified deficiencies purportedly violate the California Building Code 5 (“CBC”), Mr. Johnson contends they violate the ADA. Mot. 9–10. However, this Court maintains 6 that “there is [] no basis for treating a violation of the California Building Code as a per se 7 violation of the ADA.” Johnson v. Cala Stevens Creek/Monroe, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d. 904, 913 8 (N.D. Cal. 2019); see also Shaw v. Kelley, No. 16-CV-03768-VKD, 2019 WL 497620, at *4 (N.D. 9 Cal. Feb. 7, 2019) (“[A] purported failure to comply with a provision of the California Building 10 Code is not a violation of the ADA.”); Johnson v. 42816 Mission Blvd LLC, No. 17-CV-03040- 11 CRB, 2018 WL 3008677, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018) (“Johnson’s attempt to premise an ADA 12 violation on the California standard regarding lettering fails.”). Therefore, the Court finds that the 13 Restaurant’s improper markings and signage do not rise to an ADA violation. 14 Second, Mr. Johnson alleges there is an insufficient number of accessible parking spaces 15 at the Restaurant. Compl. ¶ 23. Under the 1991 ADAAG Standards, there must be a minimum of 16 three accessible parking spaces in a parking lot that has a total of 51 to 75 spaces. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, 17 App. A § 4.1.2(5)(a). During Mr. Johnson’s visits to the Restaurant, he encountered only two 18 “faded, uneven” parking spaces reserved for persons with disabilities out of approximately 64 19 parking spaces total. Compl. ¶ 23. Therefore, accepting the Mr. Johnson’s allegations as true, the 20 Court agrees with Mr. Johnson’s allegations that the lack of van accessible parking represents a 21 violation of the ADA (or, as discussed below, the Unruh Act). 22 Third, Mr. Johnson claims that the parking stalls and access aisles reserved for persons 23 with disabilities were not level with each other and had greater slopes than 2.1%. Compl. ¶¶ 20– 24 21; Mot. 10–11. Under the 1991 Standards, parking spaces and access aisles must be level with 25 surface slopes not exceeding a one to fifty ratio (2%) in all directions. 28 C.F.R., Pt. 36, App. D 26 § 4.6.3. “An essential consideration for any design is having the access aisle level with the parking 27 space.” Id. “Since a person with a disability, using a lift or ramp, must maneuver within the access 1 between the accessible parking spaces has a slope exceeding a one to fifty ratio. Mot. at 10–11; 2 see Mot. Ex. 4, Pictures 49–52, ECF 42-8. Accepting Mr. Johnson’s allegations as true, the Court 3 finds that he has successfully demonstrated that the Restaurant’s parking aisle is not in compliance 4 with the ADA (or, as discussed below, the Unruh Act) and that the condition of the parking aisle 5 denied him full and equal access to the Restaurant and parking lot because of his disability. 6 In addition, Mr. Johnson claims that the Restaurant failed to provide an accessible 7 transaction counter. Compl. ¶ 25–26. Mr. Johnson alleges that the Restaurant’s transaction counter 8 was not readily accessible and useable to him because Defendants placed menus, a tip jar, and a 9 card reader on the dates of his visits. Compl. ¶ 25–26. However, merely alleging that a sales 10 counter was cluttered with merchandise is insufficient by itself to support the conclusion that a 11 wheelchair user was deprived of “full and equal” access to the services of a public 12 accommodation. See Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., No. 2:16-cv-2797 WBS AC, 2019 WL 699136, 13 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2019) (denying summary judgment on allegation of “counter [] cluttered 14 with merchandise”); see also Johnson v. Starbucks Corp., 818 F. App'x 657, 660 (9th Cir. 2020) 15 (affirming summary judgment of ADA claims in favor of Starbucks Corp. where plaintiff alleged 16 that a transaction counter was less than 36 inches long because it was covered by merchandise 17 displays). Consequently, Mr. Johnson has failed to show that he was denied public 18 accommodations with respect to the transaction counter. 19 Mr. Johnson also claims that the Restaurant fails to provide accessible door hardware, 20 resulting in violation of the ADA. Compl. ¶¶ 28–31; Mot. 11. According to Mr. Johnson, the door 21 hardware at the hallway leading to the restroom and the restroom door hardware had a “traditional 22 style round knob that required tight grasping and twisting of the wrist to operate.” Compl. ¶¶ 29– 23 31. Mr. Johnson correctly notes that the 1991 ADAAG Standards provide that door hardware must 24 have a shape that is easy to grasp with one hand and does not require tight grasping, tight 25 pinching, or twisting of the wrist to operate. See Mot. 11. The 1991 ADAAG Standards provide: 26 “Handles, pulls, latches, locks, and other operating devices on accessible doors shall have a shape 27 that is easy to grasp with one hand and does not require tight grasping, tight pinching, or twisting 1 § 4.23.2 (“Doors to accessible bathrooms shall comply with 4.13.”). Accepting Mr. Johnson’s 2 allegations as true, the Court finds that he has successfully demonstrated that the Restaurant’s lack 3 of accessible door hardware violates the ADA. 4 Finally, Mr. Johnson claims that the Restaurant’s failure to provide an accessible restroom 5 sink violates the 1991 ADAAG Standards. Mot. at 11. Particularly, Mr. Johnson claims the 6 Restaurant’s sinks failed to “provide knee clearance of at least 29 inches in height”, in violation of 7 the 1991 ADAAG Standards. Mot. 11; see Compl. ¶ 40; Pictures 32–33. Under the 1991 ADAAG 8 Standards, “[k]nee clearance that is at least 27 in (685 mm) high, 30 in (760 mm) wide, and 19 in 9 (485 mm) deep shall be provided underneath sinks.” 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.24.3. Accepting 10 Mr. Johnson’s allegations as true, the Court finds that he has successfully demonstrated that the 11 Restaurant’s lack of accessible restroom sinks violates the ADA (or, as discussed below, the 12 Unruh Act) and that the restroom denied him full and equal access to the Restaurant because of his 13 disability. 14 With respect to the “readily achievable” element of his ADA claim, citing Wilson v. Haria 15 & Gogri Corp., Mr. Johnson argues that the question of whether removal of the barriers is “readily 16 achievable” is an affirmative defense that must be pled by the answering party. See Mot. at 11–12; 17 see also 479 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2007). Accordingly, Mr. Johnson believes that this 18 affirmative defense has been waived because Defendants’ answer has been struck and Defendants 19 have not otherwise appeared in this matter. See Mot. at 11–12; Order. 20 The Ninth Circuit recently decided to follow a burden-shifting framework to determine 21 who bears the burden of proving that removal of an architectural barrier is readily achievable. See 22 Lopez v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., No. 19-55136, 2020 WL 5405677, at *3–*5 (9th Cir. 23 Sept. 9, 2020). Under this burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of 24 plausibly showing that a proposal for removing a barrier is readily achievable, and then the 25 defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on an affirmative defense that removal of a 26 barrier is not readily achievable. See id. 27 In this action, Mr. Johnson has met his initial burden to plausibly show that removal of the 1 Mr. Johnson alleges that the identified barriers are “easily removed without much difficulty or 2 expense” and that they are “the types of barriers identified by the Department of Justice as 3 presumably readily achievable to [be] remove[d].” Compl. ¶ 47. Additionally, the Complaint 4 alleges that “there are numerous alternative accommodations” to provide people with disabilities a 5 greater level of access even if Defendants could not achieve a complete removal of barriers. 6 Compl. ¶ 47. Mr. Johnson provides such alternative accommodation examples with sample 7 pricing. Compl. ¶¶ 48–51. 8 Federal regulations provide a non-exclusive list of steps to remove barriers, including 9 “[c]reating designated accessible parking spaces,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(18), and “[i]nstalling 10 accessible door hardware,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(11). Courts have also observed that the listed 11 items are “examples of readily achievable steps to remove barriers.” Johnson v. Altimira Corp., 12 No. 16-cv-05335 NC, 2017 WL 1383469, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Moreover, at the default 13 judgment stage, courts have found allegations similar to Mr. Johnson’s allegations sufficient to 14 show that the removal of the barriers at issue is readily achievable. See, e.g., Ridola, 2018 WL 15 2287668, at *10–*11 (concluding that plaintiff met his burden with respect to defendant’s parking 16 spaces and guestrooms). 17 Because Mr. Johnson has met his burden, Defendants now have the burden of persuasion 18 on an affirmative defense that removal of the identified barriers is not readily achievable. Here, 19 Defendants defaulted and have not defended this action. Thus, Defendants have failed to meet 20 their burden to show that removal of the identified barriers is not readily achievable. 21 In sum, the Court finds that Mr. Johnson has alleged the requisite elements for an ADA 22 claim. 23 ii. Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53 24 “Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.” M.J. 25 Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d at 731 (citing Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f)). Thus, because Mr. 26 Johnson has alleged an ADA claim based on the Restaurant’s parking spaces and slope, door 27 hardware, and restroom, he has also alleged an Unruh Act claim based on those barriers. C. The amount of money at stake 1 The fourth Eitel factor requires the Court to consider the sum of money at stake in relation 2 to the seriousness of a defendant’s conduct. Love v. Griffin, No. 18-cv-00976-JSC, 2018 WL 3 4471073, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2018). Mr. Johnson seeks statutory damages of $16,000 under 4 the Unruh Act and an award of $4,731 for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court has reduced this 5 amount, as discussed below. While the sum awarded is not insignificant, the Court finds that it is 6 proportional to the conduct alleged and that this factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 7 D. The possibility of a dispute concerning material facts and whether Defendants 8 default was due to excusable neglect 9 Under the fifth and sixth Eitel factors, the Court considers whether there is a possibility of 10 a dispute over any material fact and whether Defendants’ failure to respond was the result of 11 excusable neglect. Griffin, 2018 WL 4471073, at *5; Ridola, 2018 WL 2287668, at *13. Because 12 Mr. Johnson pleads plausible claims for violations of the ADA and the Unruh Act, and as all 13 liability-related allegations are deemed true, there is nothing before the Court that would indicate a 14 possibility of a dispute as to material facts. Moreover, there is no indication that Defendants’ 15 default was due to excusable neglect. Defendants have abandoned the case and ignored five prior 16 court orders, suggesting that they have chosen not to present a defense in this matter. Accordingly, 17 these factors weigh in favor of default judgment. 18 E. The strong policy favoring decisions on the merits 19 While the Court prefers to decide matters on the merits, Defendants’ failure to participate 20 in this litigation makes that impossible. See Ridola, 2018 WL 2287668, at *13 (“Although federal 21 policy favors decision on the merits, Rule 55(b)(2) permits entry of default judgment in situations, 22 such as this, where a defendant refuses to litigate.”). Default judgment, therefore, is Mr. Johnson’s 23 only recourse. See United States v. Roof Guard Roofing Co., No. 17-cv-02592-NC, 2017 WL 24 6994215, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2017) (“When a properly adversarial search for the truth is 25 rendered futile, default judgment is the appropriate outcome.”). As such, the seventh Eitel factor 26 weighs in favor of default judgment. 27 F. Conclusion 1 that default judgment is warranted and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against 2 Defendants. 3 V. REQUESTED RELIEF 4 Because this Court concludes that default judgment is warranted, it now considers Mr. 5 Johnson’s request for injunctive relief, statutory damages under the Unruh Act, and attorneys’ fees 6 and costs. 7 A. Injunctive relief 8 Mr. Johnson requests an order directing Defendants to bring the Restaurant’s parking 9 spaces and lot, transaction counter, door hardware, and restroom into compliance with the 2010 10 ADAAG Standards. See Mot. 1, 14. “A plaintiff need not satisfy ‘[t]he standard requirements for 11 equitable relief . . . when an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a federal statute [that] 12 specifically provides for injunctive relief.’” Griffin, 2018 WL 4471073, at *6 (quoting Moeller v. 13 Taco Bell, 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2011)). Under the ADA, aggrieved individuals 14 “may obtain injunctive relief against public accommodations with architectural barriers, including 15 ‘an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals 16 with disabilities.’” M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d at 730 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). Injunctive 17 relief is also available under the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(h). Injunctive relief is 18 proper where the plaintiff establishes that “architectural barriers at the defendant’s establishment 19 violate the ADA and the removal of the barriers is readily achievable.” Ridola, 2018 WL 2287668, 20 at *13 (internal citation omitted). As discussed above for the second and third Eitel factors, Mr. 21 Johnson has demonstrated that the number of accessible parking spaces, parking lot aisle slope, 22 door hardware, and restroom sink at the Restaurant violate the ADA and that the removal of the 23 associated barriers is readily achievable. 24 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief to bring the 25 Restaurant’s parking lot spaces and slope, door hardware, and restroom in line with the 2010 26 ADAAG Standards. 27 B. Statutory damages 1 Unruh Act. Mot. 14–15. The Unruh Act provides a minimum statutory damages award of $4,000 2 for each violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). Mr. Johnson “need not prove [he] suffered actual 3 damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d at 4 731. “Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.” Id. at 731 5 (citing Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f)). Mr. Johnson has sufficiently pled that the number of 6 accessible parking spaces, parking lot slope, door hardware, and restroom sink at the Restaurant 7 violated the ADA on the four separate occasions he visited the Restaurant. As such, these barriers 8 at the Restaurant constitute a violation of the Unruh Act. 9 The Court understands that Mr. Johnson is only requesting statutory damages. However, 10 Mr. Johnson does not explain why he visited and returned to the Restaurant so many times over a 11 three-month period. See Compl. ¶ 14. There is no indication in the record that Mr. Johnson 12 received any type of assurance that the access barriers were removed. The Court can only assume 13 the multiple visits were intended to increase the amount of statutory damages Mr. Johnson could 14 receive in this case. See Pickern v. Nord Mkt., No. 2:17-CV-1130-JAM-CMK, 2017 WL 6622749, 15 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2017) (reducing the plaintiff’s request for statutory damages under the 16 Unruh Act for four visits to two visits because the Court could only “assume [the plaintiff’s] 17 frequent visits were only intended to increase the amount of damages she could receive in such a 18 case”). The sheer number of ADA cases that Mr. Johnson is litigating in this District also indicates 19 that Mr. Johnson is simply interested in increasing the amount of damages received in such cases. 20 See Johnson v. Baglietto, No. 19-CV-06206-TSH, 2020 WL 3065939, at *11 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 21 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-06206-HSG, 2020 WL 3060902 (N.D. 22 Cal. June 9, 2020) (“[Plaintiff’s counsel] has stated that as of November 7, 2019, [Plaintiff’s 23 counsel’s firm], consisting of 20 lawyers, was simultaneously litigating ‘over a thousand’ ADA 24 cases in the Northern District of California and approximately 1,500 ADA cases in the Central 25 District of California. The law firm had previously litigated approximately 2,500 ADA cases in 26 the Eastern District of California.” (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, the Court finds Mr. 27 Johnson’s request for statutory damages for four visits is unreasonable and that he is only entitled 1 comparable amount to similar ADA cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Chi Mai, No. 19-CV-00827-BLF, 2 2020 WL 5074191, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) (awarding Mr. Johnson $4,000 in statutory 3 damages despite two visits to the nail salon allegedly in violation of the ADA and Unruh Act); 4 Johnson v. VN All. LLC, No. 18-CV-01372-BLF, 2019 WL 2515749, at *1, *7 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 5 2019) (awarding Mr. Johnson’s requested amount of $4,000 despite four visits to the Inn allegedly 6 in violation of the ADA and Unruh Act). The Court, therefore, grants Mr. Johnson $4,000 in 7 statutory damages. 8 C. Attorneys’ fees 9 Mr. Johnson requests $3,896 in attorneys’ fees under both the ADA and the Unruh Act. 10 Mot. 15. In support of the fees requested, Mr. Johnson presents detailed billing entries attached to 11 a Russell Handy’s Declaration, expert analysis of fees for ADA-plaintiff attorneys by fee experts 12 Richard Pearl and John O’Connor, and a survey report pulled from the Real Rate Report for 2018. 13 Mot. 15–18; see Mot. Ex. 1, Decl. of Russell Handy (“Handy Decl.”), ECF 42-41; Mot. Ex. 6, 14 Decl. of Richard M. Pearl (“Pearl Decl.”), ECF 42-10; Mot. Ex. 7, Real Estate Report, ECF 42-11; 15 Mot. Ex. 8, Decl. of John D. O’Connor (“O’Connor Decl.”), ECF 42-12. 16 Further, Mr. Johnson cites four cases from the Northern District of California that have 17 granted attorneys’ fees at the hourly rates Mr. Johnson is requesting. Mot. 17, 20. The Court, 18 however, is not persuaded that this evidence justifies the attorneys’ fees requested by Mr. Johnson. 19 i. Legal Standard 20 The ADA gives courts the discretion to award attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties. M.J. 21 Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d at 730 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12205). Additionally, the Unruh Act provides that 22 “[i]n addition to any damages, injunction, or other equitable relief awarded in an action brought 23 pursuant to [Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)], the court may award the petitioner or plaintiff reasonable 24 attorney’s fees.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(i). 25 Whether calculating attorneys’ fees under California or federal law, courts follow “the 26 27 1 The Court notes that Mr. Handy states he is the attorney on record for the moving party, 1 ‘lodestar’ method, and the amount of that fee must be determined on the facts of each case.” 2 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ferland v. Conrad 3 Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)). Under the lodestar method, the most 4 useful starting point “is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a 5 reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), abrogated on other 6 grounds by Tex. State Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989). The 7 party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates 8 claimed. Id. 9 “In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the rate 10 prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, 11 experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 12 1986), reh’g denied, amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. 13 Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). “Generally, the relevant community is the forum in 14 which the district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th. Cir. 1997). The fee 15 applicant bears the burden of producing evidence, other than declarations of interested counsel, 16 that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by 17 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11. 18 Further, the district court should exclude hours that were not reasonably expended. See 19 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an 20 award and documenting the appropriate hours expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. 21 ii. Discussion 22 a. Rates 23 As an initial matter, the Court finds multiple discrepancies between the hourly rates 24 provided in the Motion, the billing statement, and Mr. Handy’s declaration. See Mot. Ex. 1, 25 Billing Statement, ECF 42-5; Handy Decl. ¶ 3–7; Mot. 20. First of all, the Motion itself does not 26 seek fees for attorney Chris Carson, but she does appear in Mr. Handy’s declaration and the 27 submitted billing statement. Mot. 20; see Billing Statement 2–3; Handy Decl. ¶ 5. In addition, in 1 charge $595 per hour. See Billing Statement 2–3; Mot. 20. According to Mr. Handy’s declaration, 2 however, Mr. Potter and Mr. Handy charged $650 per hour. See Handy Decl. ¶ 3–4. The Court 3 need not scrutinize these discrepancies because it is not persuaded that Mr. Johnson’s arguments 4 justify even the lower rates of $595 per hour. 5 The Court finds that the rates Mr. Johnson seeks exceed the rates granted in this 6 community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 7 reputation. The relevant community for this action is the Northern District of California. Indeed, 8 for attorneys with approximately 20 or more years of experience, courts in this district have 9 generally approved hourly rates ranging from $350 to $495 in disability cases. See, e.g., Castillo- 10 Antonio v. Lam, No. 18-cv-04593-EDL, 2019 WL 2642469, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2019) 11 (approving, on motion for default judgment, $350 hourly rate for attorney with over 20 years of 12 experience); Johnson v. Castagnola, No. 18-cv-00583-SVK, 2019 WL 827640, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 13 Feb. 21, 2019) (approving $350 hourly rate for attorney with 20 years of litigation experience, 14 noting that requested rate was unopposed by defendant and in line with rates approved in Northern 15 District); Wilson v. Red Robin Int’l, Inc., No. 17-cv-00685-BLF, 2018 WL 5982868, at *3 (N.D. 16 Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) (approving $495 hourly rate for attorney with 24 years of experience in civil 17 rights litigation, including 12 years devoted to disability law and $475 hourly rate for attorney 18 with over 17 years of litigation experience and more than 8 years of experience in disability law). 19 Here, Mr. Handy has 20 years of experience, Mr. Potter has 25 years of experience, Ms. 20 Seabock has about nine years of experience, Ms. Carson has over five years of experience, and 21 Ms. Gutierrez has less than five years of experience focusing on disability cases. See Handy Decl. 22 ¶ 3–7. This Court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s observation that “[t]he district court’s function 23 is to award fees that reflect economic conditions in the district; it is not to ‘hold the line’ at a 24 particular rate, or to resist a rate because it would be a ‘big step.’” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 25 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008). Mr. Handy and Mr. Potter have recently been granted hourly 26 rate increases, from $425 to $475, in actions representing Mr. Johnson, and Ms. Seabock and Ms. 27 Carson has recently been granted an hourly rate of $350. See Johnson v. Patel, No. 18-CV-00211- 1 $350 per hour); Johnson v. Oakwood Ctr. LLC, No. 19-cv-01582-VKD, 2019 WL 7209040, at *12 2 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 27, 2019) (denying Mr. Potter and Mr. Handy an hourly rate of $650, instead 3 granting an hourly rate of $475; granting Ms. Seabock an hourly rate of $350); see also VN All. 4 LLC, 2019 WL 2515749 (granting Mr. Potter and Mr. Handy an hourly rate of $425). In view of 5 the range of rates approved for attorneys practicing in this field, and further recognizing that 6 “decisions pertaining to the same attorneys in question are particularly salient,” the Court awards 7 fees for Mr. Handy and Mr. Potter at $475 per hour and for Ms. Seabock and Ms. Carson at $350 8 per hour. See Patel, 2020 WL 1865304, at *6; Oakwood Ctr. LLC, 2019 WL 7209040, at *12. As 9 an attorney who graduated less than five years ago and has less than five years of experience 10 litigating disability cases, this court awards Ms. Gutierrez $250 per hour. See Johnson v. 11 AutoZone, Inc., No. 17-CV-02941-PJH, 2019 WL 2288111, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) 12 (awarding a $250 hourly fee rate for attorneys who graduated law school between five and eight 13 years ago in a similar ADA case involving Mr. Johnson, who was represented by the same firm in 14 this action). 15 The Court is not persuaded by Mr. Johnson’s cited cases or support. To support the 16 reasonableness of the hourly rates in the Motion ($595, $450, and $400), Mr. Johnson relies on In 17 re Linkedin and In re Magsafe as examples of attorneys’ rates in the Northern District of 18 California. See Mot. 17 (citing In re Linkedin User Privacy Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573, 591 (N.D. Cal. 19 2015), and In re Magsafe Apple Power Adapter Litig., No. 5:091-cv-01911-EJD, 2015 WL 20 428105, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015)). In re Linkedin and In re Magsafe, however, are both 21 class action suits that do not contain any ADA claims. See In re Linkedin, 309 F.R.D. at 580–81; 22 In re Magsafe, 2015 WL 428105, at *1. Moreover, the relevant community is only one of the 23 considerations when determining an appropriate hourly rate. Mr. Johnson does not provide any 24 information about the skill, experience, or reputation of the attorneys in either of those cases. 25 Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that the rates awarded in either case are appropriate here. 26 Next, Mr. Johnson relies on declarations by fee experts Richard Pearl and John O’Connor 27 along with a survey report from the Real Rate Report for 2018. See O’Connor Decl.; Pearl Decl.; 1 20 to 25 years of experience had court-approved rates of between $500 and $675 per hour, while 2 attorneys with more than six years of experience had court-approved rates ranging between $350 3 and $425 per hour. Pearl Decl. ¶ 9(a). Attorneys with less than five years of experience had court- 4 approved rates ranging between $250 and $435 per hour. Pearl Decl. ¶ 9(a). Similarly, the Real 5 Rate Report shows that median rates for partners doing litigation work in San Jose is $675 per 6 hour and median rates for associates is $495 per hour. Real Estate Report 016. However, Mr. 7 Pearl’s declaration and the Real Rate Report fail to consider the nature of work done and the skill 8 or reputation of the attorneys in each case. As such, the Court is not persuaded that Mr. Pearl’s 9 declaration or the Real Rate Report provide a more salient assessment of rates than those 10 previously granted to Mr. Johnson’s attorneys. 11 In addition, Mr. O’Connor states in his declaration that reasonable partner fee rates in 12 ADA cases range from $450 to $750 per hour, while an appropriate range for associates is 13 between $350 and $550 per hour. O’Connor Decl. ¶ 33. This is similar to what the Court has 14 awarded to Mr. Johnson’s attorneys in this case, and Mr. Johnson does not adequately justify the 15 high ends of the stated rates. “[W]hen a matter ‘is a relatively simple one, involving straight- 16 forward application of the law, and which does not present novel or difficult issues requiring a 17 high level of skill or specialization,’ courts have generally found that higher rates are 18 unwarranted.” See Baglietto, 2020 WL 3065939, at *11 (citing Oakwood Ctr. LLC, 2019 WL 19 7209040, at *13). And as mentioned above, “[t]he sheer number of ADA cases that [Mr. 20 Johnson’s] counsel is litigating [] underscores the straightforward nature of their cases.” Id. 21 Lastly, Mr. Johnson cites to two decisions by another court in this district: Love v. 22 Rivendell II, Ltd., in which the court approved a $650 hourly rate for Mr. Potter and Mr. Handy 23 and a $410 hourly rate for Ms. Carson, and Johnson v. Khalsa, in which the court approved a $650 24 hourly rate for Mr. Potter and Mr. Handy and a $450 hourly rate for Ms. Seabock. See Mot. 20; 25 see also R. & R., Love v. Rivendell II, Ltd., No. 18-cv-03907-JST (EDL) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 26 2019) (“R. & R., Love v. Rivendell II, Ltd.”), ECF 25; Order Adopting R. & R., Love v. Rivendell 27 II, Ltd., No. 18-cv-03907-JST (EDL) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2019), ECF 30; R. & R., Johnson v. 1 ECF 25; Order Adopting R. & R., Johnson v. Khalsa, No. 4:19-cv-02725-SBA (N.D. Cal. April 8, 2 2020), ECF 26. In both Rivendell and Khalsa, Mr. Johnson asked for fees as part of a motion for 3 default judgment, and, as with his claim here, Mr. Johnson alleged that the defendants failed to 4 provide accessible parking spaces for disabled persons. See R. & R., Johnson v. Khalsa; R. & R., 5 Love v. Rivendell II, Ltd. As other courts in this district recently observed, the Rivendell decision 6 relied on cases, such as Civil Rights Education and Rodriguez, that concerned work that was 7 substantially different than the work performed in the present action. See, e.g., Oakwood Ctr. LLC, 8 2019 WL 7209040, at *11 (granted default judgment in ADA case but distinguished case from 9 Civil Rights Education and Rodriguez); AutoZone, Inc., 2019 WL 2288111, at *6 n.4 (same). 10 Indeed, Civil Rights Education was a complex class action matter involving 54 hotels spread 11 among multiple states and Rodriguez involved an ADA claim that included trial and post-trial 12 attorneys’ fees. See Civil Rights Educ. and Enforcement Ctr. v. Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc., 13 No. 15-cv-00216-DMR, 2016 WL 1177950, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016); Rodriguez v. 14 Barrita, 53 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1279–80 (N.D. Cal. 2014). And the Khalsa decision in awarding 15 attorneys’ fees was reached without explicitly relying on any case law. See R. & R., Johnson v. 16 Khalsa, at 6. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that the rates awarded in Rivendell or Khalsa 17 are appropriate here. Aside from Rivendell and Khalsa, Mr. Johnson does not identify any other 18 rulings in which courts have awarded Mr. Johnson fees at this rate for any of his attorneys. See 19 Mot. 20. As such, the Court is not persuaded that Mr. Johnson’s evidence justifies the rates he is 20 requesting. 21 b. Hours 22 Mr. Johnson requests fees based on 8.1 hours of work. See Billing Statement 1. This Court 23 and other courts in this district have found approximately 11 hours of work to be reasonable for 24 similar cases. See, e.g., Ridola, 2018 WL 2287668 at *17 (granted motion for default judgment in 25 ADA case, found 11.1 hours to be reasonable); VN Alliance LLC, 2019 WL 2515749, at *8 26 (granted motion for default judgment in ADA case, found 11.3 hours to be reasonable). Mr. 27 Johnson’s billing statement shows 8.1 hours were expended in this litigation: Mr. Handy and Mr. 1 Gutierrez expended 3.1 hours. See Billing Statement 2–3. Further, the Court has reviewed the 2 itemized statement of Mr. Johnson’s counsel’s legal work and finds no issue with the amount of 3 time or activities that Mr. Johnson’s counsel has conducted. Billing Statement 2–3. 4 iii. Conclusion 5 In sum, the Court finds the adjusted hourly rates of $475, $350, and $250 and the 8.1 hours 6 expended to be reasonable. Mr. Johnson does not request a multiplier for the lodestar amount. 7 Multiplying the reasonable hourly rates, $475, $350 and $250, and the hours reasonably expended, 8 2.8, 2.2., and 3.1 respectively, yields a lodestar amount of $2875 in attorneys’ fees. 9 D. Costs 10 In addition, Mr. Johnson seeks $835 in costs. Mot. 21. This includes the filing fee ($400), 11 service costs ($35), and investigation costs ($400). The ADA provides that the prevailing party 12 may recover “litigation expenses[] and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205; see VN Alliance LLC, 2019 WL 13 2515749, at *8 (including investigation costs into litigation expenses). As such, Mr. Johnson has 14 provided a billing statement to substantiate his request for $835 in filing fees, service costs, and 15 investigation costs. Billing Statement 1. 16 VI. ORDER 17 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 18 1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED. 19 2. Plaintiff is awarded statutory damages in the amount of $4,000. 20 3. Plaintiff is awarded $3,710 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 21 4. Plaintiff is granted an injunction requiring Defendants to bring their parking lot 22 spaces and slope, door hardware, and restroom sink into compliance with the 2010 23 ADAAG Standards no later than six months after service of this injunction. 24 Plaintiff shall promptly serve Defendants with this Order and file a proof of service with 25 the Court. 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 1 Dated: October 5, 2020 kom han □□□ 2 3 BETH LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 a 12 14 © 15 16 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Document Info

Docket Number: 5:18-cv-05718

Filed Date: 10/5/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/20/2024