Sladkov v. Berryhill ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HALINA SLADKOV, Case No. 19-cv-02026-KAW 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING 10 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. Nos. 21, 22 12 13 Plaintiff Halina Sladkov seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the 14 Commissioner’s final decision, and the remand of this case for issuance of a waiver of an 15 overpayment, or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. 16 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s 17 cross-motion for summary judgment. Having considered the papers filed by the parties, and for 18 the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and 19 GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On May 9, 2005, Plaintiff applied for spousal insurance benefits based on her marriage to 22 the wage earner, Vladimir Sladkov, in June 1987. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 17.) On May 23 14, 2005, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) found that Plaintiff was entitled to monthly 24 spousal’s benefits. (AR 22.) On October 23, 2014, a letter was sent to Plaintiff advising her that 25 she would be receiving “monthly widow’s benefits . . . because of the death of VLADIMIR 26 SLADKOV.” (AR 27.) 27 On March 18, 2015, and April 15, 2015 the SSA informed Plaintiff that she had been 1 Plaintiff not being entitled to any spousal benefits, as Plaintiff’s marriage had been annulled in 2 June 1988. (See AR 118.) Specifically, on June 27, 1988, the County of San Mateo Superior 3 Court issued a judgment, stating that Plaintiff had been served with process on December 3, 1987. 4 (AR 61.) Plaintiff did not appear in the annulment proceedings, and the Superior Court entered a 5 judgment that the marriage was null due to fraud. (AR 61.) On June 28, 1988, the judgment was 6 mailed to Plaintiff’s address at 101 Eastmoor, Daly City, California. (AR 62.) 7 On May 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a “Request for Waiver of Overpayment Recovery.” (AR 8 153-60.) Plaintiff asserted that the overpayment was not her fault because she believed that the 9 social security benefits were her own. (AR 153-54.) Plaintiff stated that she did not know until 10 January 2015 that Mr. Sladkov had died or that they were no longer married, as she had not lived 11 with him since 1992-1993. (AR 159-60.) Plaintiff also stated that she only spoke limited English. 12 (AR 160.) 13 On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff’s son, Andrzej Szapalas, submitted a statement stating that 14 he came to the United States in June 1990. (AR 202.) He was met at the airport by Plaintiff and 15 Mr. Sladkov. Mr. Szapalas believed Plaintiff and Mr. Sladkov were legally married, although they 16 were living separately. Mr. Szapalas later moved into Plaintiff’s apartment, while Mr. Sladkov 17 moved to Walnut Creek. (AR 202.) From that point on, Plaintiff lived separately from Mr. 18 Sladkov, although she saw him on social occasions until they stopped seeing each other about 19 three to four years after Mr. Szapalas came to the United States. (AR 202.) Mr. Szapalas stated 20 that when Mr. Sladkov introduced him to Mr. Sladkov’s daughters, Mr. Sladkov referred to 21 Plaintiff as his wife. (AR 202.) 22 On September 21, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing, at which 23 Plaintiff testified with the assistance of an interpreter. (AR 208, 217.) Plaintiff testified that she 24 had married Mr. Sladkov in June 1987. (AR 221.) Plaintiff moved in with Mr. Sladkov, and they 25 resided together for a few years at the Eastmoor address. (AR 222.) During that time, Mr. 26 Sladkov took many trips abroad, sometimes for months at a time. (AR 223-24.) Plaintiff also 27 knew that Mr. Sladkov was going to Los Angeles and meeting other women romantically, getting 1 Plaintiff further testified that she did not know what year Mr. Sladkov had died. (AR 228.) 2 When asked if Mr. Sladkov had informed Plaintiff that he had married someone else, Plaintiff 3 stated that she “didn’t know anything,” and that they “were not meeting. [She] didn’t know where 4 he was. He just disappeared.” (AR 228.) The ALJ asked if Mr. Sladkov had informed Plaintiff 5 that he had filed for divorce, and Plaintiff responded, “No. Absolutely not. I never had any 6 contact. I never – I was never – I didn’t know where he was at all.” (AR 228.) Plaintiff stated 7 that she did not know that Mr. Sladkov had petitioned for the marriage to be annulled. (AR 229.) 8 On February 26, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s waiver request. (AR 9 13-16.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff was overpaid benefits because her marriage to Mr. Sladkov 10 had been annulled in June 1988, and that Plaintiff was at fault in causing the overpayment. (AR 11 15.) In finding Plaintiff was at fault, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony that she was not 12 aware that her marriage had been annulled or that Mr. Sladkov had filed for an annulment, and 13 that she believed they were separated but still married. (AR 15.) The ALJ, however, pointed to 14 the June 27, 1988 judgment, which stated that Plaintiff had been served with process in December 15 1987. (AR 15.) A copy of the judgment was then mailed to the claimant on June 28, 1988. (AR 16 15.) Mr. Sladkov subsequently remarried in 2005, before he passed away in October 2014. (AR 17 15.) The ALJ also explained that Plaintiff had testified that Mr. Sladkov had only sporadically 18 stayed with her after 1988, and that Plaintiff was aware Mr. Sladkov was pursuing other women. 19 (AR 16.) Based on these facts, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had accepted social security 20 payments that she knew or should have known were incorrect. (AR 16.) 21 On February 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 4.) 22 On February 15, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 4.) On 23 April 4, 2019, Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 24 (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) 25 Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2019. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 26 No. 21.) Defendant filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment on November 26, 27 2019. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 22.) Plaintiff filed her reply on December 10, 2019. (Pl.’s Reply, 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Section 404(a) permits the Commissioner to recover overpaid disability benefits. 42 3 U.S.C. § 404(a). A claimant may obtain a waiver for the overpayment if the Commissioner finds: 4 “(1) [the] claimant is without fault in receiving the payment and (2) requiring repayment would 5 either defeat the purpose of Title II or would be against equity and good conscience.” Quinlivan v. 6 Sullivan, 916 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1990). 7 An individual is at fault if the incorrect payment resulted from: “(a) An incorrect statement 8 made by the individual which he knew or should have known to be incorrect; or (b) Failure to 9 furnish information which he knew or should have known to be material; or (c) . . . acceptance of 10 payment which he either knew or could have been expected to know was incorrect.” 20 C.F.R. § 11 404.507. “The claimant of an overpayment has the burden of proving that he was without fault.” 12 Anderson v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1990). 13 “The fault inquiry is highly subjective, highly individualized, and highly dependent on the 14 interaction between the intentions and state of mind of the [plaintiff] and the peculiar 15 circumstances of his situation.” Conley v. Berryhill, Case No. 13-cv-4807-JSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. 16 LEXIS 123568, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2017) (internal quotation omitted). In making this 17 determination, the Commissioner must consider “all the pertinent circumstances surrounding the 18 payment,” including any “physical, mental, educational, or linguistic limitations (including any 19 lack of facility with the English language) the individual may have.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.552. In 20 short, the “fault determination requires a reasonable person to be viewed in the claimant’s own 21 circumstances and with whatever mental and physical limitations the claimant might have.” 22 Harrison v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1984). 23 In turn, the Commissioner’s “refusal to waive repayment should be affirmed if supported 24 by substantial evidence . . . .” Anderson, 914 F.2d at 1122. “This is a highly deferential standard 25 of review: ‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 26 It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 27 conclusion.” Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff was at fault because she knew, or should have known, that 3 she was not married to Mr. Sladkov at the time she applied for wife’s insurance benefits. (AR 15.) 4 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence 5 because: (1) the ALJ did not consider her limited English, (2) Plaintiff stated in her written request 6 for a waiver that she thought she was receiving her own benefits, (3) the ALJ did not consider her 7 testimony that Mr. Sladkov did not tell her that he had filed for an annulment, and (4) the ALJ did 8 not discuss Mr. Szapalas’s statement. (Pl.’s Mot. at 7-8.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has not 9 met her burden of showing that the ALJ’s denial of her waiver was not supported by substantial 10 evidence. 11 First, Plaintiff cites no authority that the ALJ had to specifically discuss her limited 12 English. While the ALJ was required to consider Plaintiff’s limitations with English, the Ninth 13 Circuit has found that “the ALJ [i]s not obliged to render a specific finding regarding the 14 ‘pertinent circumstances’ of age, intelligence, education, and physical and mental health. Rather, 15 the regulation requires the ALJ to make fact findings regarding the three definitions of fault.” 16 Anderson, 914 F.2d at 1123. If the ALJ properly makes those determinations, the district court 17 may affirm. Id. 18 Additionally, Plaintiff points to no evidence that her English was so limited that she could 19 not understand the relevant documents, or that she even made that argument to the ALJ. Plaintiff 20 did not testify that she would not have understood the petition for annulment or subsequent 21 judgment, the May 9, 2005 application requesting spousal benefits, the May 14, 2015 letter stating 22 Plaintiff was entitled to spousal benefits, or the October 23, 2014 letter stating that Plaintiff would 23 now be receiving widow’s benefits because Mr. Sladkov had passed away. (See AR 17, 22, 27.) 24 Indeed, in her filings, Plaintiff does not state she could not understand these documents; rather, 25 she speculatively asserts that she “may not have understood” the petition for annulment, and that 26 “it is not clear” she understood the type of benefits she was receiving or understood the October 27 23, 2014 letter. (Pl.’s Reply at 3-4 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff has the burden of showing that 1 have impacted her understanding of key documents. 2 Additionally, certain facts that the ALJ found significant were not dependent on Plaintiff’s 3 understanding of English. For example, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s testimony that Mr. Sladkov 4 only sporadically stayed with her after 1988 and that she was aware he was pursuing other women. 5 (AR 16, 227.) Plaintiff also testified that she did not even know where Mr. Sladkov was, that he 6 had remarried, or that he had died. (AR 228.) Such facts could lead a reasonable fact finder to 7 conclude that Plaintiff knew or, at a minimum, should have known that she was no longer married 8 to Mr. Sladkov. Thus, the ALJ did not err. 9 Second, although Plaintiff stated in her written request for a waiver that she thought she 10 was receiving her own benefits, there were multiple documents in the record that showed Plaintiff 11 knew or should have known she was receiving spousal benefits. Specifically, Plaintiff filled out 12 an application requesting spousal benefits, received a letter stating she was being awarded spousal 13 benefits, and received a letter in October 2014 stating that she would now be receiving widow’s 14 benefits. (AR 17, 22, 27.) As discussed above, Plaintiff’s arguments that it was “not clear” she 15 understood these documents does not satisfy her burden of showing that there was no substantial 16 evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. 17 Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider her testimony that Mr. Sladkov did not 18 tell her that he had filed for annulment. The ALJ, however, acknowledged this testimony, but 19 went on to find that Plaintiff knew or should have known she was no longer married to Mr. 20 Sladkov “because she was served legal process in December 1987 and a copy of the judgment was 21 mailed to her.” (AR 15-16.) The ALJ also pointed to the fact that Mr. Sladkov only sporadically 22 stayed with Plaintiff after 1988 and that Plaintiff knew he was pursuing other women. 23 Finally, while the ALJ did not specifically address Mr. Szapalas’s statement, Plaintiff cites 24 no authority that the ALJ was required to discuss the statement. Further, while Mr. Szapalas’s 25 statement supports Plaintiff’s testimony that she believed she was still married to Mr. Sladkov, 26 Mr. Szapalas’s statement does not negate the facts that the ALJ relied on in finding that Plaintiff 27 knew or should have known that she was no longer married to Mr. Sladkov. (See AR 15-16.) 1 that Plaintiff knew or should have known that she was no longer married to Mr. Sladkov. In light 2 || of that finding, the ALJ did not need to address whether repayment would either defeat the 3 purposes of Title II or would be against equity and good conscience. See Anderson, 914 F.2d at 4 1124. 5 IV. CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary 7 || judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: October 22, 2020 . 10 andy A. dd | ORE United States Magistrate Judge 12 © 15 16 = 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28