Jones v. County of San Mateo ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ISAAC JONES, Case No. 3:21-cv-06017-WHO 8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS v. 9 Re: Dkt. No. 18 10 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al., Defendants. 11 12 13 Plaintiff Isaac Jones was assaulted by another detainee while in pretrial custody of the San 14 Mateo County Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff’s Office”). He alleges that the assaulter had 15 previously attacked other detainees for no reason while in Sheriff’s Office custody. He sued the 16 County of San Mateo (the “County”) and three of the facility’s officials for violating his 17 constitutional right to be free from violence by other detainees. The County and two of the 18 officials move to dismiss. The motion is denied when it comes to the claim against the individual 19 defendants: Jones has adequately pleaded that they knew or should have known of the risk to him 20 and exposed him to it anyway. The claim against the County is dismissed with leave to amend so 21 that Jones can adequately plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On August 5, 2019, plaintiff Isaac Jones was held in pretrial detention by the Sheriff’s 24 Office. Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. No. 1] ¶¶ 8, 10. He was put in a holding area for detainees 25 being transported to and from court. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant James Salomaa, a deputy on duty, placed 26 Jones in a holding cell with Alan Joseph Marquez. Id. 27 Marquez weighed 240 pounds and was six feet tall; Jones weighed 120 pounds and was 1 Marquez attacked him. Id. ¶ 17. According to Jones, Marquez “str[uck] him multiple times in the 2 head, face[,] and neck.” Id. Marquez used a sharpened toothbrush as a shank, stabbing him in the 3 head, neck, and back. Id. ¶ 18. Jones fell to the ground into a fetal position. Id. ¶ 17. While 4 Jones was on the ground, Marquez stomped and kicked his head. Id. ¶ 19. Salomaa heard the 5 fight. Id. ¶ 20. He and his sergeant, defendant Dennis Loubal, went to the cell and Salomaa 6 pulled Marquez off Jones. Id. ¶ 21. Jones had injuries to his head and a puncture wound. Id. ¶ 7 22. Salomaa arrested Marquez for “attempted murder.” Id. ¶ 24.1 8 Jones alleges that there were other areas he could have been held in than that cell, 9 including other cells. Id. ¶ 14. He did not know Marquez. Id. ¶ 15. He says that the attack was 10 unprovoked. Id. ¶ 27. Correctional officer and defendant Nicholas Janakos was also on duty 11 when Jones was put in the holding cell with Marquez. Id. ¶ 33. 12 Jones alleges that this was not Marquez’s first attack while in the custody of the Sheriff’s 13 Office. According to him, Marquez was in a holding cell in the San Mateo County Hall of Justice 14 on June 10, 2019, less than two months before the attack at issue. Id. ¶ 26. While there, Marquez 15 attacked another detainee “out of nowhere.” Id. Jones claims that a deputy (who is not a 16 defendant here) witnessed the attack and that it was caught on the surveillance video. Id. This 17 attack, Jones claims, was also unprovoked and between strangers. Id. ¶ 27. Then, on June 11, 18 2019, Marquez “rammed” another detainee while they were waiting in the Maguire Correctional 19 Facility. Id. ¶ 30. He struck him multiple times. Id. This attack, again, was unprovoked and 20 between strangers. Id. Janakos was also on duty during this attack. Id. ¶ 33. Jones claims that 21 the Sheriff’s Office referred Marquez to the district attorney’s office for both of these attacks. Id. 22 ¶ 34. 23 Jones filed suit against the County, Salomaa, Janakos, and Loubal in August 2021 under 42 24 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that the Sheriff’s Office “had notice of Marquez’[s] propensity for 25 violence towards other people in custody.” Id. ¶ 35. He asserts that the County has a custom of 26 failing to segregate Marquez for the protection of others. Id. He challenges the County’s alleged 27 1 “omission of a policy regarding segregating violent prisoners, [] practice of not segregating violent 2 prisoners, and/or [] failure to train staff on segregating violent prisoners with a history of violence 3 on other people in custody.” Id. And Jones claims that Salomaa, Loubal, and Janakos were 4 “deliberately indifferent” to his safety by placing him in the cell. Id. ¶ 37. 5 LEGAL STANDARD 6 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 7 if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 8 dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 10 when the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 11 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 12 (citation omitted). There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 13 unlawfully.” Id. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff 14 must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See Twombly, 15 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 16 In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 17 Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 18 plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court 19 is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 20 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 21 2008). 22 If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to 23 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 24 by the allegation of other facts.” See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In 25 making this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of 26 undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous 27 amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” See 1 DISCUSSION 2 Jones brings a single claim, based on several theories, under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 for alleged 3 constitutional violations. 4 I. CLAIM AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 5 Salomaa and Loubal (not Janakos) move to dismiss the claim against them.3 For the 6 reasons that follow, their motion is denied. 7 State pretrial detainees have a constitutional right, based on the Due Process Clause of the 8 Fourteenth Amendment, “to be free from violence from other inmates.” Castro v. Cty. of Los 9 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). As a result, “prison officials have a duty 10 to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 11 825, 833 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).4 As the Supreme Court has 12 explained, because the government has “stripped [detainees] of virtually every means of self- 13 protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free 14 to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. 15 To hold a correctional official liable for a failure to protect, the plaintiff must show that the 16 official acted with deliberate indifference. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068. In the context of a pretrial 17 detainee’s claim, the Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff must satisfy four elements. First, the 18 officer must have “made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the 19 plaintiff was confined.” Id. at 1071. Second, the conditions must have “put the plaintiff at 20 21 2 As relevant here, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 22 ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 23 rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 24 25 3 The defendants’ notice of motion states that Janakos moves to dismiss. Dkt. No. 18 at ECF 2. The substance of the motion, however, does not do so. 26 4 Farmer and several other cases in this area address the Eighth Amendment and convicted 27 prisoners. But the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have expressly applied the standards under 1 substantial risk of suffering serious harm.” Id. Third, the officer must have failed to “take 2 reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the 3 circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the 4 consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious.” Id. The court has explained that this means 5 the officer’s “conduct must be objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the 6 facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 7 omitted). Fourth, the officer’s failure to take those measures must have caused the plaintiff’s 8 injury. Id. 9 Here, Salomaa and Loubal (for purposes of this section, “the defendants”) argue that the 10 Complaint fails to adequately allege the third element. See Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 11 18] 3–5. They argue that there is nothing in the Complaint to indicate that they “appreciated the 12 risk Marquez posed to Jones.” Id. 3. Unlike Janakos, they are not alleged to have been on duty 13 during Marquez’s previous attacks. 14 The Complaint is sufficient. I must draw reasonable inferences in Jones’s favor at this 15 stage. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). One reasonable 16 inference—that Jones could likely only definitively learn through discovery—is that correctional 17 facilities keep records of violence by detainees to minimize the risk they pose. The Sheriff’s 18 Office, as an institution, is alleged to have had knowledge of Marquez’s previous attacks both 19 because they occurred in its custody and because it referred them for prosecution. See Compl. ¶ 20 34. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that the Sheriff’s Office would have recorded those 21 incidents and communicated with its deputies about issues of concern. In light of this, it is 22 plausible that the defendants were aware of Marquez’s history or should have been when he was in 23 their custody—for their own safety and that of other detainees. Discovery will reveal what the 24 defendants knew about Marquez’s history, but the claim is adequately pleaded. 25 II. CLAIM AGAINST THE COUNTY 26 The County also moves to dismiss the claim against it. For the reasons that follow, the 27 motion is granted with leave to amend. 1 Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). Their liability, 2 however, must come from their own conduct, not that of their employees. Id. “Plaintiffs who 3 seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove that ‘action pursuant to 4 official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) 5 (citations omitted). An “official municipal policy” means “the decisions of a government’s 6 lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to 7 practically have the force of law.” Id. at 61. The Supreme Court has also “required that the 8 plaintiff demonstrate that the policy or custom of a municipality reflects deliberate indifference to 9 the constitutional rights of its inhabitants.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1073 (internal quotation marks 10 and citation omitted). The policy or custom must, accordingly, be a “deliberate choice to follow a 11 course of action made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for 12 establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Id. at 1075 (internal 13 quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). 14 The County argues that Jones has failed to adequately plead that there is a policy, practice, 15 or custom that led to his injuries. Mot. 6–8. It contends the previous attacks are not sufficiently 16 similar because they did not occur in jail “housing” and that the assault was not the result of a lack 17 of supervision. Id. 5. And it argues that, to the extent the claim is intended to be a failure-to-train 18 claim, he has not adequately pleaded deliberate indifference. Id. 8. 19 I agree that the claim is inadequate as pleaded, though remedying it appears 20 straightforward. The Complaint defines the policies or customs at issue as (1) “not ensuring that 21 people are housed in areas where they will be safe from violence,” (2) “failing to segregate 22 combative detainees,” and (3) “failing to supervise holding cells to prevent physical violence 23 among those detained.” Compl. ¶ 43. The problem, however, is that these are the sole allegations 24 about these alleged policies—mere allegations that they exist. Under standard pleading principles, 25 that is insufficient. There are no “underlying facts” to plausibly indicate that these alleged policies 26 exist. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Threadbare, 27 conclusory allegations like these are insufficient to state a Monell claim. See id. As far as the 1 another was in Jones’s specific incident, which is insufficient to show a policy or custom. Nor is 2 || there any indication about the details of the supervision or, more importantly, the training about 3 the supervision to show a failure-to-train claim. This is not to say that Jones must exhaustively 4 || detail the County’s alleged policies at the pleadings, but he must plausibly illustrate that policies 5 or customs of some sort exist. He has leave to amend to do so. 6 Jones replies that the previous two attacks by Marquez are sufficient to show a policy or 7 || practice on their own. Opposition to the Mot. [Dkt. No. 28] 7. The first attack, though, is not on 8 || its own evidence of a policy of failing to protect because there is no indication that the defendants 9 || were (or should have been) on notice that Marquez was abnormally likely to attack fellow 10 || detainees before that point. The second incident did not occur in a holding cell, see Compl. § 30, 11 but all of Jones’s alleged policies relate to behavior surrounding segregation practices in holding 12 || cells. That leaves the attack at issue here, before which the County plausibly had some warning 13 that Marquez was potentially violent. While that single incident can certainly help support the 14 || existence of a policy or custom, the allegations about it are not sufficient as currently pleaded for 3 15 the reasons explained. 16 CONCLUSION 3 17 The motion to dismiss is DENIED on the claims of the individual defendants and 18 GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on the claim against the County. Any amended 19 Complaint shall be filed within 30 days. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 Dated: December 21, 2021 VM.Qe 23 . liam H. Orrick 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28