Parsons v. San Jose Police Department ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JASON THOMAS PARSONS, Case No. 22-cv-04691-WHO (PR) Plaintiff, 8 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT v. 9 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 10 SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Dkt. Nos. 3 and 18 et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Jason Thomas Parsons’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint contains allegations 15 against the police officers, the judges and others involved in his arrest, trial, and 16 conviction. However, his claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, unconstitutional 17 sentence, denial of bail, and so forth, are barred by Supreme Court precedent and must be 18 dismissed. 19 Parsons’s claims that unknown San Jose police officers used excessive force during 20 his arrest are not barred. He must, however, provide their names. Accordingly, his 21 complaint is DISMISSED with leave to file an amended complaint on or before March 1, 22 2023. He may also file a motion to stay his excessive force claims. 23 All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED. 24 DISCUSSION 25 A. Standard of Review 26 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 27 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 1 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 2 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 3 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 4 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 5 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 7 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 8 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 9 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 10 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 12 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 13 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 14 (9th Cir. 1994). 15 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 16 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 17 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 18 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 19 B. Legal Claims 20 Parson alleges that San Jose police officers, state court judges, court clerks, public 21 defenders and others are liable for malicious prosecution, false arrest, denial of bail, the 22 imposition of an unconstitutional sentence of 150 years, denial of his right to a speedy 23 trial, committing trial errors, and so forth. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 1-37.) 24 Parson’s suit is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck bars 25 section 1983 actions for damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 26 imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 27 conviction or sentence invalid. Id. at 486-487. When a state prisoner seeks damages in a 1 the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it 2 would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 3 conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Id. at 487. The Heck bar applies here 4 because a judgment that defendants committed the actions giving rise to his claims would 5 necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions and sentence. 6 The Heck bar can be avoided if a plaintiff can prove that the conviction or sentence 7 has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a 8 state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal 9 court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. There has been no such showing here. 10 Even if Heck did not apply, Parsons’s claims against most of the defendants would 11 have to be dismissed. A state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for damages 12 for acts performed in his judicial capacity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 13 (1967); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). So is the 14 prosecutor. he public defender would also have to be dismissed. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 15 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (a state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity from 16 damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his conduct in “pursuing a criminal 17 prosecution” insofar as he acts within his role as an “advocate for the State” and his actions 18 are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”) The public 19 defender is not liable at all under section 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 20 318-19 (1981) (a public defender does not act under color of state law, an essential element 21 of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions, 22 such as entering pleas, making motions, objecting at trial, cross-examining witnesses, and 23 making closing arguments.) Court clerks possess absolute quasi-judicial immunity from 24 damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the 25 judicial process. See, e.g., Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996). And a 26 witness is absolutely immune from liability for his testimony in earlier state or federal 27 court proceedings even if he committed perjury. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329- 1 2 Parsons’s allegations that unknown San Jose police officers used excessive force 3 || during his May 2020 arrest are not barred by Heck. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 11-13.) He 4 || must, however, provide their names and describe each person’s individual actions, or at 5 || least provide sufficient information for those individuals to be identified, before any claims 6 || against these persons can proceed. 7 MOTIONS 8 Parsons’s motion for a Heck dismissal without prejudice or a stay of proceedings is 9 || DENIED. (Dkt. No. 3.) His motion for the preservation of evidence is DENIED. (Dkt. 10 || No. 18.) 11 CONCLUSION 2 The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to file an amended complaint on or before 5 13 || March 6, 2023. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number S 14 || used in this order (22-04691 WHO (PR)) and the words FIRST AMENDED 3 15 || COMPLAINT must be written on the first page. The amended complaint must also appear a 16 || on this Court’s form, a copy of which will be sent to him. The amended complaint may be 17 || no longer than 10 pages, a limit that includes any exhibits or other attachments. Because 18 || an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaints, plaintiff must include 19 || in his first amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present and all of the defendants 20 || he wishes to sue. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may 21 || not incorporate material from any prior complaints by reference. Failure to file an 22 || amended complaint in accordance with this order may in dismissal of this action under 23 || Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 24 The Clerk shall terminate Dkt. Nos. 3 and 18. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: February 3, 2023 h ( . \f 0 27 IAM H. ORRICK 28 United States District Judge