Calvary Chapel San Jose v. Cody ( 2020 )

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 CALVARY CHAPEL SAN JOSE, et al., Case No. 20-cv-03794-BLF 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 10 SARA CODY, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 This case involves the intersection of the religious freedom of some and the public health 14 of all. Plaintiffs Calvary Chapel San Jose, Southridge Baptist Church of San Jose California d/b/a 15 Southridge Church, Mike McClure, and Micaiah Irmler (collectively “Plaintiffs”), are suing 16 certain Santa Clara County officials in their official capacities—Dr. Sara Cody, Santa Clara 17 County Public Health Officer, and the individuals who serve as Santa Clara County Supervisors: 18 Mike Wasserman, Cindy Chavez, Dave Cortese, Susan Ellenber, and Joe Simitian—for violating 19 their First Amendment and state constitutional religious freedom rights and state constitutional 20 right to privacy with a County public health order aimed at stopping the spread of the COVID-19 21 pandemic. See Compl., ECF 1. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss all claims on several 22 grounds. See Mot., ECF 20. Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition, see Opp’n, ECF 21. At the 23 November 5, 2020 oral argument, Plaintiffs indicated that they plan to file an amended complaint 24 substantially revising the existing claims and adding additional claims. Defendants do not oppose 25 Plaintiffs seeking leave to amend. 26 Accordingly, as stated on the record, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 27 Claims against the County Supervisors are dismissed WITHOUT LEAVE to amend, as Plaintiffs 1 public health orders or enforcing them, and Plaintiffs have not shown that they could add such 2 facts by further amendment. All claims against Defendant Cody are dismissed WITH LEAVE to 3 amend. The dismissal of the County Supervisors is without prejudice to adding additional claims 4 against them in the amended complaint. This written order memorializes the ruling. 5 A. Constitutional Religious Freedom Claims 6 Plaintiffs bring claims against the County’s Stay-at-home order (“County Order”) that was 7 signed by Defendant Cody and effective as of June 5, 2020, for violating their right to free 8 exercise of religion under both the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art. 1, sec. 4 of 9 the California Constitution, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. 10 Constitution. Compl. ¶¶ 92-144. Defendants move to dismiss the free exercise claims under 11 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, which holds that when a state or locality exercises emergency police 12 powers to enact an emergency public health measure, courts will uphold it unless (1) there is no 13 real or substantial relation to public health, or (2) the measures are “beyond all question, a plain, 14 palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law” 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905); Mot. 13-16. 15 Defendants move to dismiss the establishment clause claim under test set forth in Lemon v. 16 Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Mot. 20-21. Under Lemon, a government act is consistent with 17 the Establishment Clause if it: (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a principal or primary effect that 18 neither advances nor disapproves of religion; and (3) does not foster excessive governmental 19 entanglement with religion. Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2007) 20 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). Plaintiffs argue that the Jacobson standard does not apply in 21 this instance and that the County Order is not neutral and generally applicable and is not narrowly 22 tailored to serve the government’s interest in health and safety. Opp’n 6-19. 23 The Supreme Court recently invoked the Jacobson standard when denying an application 24 for injunctive relief against California Governor Gavin Newsom’s executive order aimed to limit 25 the spread of COVID-19. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020). 26 “Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the politically 27 accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’” Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 1 medical and scientific uncertainties,’ their latitude ‘must be especially broad.’” S. Bay United 2 Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Marshall v. United 3 States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)). Here, Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts demonstrating 4 that the County Order lacks a substantial relation to public health or is “beyond all question a plain 5 and palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” 6 Similarly, with the establishment clause claim and the Lemon test, Plaintiffs have failed to 7 allege facts showing that the County Order does not have a secular purpose, a principal or 8 primary effect that neither advances nor disapproves of religion, or does not foster excessive 9 government entanglement with religion. Accordingly, these claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT 10 PREJUDICE. 11 B. Privacy Claim 12 Plaintiffs argue that the portion of the County Order that mandates Plaintiffs record “names 13 and contact information” of all people that attend religious services and use that information to 14 “assist the County Public Health Department in any case investigation and contact tracing” 15 violates their right to privacy. Compl. ¶¶ 145-151. Defendants move to dismiss the claim because 16 Plaintiffs lack standing. Mot. 22-23. Specifically, Plaintiffs fail to plead what privacy interest is 17 allegedly being invaded by asking a gathering host to collect attendee contact information—“The 18 Complaint states only that the contact-tracing provision and the ‘enforcement’ thereof ‘implicate 19 Plaintiffs’ legally protected privacy interest’ ([Compl.] at ¶ 145), but that allegation does not 20 establish an injury in fact to these Plaintiffs.” Mot. 22. Plaintiffs further develop their theory on 21 this claim in their opposition brief, see Opp’n 19-21, but those theories are not found in the 22 complaint. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed, at this point, to 23 adequately plead a privacy interest that has been invaded, and therefore they lack standing to 24 pursue this claim. Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS this claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 25 C. Conclusion 26 Plaintiffs claims against the County Supervisors are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 27 The remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. As discussed at the hearing, 1 statement and copy of any orders issued in the parallel state proceedings involving the parties. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 Dated: November 5, 2020 kom Lh ham tn) 5 BETH LABSON FREEMAN 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 © 15 16 = 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28