Randle v. Contra Costa County Sheriff's Department ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAMELLO RANDLE, Case No. 24-cv-02099-JSC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND 10 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate in the Contra Costa County Jail who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 15 County Sherriff’s Department and jail officials Captain Beltran, Lieutenant Jensen, Sergeant 16 Morrison, and Hughes in “classification.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed 17 in forma pauperis in a separate order. For the reasons discussed below, the complaint is dismissed 18 for failure to state a claim that is capable of judicial determination. Plaintiff is granted leave to 19 amend certain claims. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff alleges jail policies provide for solitary confinement “if you fight or threaten 22 another inmate,” “if you attack or make threats to a deputy,” or “if a[n] inmate stabs a[n] inmate or 23 deputy within” the jail facility. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges on March 18, 2024, “an incident 24 occurred not within the facility,” and he was moved to solitary confinement that day. (Id. at 5.) 25 He alleges he was placed in solitary confinement “for no reason” because he did not violate jail 26 policy insofar as the “incident” did not occur inside the jail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges in solitary 27 confinement, his hand and feet are shackled during showers and “free time,” the lights are on 24 1 hours per day, and he was not able to take a shower or shave “since” April 19, 2024.1 (Id. at 5-6.) 2 Plaintiff alleges other inmates who were placed in solitary confinement because they assaulted 3 inmates or deputies within the facility “do not receive the same treatment as me.” (Id. at 6.) He 4 alleges Defendant Hughes told him Defendants Beltran and Jensen made the decision to put him in 5 solitary confinement. (Id.) 6 Plaintiff claims race and religious discrimination, violation of jail policy, “person abuse, 7 pain and suffering, being treated without dignity and respect, corporal punishment, harassment, 8 violation of my due process rights, cruel and unusual punishment, excessive lighting, violating my 9 human/civil rights.” (Id. at 3.) 10 Plaintiff seeks damages and to be returned to general population. (Id. at 7.) 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW 12 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 13 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915A(a). The Court must identify claims that are capable of being judicially heard and decided 15 or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, 16 or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a 17 defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by parties 18 unrepresented by an attorney must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 19 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 20 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 21 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 22 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 23 state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 24 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 25 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 26 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 27 1 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a 2 claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555. 3 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 4 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 5 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 6 42, 48 (1988). 7 LEGAL CLAIMS 8 There are several legal deficiencies with Plaintiff’s complaint. 9 A. Defendants Morrison and Hughes 10 First, Plaintiff has not alleged actions or omissions by Defendants Morrison and Hughes 11 that caused the alleged violations of his rights. Liability may be imposed on an individual 12 defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both 13 actually and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. 14 Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). A person deprives 15 another of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, 16 participates in another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 17 do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 18 633 (9th Cir. 1988). At the pleading stage, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, 19 that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren 20 v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff’s claims stem from his placement in 21 solitary confinement. He names Sergeant Morrison as a Defendant, but he makes no allegations 22 whatsoever about Morrison, let alone any allegation showing Morrison was involved in placing 23 Plaintiff in solitary confinement. As to Defendant Hughes, Plaintiff only alleges Hughes told him 24 Beltran and Jensen decided to move Plaintiff to solitary confinement. There are no allegations of 25 conduct by Hughes that caused Plaintiff to be placed there. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to 26 state a claim capable of judicial determination against Hughes or Morrison for violating his rights. 27 As there are no allegations suggesting Hughes or Morrison were involved in the alleged 1 B. Defendant Contra Costa Sherriff’s Department 2 Second, Plaintiff names the Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Department as a defendant, but 3 it is not clear whether it is an independent municipal entity, as opposed to just a department within 4 the municipal government of Contra Costa County. Regardless, the allegations indicate this 5 municipal entity is not liable under Section 1983 for the asserted violations of Plaintiff’s rights 6 stemming from his placement in solitary confinement. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 7 for a violation of constitutional rights resulting from governmental inaction or omission, a plaintiff 8 must show: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that 9 the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 10 plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional 11 violation.” Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, 12 Plaintiff alleges his placement in solitary confinement violated his constitutional rights, but he 13 does not allege he was placed there pursuant to any Sherriff’s Department policy. To the contrary, 14 he alleges officials placed him in solitary confinement in violation of jail policies. Accordingly, 15 the complaint does not state a claim against Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Department under 16 Section 1983 that is capable of judicial determination for the violation of his constitutional rights 17 stemming from his placement in solitary confinement. 18 Leave to amend this claim is not granted because the allegations in the complaint indicate 19 the Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Department is not liable for allegedly placing Plaintiff in 20 solitary confinement against the jail’s policy. See Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 21 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding leave to amend should not be granted if amendment of the pleading would 22 be futile). 23 C. Placement in Solitary Confinement 24 As to the remaining Defendants (Beltran and Jensen), Plaintiff claims his placement in 25 solitary confinement violated jail policy. The violation of jail policy in and of itself is not 26 actionable under Section 1983, which applies to the violation of a right secured by the 27 Constitution or laws of the United States. West, 487 U.S. at 48. Jail policy is not federal law. 1 (ECF No. 1 at 3), but Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that, if true, would establish his placement 2 in solitary confinement violated his due process rights. For a pretrial detainee, “restraints that are 3 reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, 4 constitute unconstitutional punishment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979). Jail officials’ 5 imposition of segregation as a disciplinary sanction for a violation of jail rules, however, does 6 require the procedural protections of due process set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 7 564-70 (1974) (listing procedural protections). Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 523-26 (9th Cir. 8 1996). For a convicted inmate, segregation implicates a liberty interest protected by the right to 9 due process only if the regulation under which segregation is imposed “narrowly restrict” the 10 officials’ power to impose it and the segregation amounted to a deprivation of “real substance." 11 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995); see, e.g., May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 12 (9th Cir. 1997) (mere placement in administrative segregation not enough to state claim after 13 Sandin); Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding no liberty interest when 14 inmate placed in disciplinary segregation for 14 days). The “real substance” determination 15 requires a factual comparison between conditions in the plaintiff’s former status and his new 16 status, examining the hardship caused by the challenged action in relation to the basic conditions 17 of life as a prisoner. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). 18 Plaintiff does not allege if he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted inmate at the time he 19 was in solitary confinement.2 Also, he does not allege clearly the reason for his segregation, 20 saying both it was “for no reason” and that it was for the policy-violating reason of the “incident” 21 that occurred outside of the jail. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) It is also not clear from the complaint whether 22 he has segregated as a disciplinary sanction or as an administrative measure to ensure the safety of 23 other inmates or staff at the jail. Plaintiff does not allege how long he was placed in solitary 24 25 2 The allegations in his other complaint and the criminal court docket indicate he was convicted on March 22, 2024. See Randle v. Fregi, et al., No. C 24-2098 JSC (PR) (N.D. Cal.) (ECF No. 1 at 26 6); State of California v. Randle, No. 04002000347 (Contra Costa County Sup. Ct.) (docket entry of March 22, 2024) (see https://odyportal.cc-courts.org/Portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0). This 27 would mean he was in solitary confinement as a pretrial detainee from March 18-24, 2024, and as a convicted inmate from March 24, 2024, onwards. The Court may take judicial notice of these 1 confinement, including whether he was placed there indefinitely. And Plaintiff does not allege 2 how the conditions of his segregation differed from the conditions in general population for 3 purposes of Sandin’s “real substance” analysis, nor does he allege how long he was in segregation. 4 Such factual allegations are necessary, under Bell, Mitchell, Sandin, and Jackson to state a 5 plausible claim that his placement in solitary confinement violated his right to due process. 6 Plaintiff may amend his complaint to cure these deficiencies in his claim. 7 D. Racial and Religious Discrimination 8 Plaintiff alleges Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race and religion. 9 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny 10 to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a 11 direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 12 Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). A 13 plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on race must plead 14 intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of 15 discriminatory intent. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 16 1998). A plaintiff must allege the state actor acted at least in part because of plaintiff’s 17 membership in a protected class. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). The 18 plaintiff “must show that a class that is similarly situated has been treated disparately.” Ariz. 19 Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2017). Treatment that is harmful but not 20 disparate is not an equal protection violation. See Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 21 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (upholding dismissal of equal protection claim that 22 alleged harmful but not disparate treatment). 23 Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting a plausible equal protection claim. Plaintiff has 24 not alleged he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates. He alleges he was treated 25 differently from other inmates in solitary confinement, but he also alleges those inmates, unlike 26 him, had attacked other inmates or jail staff in the jail facility, in violation of jail policy. Thus, the 27 other inmates were not similarly situated to Plaintiff. Consequently, the complaint does not state a 1 violated his equal protection rights by discriminating against him based upon his race or religion. 2 Plaintiff may amend his complaint to cure the deficiency in this claim. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, 5 1. The complaint, when liberally construed, is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 6 that is capable of judicial determination. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his due process and 7 equal protection claims against Defendants Beltran and Jensen. Plaintiff’s other claims are 8 dismissed without leave to amend. 9 2. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before June 28, 2024. The amended 10 complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (No. C 24-2099 JSC 11 (PR)) and the words “COURT-ORDERED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. 12 Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, see Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 13 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992), Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the original by 14 reference; he must include in his amended complaint all the allegations he wishes to present. If 15 Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the designated time, or if the amendment is not 16 sufficient, the case will be dismissed. 3 17 // 18 // 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 Approximately two weeks after the complaint was filed, the Court received from Plaintiff an 25 unlabeled 9-page document making additional allegations with a number of exhibits attached. (ECF No. 7.) It is unclear what this document is intended to be because it is not labeled. Under 26 Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the only pleading Plaintiff may file is a complaint, and other requests for a court order must be filed as a motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a),(b). To the 27 extent Plaintiff means for this to be part of his complaint, he may not file supplements to or piecemeal complaints, nor may he file an amended complaint without leave of Court, which he did 1 3. It is Plaintiffs responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 2 || informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 3 || Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 4 || do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 5 Civil Procedure 41(b). Reasonable requests for an extension of a deadline will be allowed upon a 6 || showing of good cause if the request is filed prior to the deadline. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: May 28, 2024 9 ne JAGQUELINE SCOTT CORL 10 United States District Judge 11 as 12 13 Se 15 16 = 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28