Bradford v. Javate ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAYMOND ALFORD BRADFORD, Case No. 20-cv-06833-PJH 8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING 9 v. MOTIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 10 JAVATE, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 7, 10, 11 Defendants. 11 12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed the complaint and ordered plaintiff to file a response 15 discussing why the case should not be dismissed as unexhausted because plaintiff had 16 sought to be excused from exhaustion. Plaintiff has filed a response and two motions for 17 a preliminary injunction. 18 DISCUSSION 19 STANDARD OF REVIEW 20 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 21 seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 23 dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 24 may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 25 relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 26 Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 1 necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 2 is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 3 (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 4 factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 5 to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 6 elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 7 raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 8 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 9 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 10 Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 11 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 12 allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 13 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 15 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 16 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 17 violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 18 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 19 LEGAL CLAIMS 20 Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that several medical officials at his prison failed to 21 properly treat his rectal pain and bleeding. 22 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 23 (1996) (“PLRA”), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought 24 with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 25 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 26 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 27 Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of the district court. 1 (2001)). Courts may not create their own “special circumstances” exceptions to the 2 exhaustion requirement. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (reversing Fourth 3 Circuit’s ruling that failure to exhaust was justified where prisoner reasonably—even 4 though mistakenly—believed he had exhausted remedies). “Prisoners must now exhaust 5 all ‘available’ remedies, not just those that meet federal standards.” Woodford, 548 U.S. 6 at 84. Even when the relief sought cannot be granted by the administrative process, i.e., 7 monetary damages, a prisoner must still exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 85-86 8 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734). 9 Plaintiff seeks to be excused from the exhaustion requirement. Pursuant to the 10 legal standards set forth above, exhaustion is mandatory, and the court cannot create an 11 exception to excuse exhaustion. The action will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff 12 should attempt to exhaust his claims. Once he has exhausted his claims, he may file a 13 new complaint. If prison officials interfere with his inmate appeals, he must still attempt to 14 fully exhaust the prison grievance process. 15 Plaintiff has also filed motions for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining 16 order. A temporary restraining order preserves the status quo and prevents irreparable 17 harm until a hearing can be held on a preliminary injunction application. See Granny Goose 18 Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 19 A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award only 20 when a plaintiff makes a clear showing that he is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. 21 Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The standards for a temporary 22 restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l 23 Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A 24 plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of 25 irreparable harm that will result if an injunction is not issued, (3) the balance of equities tips 26 in favor of the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. 27 at 20. The irreparable injury must be both likely and immediate. See id. at 22; Caribbean 1 do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must 2 demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”) 3 One of plaintiff’s motions seeks a preliminary injunction regarding the processing of 4 his inmate appeals. Yet, he failed to present sufficient evidence that prison officials 5 interfered with his appeals to warrant court intervention. Nor has plaintiff shown that any 6 of the named defendants in this action are responsible for inmate appeals at the prison. 7 An injunction is binding only on parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, 8 employees and attorneys and those "in active concert or participation” with them. Fed. R. 9 Civ. P. 65(d). In order to enforce an injunction against an entity, the district court must 10 have personal jurisdiction over that entity. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 94 F.3d 539, 11 545 (9th Cir. 1996). The court should not issue an injunction that it cannot enforce. Id. 12 Plaintiff has not identified any defendants in this case who could provide the relief he seeks. 13 The motion (Docket No. 11) is denied.1 14 Plaintiff’s other motion for a preliminary injunction seeks a transfer out of the central 15 valley and into a medical facility due to plaintiff having Valley Fever. He argues that he is 16 at risk due to the Coronavirus. The court notes that plaintiff is not housed in the central 17 valley. Plaintiff is housed in Soledad, CA. Plaintiff again fails to identify any defendants in 18 his complaint who have the authority to transfer him to a medical facility. Most importantly, 19 plaintiff’s allegations in the motion for a preliminary injunction are not the same as what he 20 stated in the complaint. A plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief based on claims not 21 pled in the complaint because the “court’s equitable power lies only over the merits of the 22 case or controversy before it.” Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 23 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., id. at 636-38 (district court properly denied 24 1 To the extent that plaintiff contends that he has now exhausted his administrative 25 remedies (Docket No. 10 at 3), the case must still be dismissed without prejudice. If a prisoner exhausts a claim after bringing it before the court, his subsequent exhaustion 26 cannot excuse his earlier failure to exhaust. Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A prisoner] may initiate litigation in federal court only after the 27 administrative process ends and leaves his grievances unredressed. It would be 1 plaintiff’s request for an injunction to prevent HIPAA violation, where plaintiff had not 2 asserted a claim for a HIPAA violation). In this motion, plaintiff discusses the risks due to 3 Coronavirus, while in the complaint he seeks medical treatment for rectal pain and 4 bleeding. For all these reasons, this motion (Docket No. 10) is denied. 5 CONCLUSION 6 1. The action is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a new complaint 7 once he has exhausted his administrative remedies. 8 2. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No 7.) is DENIED as 9 incomplete. The motions for a preliminary injunction (Docket Nos. 10, 11) are DENIED 10 for the reasons set forth above. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: November 30, 2020 13 14 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27