Roshan v. Lawrence ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 PEYMAN ROSHAN, Case No. 21-cv-01235-JST 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 v. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 10 MELANIE J. LAWRENCE, et al., Re: ECF No. 153 Defendants. 11 12 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment. ECF No. 153. The Court 14 will deny the motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Because the facts are well-known to the parties and the Court has summarized Plaintiff’s 17 allegations in detail in its prior order, ECF No. 139, the Court will not elaborate them at length 18 here. 19 In sum, Plaintiff Peyman Roshan brings this action against Defendants the Office of Chief 20 Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (“OCTC”); George Cardona, the current Chief Trial 21 Counsel of the State Bar of California; and his predecessor, Melanie J. Lawrence. He challenges 22 both the State Bar Rules of Procedure and the internal rules and policies of the State Bar as 23 unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 24 In his operative third amended complaint (“TAC”), ECF No. 74, Roshan brought claims on 25 behalf of himself and two putative classes: (1) persons who have been the subject of attorney 26 discipline “from and after 2010” and (2) persons who are subject to ongoing attorney discipline 27 proceedings. Id. ¶ 31. The TAC asserted three counts against Defendants: (1) “injunctive relief 1 Young” against Cardona in his official capacity; and (3) declaratory relief against Lawrence and 2 Cardona. Id. ¶¶ 38–47. Roshan sought various remedies, including a declaratory judgment that 3 the State Bar Rules of Procedure are unconstitutional, that the State Bar’s internal rules and 4 policies regarding prosecutions are overbroad, and that all attorney discipline proceedings since 5 2010 violated respondents’ due process rights. Id. at 25. He further asked the Court to enjoin 6 Cardona from filing new charges, continuing ongoing prosecutions, or enforcing disciplinary 7 orders until the Rules of Procedure are amended. Id. at 23–24. Roshan specifically seeks to 8 enjoin the order suspending him from the practice of law, as well as “all other State Bar attorney 9 discipline proceedings” until the Rules of Procedure are amended. Id. ¶ 41. Defendants thereafter 10 moved to dismiss the TAC. ECF No. 75. 11 On May 23, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ motion, and dismissed Roshan’s claims 12 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 139. It found that “to the extent that Roshan’s 13 facial constitutional claims seek to overturn Roshan’s own prior disciplinary order, the Court is 14 barred by Rooker-Feldman from hearing such claims.” Id. at 7. The Court, however, noted that 15 “Roshan’s facial challenges to the validity of the relevant rules and procedures are not barred by 16 Rooker-Feldman to the extent he seeks, for example, declaratory relief that the rules and 17 procedures are unconstitutional.” Id. at 8. It further dismissed Roshan’s remaining claims for lack 18 of standing, but it granted “leave to amend solely to provide Roshan with an opportunity to allege 19 additional facts, if he can do so, that would support a reasonable inference that he will face future 20 disciplinary proceedings under the rules and policies he challenges as unconstitutional.” Id. at 10. 21 After the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Roshan filed an administrative 22 motion, ECF No. 143, which the Court construed as a motion for leave to file a motion for 23 reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9. ECF No. 145. Roshan argued that the Court’s May 24 23, 2023 order was inconsistent with Reed v. Goertz, 143 S. Ct. 955 (2023), which was issued on 25 April 10, 2023. ECF No. 143 at 3–4. In denying Roshan’s motion, the Court reasoned that he did 26 not “meet the necessary burden of showing (1) a material difference in law from that presented to 27 the Court before the order, (2) a change of law arising after the order, or (3) a manifest failure by 1 at 1–2. 2 Roshan now moves for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 3 Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that Roshan cannot invoke Rule 60(b) to challenge a non- 4 final order. 5 II. JURISDICTION 6 The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 7 III. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a movant may seek relief from a “final 9 judgment, order, or proceeding” for six reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 10 neglect1; (2) newly discovered evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered 11 before the court’s decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) 12 satisfaction of the judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see 13 Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 14 “Rule 60(b) does not provide relief from judgments, orders, or proceedings that are not 15 final decisions within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which generally cannot be appealed 16 immediately.” Meas v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 17 2010); see also United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding Rule 18 60(b) applies only to motions attacking “final, appealable orders”). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 Roshan seeks relief from this Court’s May 23, 2023 order on two grounds. First, he argues 21 that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because the Court erred in applying the Rooker- 22 Feldman doctrine in its prior ruling. Second, he contends that he is entitled to amend his 23 complaint under Rule 60(b)(2) in light of newly discovered evidence concerning the State Bar’s 24 failure to provide disciplinary respondents with exculpatory evidence. Defendants respond that 25 Roshan’s motion should be denied because “it asks the Court to set aside the non-final order 26 dismissing the [TAC] with leave to amend, whereas [R]ule 60(b) applies only to final judgments, 27 1 orders or proceedings.” ECF No. 154 at 11 (emphasis in original). 2 It is well-established that Rule 60(b) is limited to relief from a final judgment, order, or 3 proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Interlocutory orders and judgments—including those that 4 dismiss some, but not all, claims in a complaint—are “not within the provisions of 60(b).” In re 5 Gerry, 670 F. Supp. 276, 277 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d sub nom. Adams v. Johns-Manville 6 Corp., 876 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1989). “[W]hen a district court expressly grants leave to amend, it 7 is plain that the order is not final.” WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 8 1997). The Court’s May 23, 2023 order granted Roshan “leave to amend to allege additional facts 9 to support a reasonable inference that he will again face disciplinary proceedings under the rules 10 and policies he challenges as unconstitutional.” ECF No. 139 at 10. Accordingly, it is a non-final 11 order that is not subject to review under Rule 60(b). 12 Roshan’s argument that this Court’s prior order is “final” under Rule 60(b) is difficult to 13 comprehend. He appears to assert that it is incorrect to assume that “the word ‘final’ in the portion 14 of Rule 60(b) means “final in the sense of appealable, or final in the sense that the time for appeal 15 has expired” because “proceedings,” as well as certain judgments and orders, are not appealable. 16 ECF No. 156 at 6. This argument is not persuasive. Indeed, the Advisory Committee’s Notes on 17 the 1946 Amendments to Rule 60(b) expressly state that “[t]he addition of the qualifying word 18 ‘final’ emphasizes the character of the judgments, orders or proceedings from which Rule 19 60(b) affords relief . . . interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the rule.” 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. The Court’s prior order, 21 which granted leave to amend, did not provide “a final resolution of the whole controversy.” 22 Interlocutory, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“interim or temporary; not constituting a 23 final resolution of the whole controversy.”). It is therefore an interlocutory order that is beyond 24 the reach of Rule 60(b). 25 Roshan contends that it is in the interest of judicial efficiency to “address any errors on 26 matters that partially dispose of a lawsuit before holding a trial.” ECF No. 156 at 6. This 27 argument also fails. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has made clear that the final judgment 1 the courts through a succession of costly and time-consuming appeals.” Flanagan v. United 2 || States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984). 3 Finally, Roshan contends that Rule 60(c)’s “emphasis on promptness” would be “defeated” 4 || if “orders dismissing all claims” are not addressable until “the last dismissal order.” ECF No. 156 5 at 6. This argument also is without merit. “A party does not lose the right to appeal an 6 || interlocutory order by not immediately appealing and waiting for the final judgment. The 7 || interlocutory order merges in the final judgment and may be challenged in an appeal from that 8 || judgment.” City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 889 (9th 9 Cir. 2001) (quoting Hook v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997)). 10 Because the Court’s May 23, 2023 order is non-final, Rule 60(b) provides no basis for 11 relief from judgment. 12 CONCLUSION 13 In sum, because the Court’s May 23, 2023 order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 14 || nota final order, Roshan’s Rule 60(b) motion is denied. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 Dated: November 9, 2023 . . M | JON S. no 18 nited States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28