- 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ZTE (USA) INC., Case No. 18-cv-06185-HSG 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 106 10 AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC, 11 Defendant. 12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff ZTE (USA) Inc.’s administrative motion to file under 14 seal portions of Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Record and the Declaration of Bradford C. 15 Schulz in support of the Motion to Supplement, as well as Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Declaration of 16 Bradford C. Schulz in their entirety. See Dkt. No. 106. For the reasons articulated below, the 17 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 18 I. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal 20 documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010). “This standard 21 derives from the common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including 22 judicial records and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 23 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[A] strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” 24 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this strong presumption, the 25 party seeking to seal a document attached to a dispositive motion must “articulate compelling 26 reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the 27 public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial 1 However, documents attached to non-dispositive motions are not subject to the same 2 strong presumption of access. See id. at 1179. Because such records “are often unrelated, or only 3 tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action,” parties moving to seal must meet the lower 4 “good cause” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Id. at 1179–80 (quotations 5 omitted). This requires only a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will 6 result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 7 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, 8 unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., 9 Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted). 10 II. DISCUSSION 11 Because the documents Plaintiff seeks to seal relate to a non-dispositive motion, the Court 12 will apply the lower good cause standard. Plaintiff seeks to file under seal Exhibits 1 and 2 to the 13 Declaration of Bradford C. Schulz in their entirety, as well as the portions of Plaintiff’s Motion to 14 Supplement the Record and the Declaration of Bradford C. Schulz in support of the Motion to 15 Supplement that discuss those exhibits. See Dkt. No. 106. The only basis Plaintiff proffers for 16 sealing is that the exhibits “contain information that has been designated “RESTRICTED – 17 ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” by Defendant AGIS Software Development, LLC (“AGIS”). See 18 id. at 1. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the motion repeats this same explanation. See Dkt. 19 No. 106-1, ¶¶ 2–5. Defendant did not file a declaration establishing that Exhibits 1 and 2, and the 20 motion and declaration that refer to them, are sealable within four days of Plaintiff’s motion as 21 required under Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1). Instead, as part of Plaintiff’s motion to seal, the 22 parties included a document styled “Joint Stipulation regarding Administrative Motion for Filing 23 under Seal,” which states that the parties agree to seal these documents. See Dkt. No. 106-2. 24 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s cursory justification that the documents were designated 25 confidential and the parties “joint stipulation” agreeing to seal the documents do not adequately 26 establish a “particularized showing” of “specific prejudice or harm.” See Phillips, 307 F.3d at 27 1210–11 (quotation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). As Civil Local Rule 79-5(d)(1)(A) 1 documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are 2 || sealable.” “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial designation of confidentiality to establish 3 coverage under the stipulated protective order. See Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, 4 |) Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015). Thus, □□□□□□□□□□□ 5 |} motion does not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5, and the Court finds no basis to seal the 6 || requested documents. 7 Wl. CONCLUSION 8 The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff's motion. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5(f)(2), 9 Plaintiff may file unredacted versions of the motion, declaration, and exhibits, or Plaintiff may file 10 anew motion to seal, within seven days of this order according to the requirements discussed 11 above. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 || Dated: 10/15/2019 Alaprd 8 Mbt. HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. nited States District Judge 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Document Info
Docket Number: 4:18-cv-06185
Filed Date: 10/15/2019
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/20/2024