F.R. v. Santa Clara Unified School District ( 2023 )

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 F. R., a minor, by and through her Guardian Case No. 23-cv-01840-BLF Ad Litem, MILA ROMERO, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS 9 BROUGHT BY DEFENDANTS v. DISTRICT AND ALBERTS 10 SANTA CLARA UNIFIED SCHOOL [Re: ECF 16] 11 DISTRICT, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 This action arises out of the alleged mistreatment and sexual battery of minor Plaintiff F.R. 15 (“Plaintiff”) at the public school where she attended kindergarten. In brief, Plaintiff claims that 16 her classroom teacher, Nicole Bilte (“Bilte”), cut her hair and scratched her face; that her 17 subsequent classroom teacher, Melissa Le (“Le”), scratched her face; and that another teacher 18 and/or coach, Daniel Flores (“Flores”), sexually battered her. Plaintiff, through her mother acting 19 as Guardian ad Litem, sues Bilte, Le, Flores, school principal Anthony Alberts (“Alberts”), and 20 the Santa Clara Unified School District (“the District”) under federal and state law. 21 Flores, Bilte, and Le have filed answers denying all allegations of wrongdoing. The 22 District and Alberts have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 12(b)(6). The District moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims to the extent they seek to impose 24 vicarious liability for Flores’ alleged sexual battery of her. Alberts seeks dismissal of all claims 25 against him. The Court finds the motion to be suitable for decision without oral argument and 26 VACATES the December 20, 2023 motion hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 27 The motion to dismiss brought by the District and Alberts is GRANTED IN PART 1 I. BACKGROUND1 2 In August 2022, Plaintiff was a kindergarten student at the Don Callejon School in Santa 3 Clara, California. See FAC ¶¶ 6, 12. On August 25, 2022, Plaintiff’s mother and older sister 4 witnessed Plaintiff’s kindergarten teacher, Bilte, push Plaintiff out of and away from Bilte’s 5 classroom. See id. ¶ 12. The next day, Plaintiff’s mother noticed that Plaintiff’s hair had been cut 6 in a jagged manner. See id. ¶ 13. When asked who cut her hair, Plaintiff stated, “Ms. Bilte did it.” 7 Id. Over the next few days, Plaintiff returned home from school with scratches on her body. See 8 id. ¶ 15. When asked who scratched her, Plaintiff stated, “Ms. Bilte did it.” Id. During the same 9 time period, Plaintiff’s parents noticed that she no longer wanted to go to school. See id. ¶ 16. On 10 August 29, 2022, Plaintiff’s father emailed the school principal, Alberts, about the haircut and 11 scratches. See id. 12 On August 30, 2022, Plaintiff told her parents that she had been approached by three 13 people who told her that Bilte did not cut her hair. See FAC ¶ 17. Plaintiff indicated that the three 14 people were Bilte, a female teacher whose name sounded like “Gray,” and a male “coach” who 15 has since been identified as Flores. See id. According to Plaintiff, some school teachers or other 16 personnel are called “coaches” even though they are not associated with sports or physical 17 education. See id. ¶ 18. 18 On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff’s parents had an in-person meeting with the school principal, 19 Alberts. See FAC ¶ 19. On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff’s mother emailed Alberts regarding the 20 alleged confrontation of Plaintiff by three school employees and also advised Alberts that Flores 21 had asked whether Plaintiff wore shorts under her dress. See id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff apparently had 22 done a cartwheel and either Flores or someone else observed that she was not wearing shorts under 23 her dress. See id. 24 Plaintiff’s parents had another in-person meeting with Alberts on September 9, 2022, to 25 discuss the incidents at the school. See FAC ¶ 21. On the same day, Plaintiff came home from 26 school with a long scratch on her face. See id. 27 1 On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff came home from school with her hair cut again, but this 2 time the cut was in a clean, straight line and was not jagged like the first haircut. See FAC ¶ 22. 3 When asked who had cut her hair, Plaintiff indicated that it was Bilte. See id. Plaintiff also had a 4 long scratch on her face. See id. 5 On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff’s parents reported these events to the City of Santa Clara 6 Police Department (“SCPD”). See FAC ¶ 23. They also met with the school’s principal, Alberts, 7 telephonically and in person. During that in-person meeting, Plaintiff’s father and Alberts 8 reviewed the school’s video footage for September 13, 2022. See id. The video was of poor 9 quality and did not cover any of the classrooms or interior hallways of the school; Alberts could 10 not determine whether Plaintiff’s hair had been cut on the school grounds. See id. However, 11 Alberts removed Plaintiff from Bilte’s class and placed her in the class of another teacher, Le. See 12 id. ¶ 24. On September 15, 2022, Alberts informed Plaintiff’s parents that he had instructed Bilte 13 to have no contact with Plaintiff. See id. ¶ 25. On the same date, Plaintiff’s parents emailed 14 Alberts to tell him that Plaintiff had urinated in her pants three times the previous week, which 15 was unusual for Plaintiff and concerning to the parents. See id. ¶ 26. 16 When Plaintiff’s parents picked her up from school on September 21, 2022, she was 17 covered in dirt and sitting uncharacteristically quietly at a table next to Flores. See FAC ¶ 27. 18 Plaintiff looked despondent, she was silent, and she did not get up to greet her parents as usual. 19 See id. After arriving home, Plaintiff’s mother noticed that she was limping and Plaintiff later 20 complained about groin pain while bathing. See id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff’s mother discovered that 21 Plaintiff had vaginal and perineal injuries, inflammation, and discharge. See id. When asked who 22 had hurt her groin area, Plaintiff stated that “teacher” had. See id. 23 Plaintiff’s parents called SCPD and took Plaintiff to Stanford Hospital’s Emergency 24 Department. See id. ¶¶ 28-30. Plaintiff told Stanford Hospital personnel that she had been in a 25 school classroom with “coach.” See id. ¶ 28. She also stated that “teacher” had sent her to a 26 school bathroom, where she was not alone. See id. Plaintiff and other students at the school use 27 the terms “teacher” and “coach” interchangeably. See id. In addition to the injuries to her groin 1 scratched her. See id. Stanford Hospital determined that Plaintiff could not be fully evaluated 2 there without the risk of destroying evidence; Stanford Hospital referred Plaintiff to another 3 facility for evaluation. See id. ¶ 30 & n.3. 4 In the early hours of September 22, 2022, SCPD officers escorted Plaintiff and her parents 5 to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center and then the Pediatric Child Advocacy Rape Center, where a 6 pediatric forensic examination was performed. See FAC ¶ 31. The examination revealed DNA in 7 Plaintiff’s groin area that did not belong to Plaintiff or either parent. See id. Plaintiff had vaginal 8 and perineal pain and bruising. See id. ¶ 32. 9 Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff claims that she was physically abused and 10 sexually battered at school. The FAC contains the following claims: (1) Violation of the Right to 11 Bodily Integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Flores, Bilte, 12 and Le); (2) Excessive Force and Unreasonable Corporal Punishment under the Fourth 13 Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Flores, Bilte, and Le); (3) Battery (against Flores, 14 Bilte, Le, and the District); (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (against Flores, Bilte, 15 Le, and the District); (5) Negligence (against all Defendants); and (6) Supervisory Liability under 16 the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Alberts). 17 II. LEGAL STANDARD 18 “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 19 claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force 20 v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). While 21 a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, 22 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 The District moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims to the extent they seek to impose vicarious 26 liability for Flores’ alleged sexual battery of her, and Alberts seeks dismissal of all claims asserted 27 against him. The Court first addresses the claims against the District, and then the claims against 1 A. The District 2 The District is named as a defendant in Claim 3 for battery, Claim 4 for Intentional 3 Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Claim 5 for Negligence. As against the District, those claims 4 are premised on the District’s alleged vicarious liability for the state law torts of its employees 5 Bilte, Le, Flores, and Alberts. See FAC ¶ 57, 61, 66, 77. Under California law, an employer may 6 be vicariously liable for the torts of an employee committed within the scope of employment. See 7 John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 447 (1989). “This includes willful and 8 malicious torts as well as negligence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 The District does not challenge Plaintiff’s claims of vicarious liability for the alleged torts 10 of Bilte, Le, and Alberts. However, the District does seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims of 11 vicarious liability for Flores’ sexual battery of her.2 Under California law, an employer’s 12 vicarious liability for the torts of its employee does not extend to a teacher’s sexual abuse of a 13 student. See John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 447-53. Plaintiff concedes that the District cannot be held 14 vicariously liable for Flores’ alleged sexual battery and does not oppose dismissal of Claims 3, 4, 15 and 5 against the District to the extent they are premised on vicarious liability for Flores’ alleged 16 sexual batter. See Pl.’s Opp. at 2, ECF 24. 17 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to 18 Claims 3, 4, and 5 against the District, to the extent those claims are premised on vicarious 19 liability for Flores’ alleged sexual battery of Plaintiff. 20 B. Alberts 21 Alberts is named as a defendant in Claim 5 for negligence and Claim 6 for supervisory 22 liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Alberts moves to dismiss both claims. The Court addresses the 23 claims in turn. 24 1. Claim 5 for Negligence 25 Claim 5 is a state law claim for negligence. As asserted against Alberts, the claim is one 26 27 2 The FAC does not expressly allege that Flores is the individual who sexually battered Plaintiff. 1 for negligent supervision of Bilte, Le, and Flores. See FAC ¶¶ 67-76. Plaintiff alleges that Alberts 2 owed a duty of care to ensure her safety while at school, that it was reasonably foreseeable to 3 Alberts that Bilte, Le, and Flores posed a danger to Plaintiff given the incidents reported to him by 4 Plaintiff’s parents, and that Alberts acted negligently in supervising Bilte, Le, and Flores with the 5 result that Plaintiff was injured by them. See FAC ¶¶ 67-76. 6 “California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to supervise at all times the 7 conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary 8 to their protection.” C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 4th 861, 869 (2012) 9 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standard of care imposed upon school personnel in 10 carrying out this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the performance of their other 11 duties.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). School personal must use the degree of care 12 that a personal of ordinary prudence would exercise under the same circumstances. See id. Either 13 a “total lack of supervision” or “ineffective supervision” may give rise to a claim of negligence 14 supervision in the school context. Id. “[T]he duty of care owed by school personnel includes the 15 duty to use reasonable measures to protect students from foreseeable injury at the hands of third 16 parties acting negligently or intentionally.” Id. at 870. “This principle has been applied in cases 17 of employees’ alleged negligence resulting in injury to a student by another student, injury to a 18 student by a nonstudent, and . . . injuries to a student resulting from a teacher’s sexual assault.” Id. 19 (citations omitted). 20 Alberts contends that the FAC does not allege facts showing that he was negligent in his 21 supervision of Bilte, Le, or Flores. The Court discusses Alberts’ alleged negligence with respect 22 to each teacher. 23 a. Bilte 24 The FAC alleges that Plaintiff’s parents emailed Alberts on August 29, 2022, regarding 25 Bilte’s conduct in pushing Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s claims that Bilte had cut her hair and scratched 26 her. See FAC ¶¶ 12-16. On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff’s parents met with Alberts in person to 27 discuss those incidents and also Plaintiff’s report that Bilte, Flores, and another teacher had 1 September 2, 2022, Plaintiff’s mother emailed Alberts about the three teachers’ confrontation of 2 Plaintiff, among other things. See id. ¶ 20. On September 9, 2022, Plaintiff’s parents met with 3 Alberts again. See id. ¶ 21. It does not appear that Alberts took any action to remove Plaintiff 4 from Bilte’s classroom or to address the information provided by Plaintiff’s parents at that time. 5 On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff returned home with her hair cut again and with a scratch 6 on her fact, and on September 14, 2022, Plaintiff’s parents reported the series of incidents to 7 SCPD. See id. ¶¶ 22-23. Plaintiff’s parents also met with Alberts yet again on September 14, 8 2022. See id. ¶ 23. Alberts reviewed school video footage, which was of poor quality and did not 9 cover classrooms or interior hallways. See id. Alberts was unable to find video support for the 10 parents’ allegations, but he did – finally – remove Plaintiff from Bilte’s classroom and assign her 11 to Le’s classroom See id. ¶¶ 23-24. Alberts also advised Plaintiff’s parents that he had instructed 12 Bilte to have no contact with Plaintiff. See id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff’s parents later learned that Bilte did 13 have contact with Plaintiff, including on Le’s birthday when Le was not at school. See id. 14 Plaintiff claims that based on her parents’ numerous communications with Alberts, he 15 reasonably should have foreseen that Bilte might injure Plaintiff, and that Alberts did not use 16 reasonable measures to protect Plaintiff from such injury. Alberts argues that Plaintiff’s 17 allegations actually establish that Alberts “did supervise Ms. Bilte” by investigating the 18 complaints made by Plaintiff’s parents and removing Plaintiff from Bilte’s classroom. Mot. at 8, 19 ECF 16. Alberts contends that in light of these allegations, Plaintiff cannot establish that he 20 breached his duty of care to Plaintiff. See id. This argument is wholly unpersuasive. That Alberts 21 eventually took some action regarding Bilte does not insulate him from liability for negligent 22 supervision. As noted above, Plaintiff does not have to allege a total lack of supervision – liability 23 may be premised on alleged ineffective supervision. See C.A., 53 Cal. 4th at 869. The Court 24 concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations establish, for pleading purposes, that Alberts provided 25 ineffective supervision of Bilte by delaying in taking any action provided by Plaintiff’s parents 26 and ultimately taking action that was insufficient to keep Bilte away from Plaintiff. 27 Albert’s motion to dismiss Claim 5 to the extent it is based on his alleged negligent 1 b. Le 2 The FAC alleges that Le scratched Plaintiff on a single occasion and does not contain any 3 other allegations regarding Le. See FAC ¶ 29. Alberts contends that this allegation is insufficient 4 to state a claim against him for negligent supervision of Le. Plaintiff concedes that point, and does 5 not oppose Alberts’ motion to dismiss Claim 5 to the extent it is based on his alleged negligent 6 supervision of Le. 7 Albert’s motion to dismiss Claim 5 to the extent it is based on his alleged negligent 8 supervision of Le is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 9 c. Flores 10 The FAC alleges that Flores was one of the three individuals who confronted Plaintiff on 11 August 30, 2022, insisting that Bilte had not cut Plaintiff’s hair; that on September 2, 2022, Flores 12 asked Plaintiff’s mother whether Plaintiff wore shorts under her dress; that Plaintiff’s parents 13 related those incidents to Alberts during their communications with him; and that the information 14 regarding Flore was provided to Alberts in the context of a series of incidents in which Plaintiff 15 was inappropriately touched, injured, and bullied by other teachers at the school. See FAC ¶¶ 17- 16 26, 69-71. Plaintiff claims that under these circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable to 17 Alberts that Flores might pose a risk of harm to Plaintiff, that Alberts owed Plaintiff a duty of care 18 to take reasonable measures to protect her from Flores, and that Albert’s breach of that duty 19 resulted in Flores’ sexual battery of her. Alberts contends that the facts alleged in the FAC do not 20 show that there was a foreseeable risk that Flores might sexually batter Plaintiff. 21 In the context of a claim for negligent supervision in a school, “[f]oreseeability is 22 determined in light of all the circumstances and does not require prior identical events or injuries.” 23 M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist., 110 Cal. App. 4th 508, 519 (2003). “It is not 24 necessary to prove that the very injury which occurred must have been foreseeable by the school 25 authorities. . . . Their negligence is established if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that 26 injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in the absence of [adequate] 27 safeguards.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original). “Further, the issue 1 instead focuses on whether the allegedly negligent conduct at issue created a foreseeable risk of a 2 particular kind of harm.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 In M.W., the California appellate court confronted the question whether the school district 4 owed the minor plaintiff a duty to protect him from the sexual assault of another student, “Chris,” 5 when the school district had no knowledge that Chris had a propensity to commit the assault. See 6 M. W., 110 Cal. App. 4th at 516. The court determined that under all the circumstances known to 7 the school district – the lack of direct supervision in the early morning hours when the plaintiff 8 customarily arrived at school, the vulnerability of special education students such as the plaintiff, 9 and Chris’s history of discipline problems – it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff was at 10 risk of an assault by Chris. See id. at 520. The court concluded that it was not necessary for the 11 district to have foreseen that an act of sodomy could have occurred, stating that “[w]e find no 12 distinction between a physical assault and a sexual assault for purposes of foreseeability in this 13 case.” Id. 14 Applying this reasoning, and construing the allegations of the FAC in the light most 15 favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim 16 against Alberts for negligent supervision of Flores. In the weeks leading up to the alleged sexual 17 battery of Plaintiff, Alberts allegedly was informed of a series of bizarre and troubling events 18 involving multiple physical assaults on Plaintiff by Bilte and Le, Alberts also was informed that 19 Flores allegedly had inserted himself into the situation by confronting Plaintiff about her claim 20 that Bilte had cut her hair, and by asking Plaintiff’s mother if she wore shorts under her dress. It 21 was not necessary for Alberts to have foreseen that the physical assaults of Plaintiff would escalate 22 to sexual assaults, or even that a sexual assault would be committed by Flores. See M.W., 110 Cal. 23 App. 4th at 519. Alberts’ negligence may be established if a reasonably prudent person in his 24 circumstances would foresee that injuries of the same general type – here, physical injuries – 25 would be likely to happen in the absence of adequate safeguards. See id. The Court concludes 26 that Plaintiff has pled facts showing that a reasonably prudent person in Alberts’ position would 27 foresee that Plaintiff would suffer further physical assaults from teachers absent adequate 1 safeguards other than to change Plaintiff’s classroom teacher. 2 Albert’s motion to dismiss Claim 5 to the extent it is based on his alleged negligent 3 supervision of Flores is DENIED. 4 2. Claim 6 for Supervisory Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 Claim 6 alleges that Alberts is liable for violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under 6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the theory of supervisory liability. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that her 7 Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity, and Fourth Amendment right to be free from 8 excessive force, were violated by Bilte, Le, and Flores, and that Alberts may be held liable for his 9 failure to terminate the series of events which Alberts reasonably should have known would result 10 in those constitutional violations. 11 “A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his 12 or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 13 between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 14 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The requisite 15 causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by 16 knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or 17 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207- 18 08 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). 19 Alberts argues that he is not subject to supervisory liability for the alleged violations of 20 Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, because he responded adequately to the complaints of Plaintiff’s 21 parents. The asserted adequacy of Alberts’ response is not apparent from the face of the FAC. As 22 discussed above, Alberts was informed of a series of bizarre and troubling events that allegedly 23 occurred at the school, including Bilte cutting Plaintiff’s hair twice, Bilte and Le physically 24 assaulting Plaintiff by scratching her, and Bilte, Flores, and another teacher bullying Plaintiff 25 about her claim that Bilte had cut her hair. Based on the face of the FAC, it does not appear that 26 Alberts did anything to stop this series of acts by the teachers under his supervision beyond 27 transferring Plaintiff to a different classroom after weeks of complaints by Plaintiff’s parents. It 1 alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court finds that under these 2 || circumstances, Plaintiff has stated a claim for § 1983 liability against Alberts under a theory of 3 supervisory liability. 4 Alberts’ motion to dismiss Claim 6 is DENIED. 5 IV. ORDER 6 (1) The motion to dismiss brought by the District and Alberts is GRANTED IN PART 7 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENIED IN PART as follows: 8 (a) the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART WITHOUT LEAVE TO 9 AMEND as to Claims 3, 4, and 5 against the District to the extent those 10 claims are premised on the District’s vicarious liability for Flores’ alleged 11 sexual battery of Plaintiff, and as to Claim 5 against Alberts to the extent 12 premised on his alleged negligent supervision of Le; and 5 13 (b) the motion to dismiss otherwise is DENIED. 14 (2) The District and Alberts shall answer the FAC consistent with this ruling. 3 15 (3) The Initial Case Management Conference set for December 20, 2023 at 11:00 a.m. 16 remains on-calendar. 3 17 (4) This order terminates ECF 16. 18 19 Dated: December 15, 2023 ETH LABSON FREEMAN 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28