Downes v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 MAUREEN DOWNES, 10 Case No. 23-cv-01643-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY 12 FEES AND COSTS UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 13 OF AMERICA, 14 Defendant. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiff Maureen Downes moves for an order awarding her $97,965 in attorney fees and 17 $625.07 in costs incurred during the successful litigation of her claim against Defendant Unum 18 Life Insurance Company of America pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 19 (“ERISA”). Plaintiff sought to hold Defendant liable for denying her long-term disability benefits and secured a favorable judgment. See Downs v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 23-cv-01643, 20 2024 WL 3908106, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2024). For the reasons explained below, the motion 21 is granted. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 In an ERISA action, the court has discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs 24 to either party. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). A party who achieves “some degree of success on the 25 merits” may be entitled to attorney fees. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 26 255 (2010). In particular, a prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless 27 1 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). In that context, discussion of the five-factor 2 test elaborated in Hummell v. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980) is “unnecessary.” 3 Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nelson 4 v. EG & G Energy Measurements Group, Inc., 37 F.3d 1384, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994)). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 A. Success on the Merits 7 Plaintiff succeeded on the merits of her ERISA claim by securing a judgment. Defendant 8 presents no special circumstances that caution against awarding Plaintiff attorney fees. None 9 appear present, so the presumption in favor of granting the motion applies. Moreover, because 10 Plaintiff unambiguously won judgment on her sole claim for relief in this matter, there is no need 11 to proceed through the Hummell analysis. See Grosz-Salomon, 237 F.3d at 1164. 12 B. Reasonableness of Requested Fees 13 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks attorney fees based on the lodestar calculation approach. Under 14 this approach, “the court establishes a lodestar by multiplying the number of hours reasonably 15 expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 16 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2007). “The party seeking fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation and must submit evidence supporting those hours and the rates 17 claimed.” Id. at 945–46. “Affidavits of the plaintiff[’s] attorney and other attorneys regarding 18 prevailing fees in the community. . . are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” 19 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1980). 20 Defendant challenges opposing counsel’s $900 hourly rate as excessive. To support that 21 position, it cites a nonprecedential memorandum disposition from the Ninth Circuit in which a 22 Plaintiff’s attorney forfeited arguments against reducing a fee award from $650 to 500. See Nagy 23 v. Grp. Long Term Disability Plan for Emps. of Oracle Am., Inc., 739 F. App’x 366, 368 (9th Cir. 24 2018). This cited case is inapposite here, where Plaintiff has not forfeited any fee-related 25 arguments. In fact, Plaintiff has well-supported the motion with declarations from attorneys in the 26 ERISA field who charge similar rates, see Dkt. Nos. 41-2 at ¶ 8 (attorney charges $1,025 per hour 27 1 in 2024), 41-3 at ¶ 8 (attorney charges $950 per hour in 2024), Dkt. No. 41-5 at ¶ 6 (attorney 2 charges $900 per hour in 2024), as well as others who personally vouched for Plaintiff’s counsel 3 and the reasonableness of his $900 rate, see Dkt. Nos. 41-4 and 41-6. The rate roughly tracks 4 inflation since 2019, when another district court in this circuit deemed reasonable this counsel’s then-rate of $750. See Herrman v. Lifemap Assurance Co., 497 F. Supp. 3d 970, 975 (D. Or. 5 2020). As counsel explains, “if we had simply pegged our rates to the [Consumer Price Index] 6 since 2019, our rates would have increased” to $916.70 as of July 2024. Dkt. No. 41-1 at 4. 7 Reflecting this reality, courts in the Northern District routinely authorize rates in this range for 8 partners specializing in ERISA claims. See, e.g., Dimry v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. 9 Plan, 2018 WL 6726963, at *2 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 22, 2018) ($900 per hour); Price v. Reliance 10 Standard Life Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2600453, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 22, 2023) ($800 per hour); Beryl 11 v. Navient Corp., 2023 WL 4570626, at *4 (N.D. Cal., July 13, 2023) ($1200 per hour). 12 Moreover, well-established rates such as these are presumed reasonable in the absence of 13 opposing evidence, see United Steelworkers, 896 F.2d at 407, and here, Defendant offers no 14 opposing evidence against a fee award of $900 per hour. Instead, Defendant merely alleges that 15 ERISA litigation clients “do not actually pay” $900 per hour. Dkt. No. 45 at 3–4. This unfounded 16 claim flies in the face of Plaintiff’s counsel’s sworn declaration that the firm has “current clients 17 paying our current hourly rates” for attorneys who “specialize in representing plaintiffs in ERISA 18 litigation.” Dkt. No. 41-1 at ¶ 7. Presenting no reason to doubt the veracity of the sworn 19 declaration, Defendant’s bald assertion to the contrary is unavailing. 20 Defendant next attempts to argue that Plaintiff’s fee claim is not supported by the attached 21 declarations because the request involves “significant and uninterrupted increases in rates, based 22 only on increasing costs and inflation.” Dkt. No. 45 at 4. It also highlights that Plaintiff’s counsel 23 increased the yearly rate by $50 in 2022 but only by $25 in most other years, and that Plaintiff’s 24 counsel did not include declarations from two partners who worked minimal hours on the matter. 25 None of these contentions are persuasive. Using declarations from attorneys in the field to 26 establish the reasonableness of a request is a long-established method of proof that the Ninth 27 Circuit has explicitly endorsed. See Welch, 480 F.3d at 947. Increasing rates on an annual basis is 1 standard practice, and Defendant offers no caselaw to suggest that such increases must be uniform 2 in order to be reasonable. As for the rate charged by Plaintiff’s counsel’s colleagues, it is the same 3 rate that he charges and is supported by the same rationales, discussed supra. The hours they 4 billed—0.7 hours for one and 4.4 hours for another—are also de minimis when compared to the 108.85 hour total, so it makes sense why counsel did not endeavor to have them complete their 5 own declarations. See generally Dkt. No. 47 at 5. As for time billed, Plaintiff “submit[ted] 6 evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed,” with more than adequate 7 documentation. See Dkt. No. 41-1 at 9–15 (providing detailed accounts of every hour billed). 8 Defendant protests that one attorney on the matter provided duplicative work in preparing for and 9 a hearing, but “collaboration and brainstorming are an important aspect of legal practice. Even the 10 most competent and experienced attorney does not have all the answers, and therefore attorneys 11 should receive some compensation for consultations with colleagues.” Dragu v. Motion Picture 12 Indus. Health Plan for Active Participants, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1128–29 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 13 Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel should only be permitted to bill at the 14 rate of the years when the litigation began and was litigated, rather than the current 2024 rate. But 15 “[d]istrict courts have the discretion to compensate plaintiff’s attorneys for delay in payment by 16 either applying the attorneys’ current rates to all hours billed during the course of the litigation or 17 using the attorneys’ historical rates and adding a prime rate enhancement.” Welch, 480 F.3d at 18 947. Plaintiff’s counsel notes that the majority of time spent on the case occurred in 2024, during 19 which he defeated Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and won judgment for Plaintiff. All 20 things considered, it is appropriate here to award Plaintiff’s counsel the current hourly rate. See, 21 e.g., Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 258 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 22 In sum, the application for attorney fees is reasonable. Plaintiff’s counsel will be 23 compensated for 108.85 hours’ work at a rate of $900 per hour, resulting in a total award of 24 $97,965. Defendant did not contest the costs, and an independent review of the record confirms 25 that the $625.07 sought is fair and reasonable. Plaintiff’s counsel therefore will be awarded the 26 requested costs as well. 27 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs 3 is granted. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $97,965 in attorney fees and $625.07 in fees, costs, and 4 expenses. 5 6 || ITISSO ORDERED. 4 8 Dated: November 20, 2024 9 RICHARD SEEBORG 10 Chief United States District Judge 11 12 15 16 = 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS CASE No. 23-cv-01643-RS