Rivas v. Koenig ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DANIEL MENDOZA RIVAS, Case No. 24-cv-00007-JST 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 10 CRAIG KOENIG, et al., Re: ECF No. 15 Defendants. 11 12 13 Plaintiff Daniel Mendoza Rivas, an inmate housed at Folsom State Prison, has filed this 14 pro se civil rights action regarding events that took place at Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”) 15 in Soledad, California. Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 16 complaint. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, ECF No. 16, and Defendants have filed 17 a reply in support of their motion, ECF No. 17. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 18 GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No. 15. 19 DISCUSSION 20 I. Complaint 21 The complaint names as defendants Craig Koenig, identified as CTF warden from 2020- 22 2021; and L. Martinez, identified as CTF warden from 2021 to present. The complaint alleges 23 that, despite knowing the dangers posed by COVID-19, Defendants failed to enforce COVID-19 24 safety protocols, such as masking and maintaining a six foot distance, from 2020-2022. The 25 failure to enforce the COVID-19 protocols resulted in the following: in 2020, Plaintiff and 2,700 26 other inmates contracted COVID, and 21 inmates died from COVID; in late December 2020, 27 Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19; Plaintiff suffers from numerous health complications 1 CTF staff due to staff failure to wear masks, which resulted in 200 inmates contracting COVID. 2 The complaint requests the following relief: immediate release from prison so that Plaintiff can 3 receive professional mental help; medical examination for COVID-related health issues; and 4 whatever the Court deems appropriate to pay mental and medical expenses. See generally ECF 5 No. 1. Plaintiff attached to his complaint photos of staff and inmates unmasked in late 2020 and 6 in January 2022, and a March 19, 2021 video of then-warden Koenig stating that COVID was 7 brought into the prison by staff. ECF No. 1, Exs. B, I. The Court found that, liberally construed, 8 the complaint’s allegations stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants. 9 ECF No. 9. 10 The complaint has Grievance No. 69229 attached as an exhibit. Plaintiff submitted 11 Grievance No. 69229 on December 20, 2020, and identified the issue as follows: 12 Due to the severe corona virus (COVID 19) outbreak and the fact that the CTF staff has failed to manage the outbreak effectively 13 within the prison, I’m concern for my safety. As is I’m CCCM’S I have mental health problems and seeing other inmates sufer (sic) 14 from the decease (sic) including some death’s (sic) in this month in A yard has cause me some stress, and seeing my own celly today 15 came out positive I’m afraid to have the virus COVID 19. I have less than 6 years to go home but I’m afraid to get sick or even die 16 and not be able to make it home. 17 I have me, and my celly witnessed way to (sic) many irregularities within the institution failing to contain the virus. 18 19 ECF No. 1-1 at 35-36. Plaintiff requested that he be immediately released “because if something 20 does happen to me due to staff not following guidelines within the institution my family and/or I 21 will take legal actions against the CDCR institution.” Id. In the January 7, 2021 first-level 22 decision, the CDCR staff summarized the grievance as follows: “Claimant is seeking immediate 23 release from incarcerated custody due to COVID-19. Alleges CTF staff failed to manage the 24 outbreak of COVID-19 effectively.” ECF No. 1-1 at 38. The response stated that CDCR took 25 action to help mitigate the spread of COVID-19, including paroling inmates in order to increase 26 both capacity and physical space at the prisons, which allowed for increased physical distancing 27 and assisted isolation quarantine efforts for suspected or positive COVID-19 cases. ECF No. 1-1 1 contradicted the claim that the CDCR took steps to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, with records 2 showing that more than 300 CTF staff members contracted COVID, more than 2500 inmates 3 contracted COVID; and 6 inmates died of COVID. ECF No. 1-1 at 39. 4 II. Motion to Dismiss 5 Defendants alleges that this action should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) 6 Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for this claim, and the failure to exhaust 7 is clear on the face of the complaint; (2) Plaintiff cannot raise a claim based on supervisory 8 liability; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no legal authority 9 clearly establishing that a prison warden violates the Eighth Amendment simply because, during a 10 once-in-a-century pandemic, one of his many staff members came to work while infected. See 11 generally ECF No. 15. Below, the Court addresses each argument in turn. 12 A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss 13 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 14 complaint. See City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the “notice 15 pleading” standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff’s complaint must provide a 16 short and plain statement of the plaintiff’s claims showing entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 8(a)(2); see also Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). A court may dismiss a 18 complaint for lack of cognizable legal theory or if the facts alleged fail to suffice under a 19 cognizable legal claim. Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2017). However, 20 a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief 21 that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 22 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations 23 and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Polanco v. Diaz, 76 F.4th 918, 925 24 (9th Cir. 2023). Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court “need not accept as true 25 allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,” Produce Pay, 26 Inc. v. Izguerra Produce, Inc., 39 F.4th 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2022), and need not accept as true 27 legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 1 content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim 2 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) 3 (quotations and citation omitted). “Pro se complaints must be held to less stringent standards than 4 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, especially when they are civil rights claims by inmates.” 5 Tiedemann v. von Blanckensee, 72 F.4tg 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2023). In ruling on a motion to 6 dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), the court “may generally consider only allegations 7 contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to 8 judicial notice.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 9 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 10 B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 11 1. CDCR Administrative Grievance Process 12 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides its 13 inmates and parolees the right to administratively grieve and appeal any “policy, decision, action, 14 condition, or omission by the [California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]or 15 departmental staff that causes some measurable harm to their health, safety, or welfare.” 15 Cal. 16 Code Regs. § 3481(a) (eff. June 1, 2020).1 For non-healthcare grievances by inmates,2 there are 17 two levels of review. At the first level, the inmate submits his claim on a CDCR Form 602-1 to 18 the Institutional Office of Grievances at the prison where he is housed. 15 Cal. Code Regs. 19 § 3482(a)(1), (c). In the Form 602-1, the inmate is required to “describe all information known 20 and available to the [inmate] regarding the claim, including key dates and times, names and titles 21 of all involved staff members (or a description of those staff members), and names and titles of all 22 witnesses, to the best of the [inmate’s] knowledge.” Id. at § 3482(c)(2). “In response, [the 23 inmate] shall receive a written decision” from the Institutional Office of Grievances “clearly 24 explaining the reasoning for the Reviewing Authority’s decision as to each claim.” Id. at 25 1 The regulations that set out the features of the administrative remedies process for California 26 prisoners underwent a substantial restructuring in 2020. On March 25, 2020, and effective June 1, 2020, California Code of Regulations Title 15, sections 3084 through 3084.9 were repealed and 27 replaced with the renumbered and amended provisions at sections 3480 through 3487. 1 § 3481(a). This written decision, referred to as a first level decision, does not exhaust 2 administrative remedies. Id. at § 3483(l). If an inmate is dissatisfied with the first level decision, 3 the inmate may appeal the decision to the second level by submitting a CDCR Form 602-2 to the 4 CDCR’s Office of Appeals in Sacramento within 30 days of receiving the first level decision. Id. 5 at §§ 3481(a), 3485(a). The Office of Appeals shall ensure that a written decision is completed no 6 later than 60 calendar days after receipt of the grievance. Id. at § 3485(g). The written decision 7 shall clearly explain the reasoning for the decision in each claim. Id. at § 3481(a). A written 8 decision containing one of the following decisions—“denied,” “granted,” “no jurisdiction,” 9 “identified as staff misconduct,” “pending legal matter,” or “time expired”—constitutes 10 exhaustion of the administrative remedy process. Id. at § 3485(l). “Time Expired” means that the 11 Office of Appeals was not able to respond to the grievance within 60 calendar days, resulting in 12 the first level decision serving as the department’s final decision. Id. at § 3485(g)(10). 13 2. Legal Standard 14 The Prison Litigation Reform Act sets forth the following exhaustion requirement: “No 15 action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other 16 Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 17 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA’s 18 exhaustion requirement is mandatory, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007), and requires 19 “proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 20 (2006). Proper exhaustion requires using all steps of an administrative process and “demands 21 compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative 22 system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its 23 proceedings.” Woodford, 548 at 90–91. Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that 24 is required by the PLRA to “properly exhaust.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. However, if an inmate’s 25 grievance does not comply with a procedural rule but prison officials decide it on the merits 26 anyway at all available levels of administrative review, it is exhausted. Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 27 654, 656-58 (9th Cir. 2016) (California inmate whose grievance failed to name all staff members 1 exhausted claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs because claim was decided on 2 merits at all levels of review). 3 Because a challenge to a prisoner complaint based on the failure to exhaust administrative 4 remedies typically requires recourse to documents and evidence outside the pleadings, the proper 5 vehicle for raising a failure to exhaust defense is generally a motion for summary judgment, not a 6 Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 7 However, the “[i]n the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a 8 defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. 9 3. Analysis 10 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for the 11 claims raised in this action, and that the failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint. 12 Specifically, Defendants argue that Grievance No. 69229 does not exhaust any claim against 13 defendants Koenig and Martinez because it does not identify either of them by name or title, and 14 does not describe their involvement in any violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Defendants further argue 15 that because Grievance No. 69229 was submitted in December 2020, this grievance could not 16 grieve defendant Martinez’s conduct as warden as defendant Martinez did not become warden 17 until 2021. ECF No. 15 at 4-5. 18 Plaintiff argues that Grievance No. 69229 exhausted the claims in this action because it 19 “addressed the core issue of staff failure to manage the COVID-19 outbreak, which falls under the 20 responsibility of the warden and chief deputy warden” and “clearly detail[ed] the negligence in 21 managing the outbreak and highlight the conditions that placed [Plaintiff] and other inmates at 22 risk.” ECF No. 16 at 3-4. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that seeking administrative remedies 23 would have been futile given the video evidence wherein the warden admitted responsibility for 24 the relevant events. He argues that because the purpose of the administrative exhaustion 25 requirement is to give the institution a chance to address the issue, there is no need to pursue 26 administrative remedies where the warden has acknowledged fault because grievances would not 27 result in a different outcome. Plaintiff further argues that his August 26, 2020 letter to defendant 1 outbreak” and “demonstrates that [Plaintiff] made a concerted effort to address the issue internally, 2 seeking resolution through proper administrative channels.” ECF No. 16 at 4. 3 Viewing the complaint and its attachments in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the 4 Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his claims against defendant Martinez and his 5 claims regarding actions subsequent to December 20, 2020, but that he has exhausted the 6 remaining claims, i.e., the claims against defendant Koenig arising out of his management, or 7 mismanagement, of CTF’s response to the COVID outbreak prior to December 20, 2020. 8 Because Grievance No. 69229 was filed on December 20, 2020, it cannot exhaust claims 9 for actions subsequent to December 20, 2020. Assuming that Grievance No. 69229 was decided 10 on the merits at all levels,3 the prison’s responses to Grievance No. 69229, at most, addressed the 11 prison’s handling of COVID in 2020. The prison’s responses to Grievance No. 69299 did not 12 address events in 2021 or 2022, and did not address prison policy or management while defendant 13 Martinez was warden. The claims arising out of any failure to enforce COVID safety policies 14 subsequent to December 20, 2020, and arising out of the January 2022 COVID outbreak are 15 therefore unexhausted. The claims against defendant Martinez are similarly unexhausted because 16 there is no allegation that defendant Martinez was responsible for setting or enforcing CTF 17 policies, or for training subordinates, prior to becoming CTF warden sometime in 2021. The 18 Court DISMISSES defendant Martinez and the claims regarding actions subsequent to December 19 20, 2020 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The dismissal is without prejudice to 20 filing a new action raising these claims after Plaintiff has satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion 21 requirement with respect to these claims. 22 However, Grievance No. 69229 exhausts the claims regarding defendant Koenig’s 23 management of the COVID-19 outbreak prior to December 20, 2020. Although Grievance No. 24 25 3 The exhaustion requirement requires CDCR inmates to receive a decision from the Office of Appeals of “denied,” granted”, “no jurisdiction,” “identified as staff misconduct,” “pending legal 26 matter,” or “time expired” with respect to their grievance. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3945(l). It is unclear if the Office of Appeals issued a decision on Grievance No. 69229. The complaint’s 27 exhibits only show a first level decision. But Defendants do not argue that Grievance No. 69229 1 69229 did not identify defendant Koenig at all levels, Grievance No. 69229 grieved CTF’s 2 handling of the COVID-19 outbreak prior to December 20, 2020, and was decided on the merits at 3 all levels despite failing to name defendant Koenig. The requirement that a grievance name all 4 staff members involved is a procedural rule. If prison officials accept and render a decision on the 5 merits of a procedurally flawed grievance at each available step of the administrative process, then 6 the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied. See Reyes, 810 F.3d at 657-58 7 (“But when prison officials address the merits of a prisoner’s grievance instead of enforcing a 8 procedural bar, the state’s interests in administrative exhaustion have been served.”). Moreover, 9 here, as in Reyes, the grievance put prison officials on notice of the nature of the wrong alleged in 10 this action – that prison officials generally, including defendant Koenig, had failed to properly 11 manage CTF’s response to COVID-19. Defendant Koenig was warden during the time period 12 referenced, and the grievance therefore is reasonably read as grieving how defendant Koenig 13 handled COVID-19. See, e.g., Reyes, 810 F.3d at 659 (claim against two specific doctors was 14 exhausted despite failure to name them in grievance because grievance grieved denial of pain 15 medication and doctors were members of committee that denied medication). 16 C. Supervisory Liability 17 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they rely on a theory of 18 supervisory liability, for which Section 1983 relief is unavailable. Specifically, Defendants argue 19 that the complaint has only pled supervisory liability because it does not plead any particular acts 20 or omissions by Defendants that increased the risk to inmate health and safety, and because the 21 complaint only pleads that staff did not follow protocol and that the wardens did a poor job 22 controlling staff. Defendants are correct that, generally speaking, there is no supervisory liability 23 under § 1983, i.e., liability simply because the defendant supervises the wrongdoer. See Taylor v. 24 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). But a supervisor is liable under Section 1983 for the 25 “constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor . . . knew of the violations and failed 26 to act to prevent them,” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045, or if the alleged constitutional violation was the 27 result of the supervisor’s “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control 1 that defendant Koenig was aware that the COVID-19 protocols, such as masking, quarantining, 2 and social distancing, were necessary to prevent the spread of COVID-19; that his staff regularly 3 failed to comply with these protocols; and that COVID-19 posed a serious risk to inmate’s health 4 and safety. Liberally construed, this allegation states a claim for Section 1983 liability against 5 defendant Koenig. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on 6 the grounds that the complaint has only pled supervisory liability. 7 D. Qualified Immunity 8 Defendants argue that qualified immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims because “there exist[s] no 9 legal authority clearly establishing that a prison warden violates the Eighth Amendment simply 10 because, during a once-in-a-century pandemic, one of his many staff members came to work while 11 infected.” ECF No. 15 at 6-7. The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity because Defendants have defined the relevant right too narrowly. “The 12 doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does 13 not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 14 would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. 15 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). To be entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to 16 dismiss stage, an officer must show that the allegations in the complaint do not make out a 17 violation of a constitutional right or that any such right was not clearly established at the time of 18 the alleged misconduct. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232-36. Determining whether the law was 19 clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case and not as a 20 broad general proposition, but binding caselaw “need not catalogue every way in which prison 21 conditions can be constitutionally inadequate . . . to conclude that a reasonable official would 22 understand that his actions violated an inmate’s rights.” Hampton v. Calif., 83 F.4th 754, 769 (9th 23 Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Recently, in 2023, the Ninth Circuit 24 held that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage 25 with respect to a similar COVID-19 related claim. In Hampton, a inmate’s spouse alleged that the 26 CDCR had violated the Eighth Amendment when, in 2020, they transferred inmates from 27 California Institute for Men into San Quentin State Prison in a manner that resulted in infecting 1 guard. See generally Hampton. The Ninth Circuit found that the CDCR was not entitled to 2 qualified immunity because, in 2020, it was clearly established that the Eighth Amendment 3 requires correctional officials to reasonably protect inmates from exposure to serious diseases. Id. 4 at 754, 770. Similarly, qualified immunity is not appropriate here at the motion to dismiss stage. The complaint alleges that defendant Koenig failed to act reasonably by ensuring compliance with 5 the prison’s own COVID-19 protocols, and therefore exposed Plaintiff to a serious communicable 6 disease. The Court therefore DENIES the motion to dismiss this action on the grounds of 7 qualified immunity. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons set forth below, the Court ORDERS as follows. 10 1. The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to 11 dismiss. The Court DISMISSES the claims against defendant Martinez and the Eighth 12 Amendment claims regarding Defendants’ actions subsequent to December 20, 2020 for failure to 13 exhaust administrative remedies. The Court DENIES the remainder of the motion to dismiss. 14 2. The Court sets the following briefing schedule. No later than 91 days from the date 15 this order is filed, Defendant must file and serve a motion for summary judgment or other 16 dispositive motion. If Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary 17 judgment, Defendant must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. Plaintiff’s 18 opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion must be filed with the Court and 19 served upon Defendant no later than 28 days from the date the motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear 20 in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment provided later in this order as he 21 prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. Defendant shall file a reply brief no 22 later than 14 days after the date the opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as 23 of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion. 24 A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that 25 Plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose 26 the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in 27 1 summary judgment). Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 2 || the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 3 must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 4 || be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact — that is, if there is no real dispute about 5 any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 6 || entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 7 makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 8 testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 9 specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 10 || as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 11 documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 12 || your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 5 13 If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 14 Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A). (The Rand notice above does 3 15 not excuse Defendant’s obligation to serve said notice again concurrently with a motion for 16 summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939). 3 17 This order terminates ECF No. 15. IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: November 25, 2024 . 20 JON S. TIGAR 2] y States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28