McLaughlin v. Tesla, Inc. ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AARON MCLAUGHLIN, et al., Case No. 22-cv-07849-SVK 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 9 v. MOTION TO SEAL 10 TESLA, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 107 11 Defendants. 12 On September 5, 2024, the Parties appeared for a hearing on Defendant’s motions to 13 exclude the testimony of two of Plaintiffs’ experts and to apply Virginia law to certain substantive 14 issues in this action. See Dkts. 78-81, 98. The Parties subsequently requested a production of the 15 transcript of the hearing, which the court reporter filed on October 8, 2024. See Dkts. 99-100, 106 16 (“Hr’g Tr.”). Defendant now moves to seal about four lines from the transcript in which counsel 17 for Plaintiffs discusses crashes involving cars manufactured by Defendant and Defendant’s 18 business practices regarding those crashes. See Dkt. 107 (the “Motion”). 19 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records 20 and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of 21 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Thus, in evaluating the 22 propriety of sealing court records, “a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 23 See id. (citation omitted). And where the filings in question are “more than tangentially related to 24 the merits of a case,” public access will remain the ending point unless the moving party presents 25 “compelling reasons” for sealing. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 26 1096-97, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 2016). For filings “not related, or only tangentially related, to the 27 merits of a case,” however, a moving party must instead satisfy the less-burdensome “good cause” 1 Despite Defendant’s insistence to the contrary (see Motion at 3), the good-cause standard 2 does not apply here. The transcript excerpts that Defendant seeks to seal relate to Defendant’s 3 motion to apply Virginia law to certain substantive issues in this action.1 That motion presented 4 choice-of-law issues that were more than tangentially related to the merits of the case, and so the 5 more-stringent compelling-reasons standard applies to the Motion. See, e.g., White v. Symetra 6 Assigned Benefits Serv. Co., No. 20-cv-01866-MJP, 2022 WL 1136804, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7 18, 2022). 8 “What constitutes a ‘compelling reason’ is ‘best left to the sound discretion of the trial 9 court.’” Chrysler, 809 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). The analysis requires the Court to 10 “conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep 11 certain judicial records secret.” See id. (citation omitted). Defendant satisfies the standard here. 12 The transcript excerpts “reference nonpublic, confidential information” about Defendant’s 13 business processes regarding car crashes, the disclosure of which Defendant fears could result in 14 competitive harm. See Motion at 3. Indeed, counsel for Plaintiffs confirmed at the hearing that he 15 obtained the information in question through the discovery process. See Hr’g Tr. at 10:18-11:12. 16 Compelling reasons exist to seal “business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive 17 standing.” See Chrysler, 809 F.3d at 1097 (citation omitted). To be sure, the excerpts discuss 18 Defendant’s information at a high level of generality, which counsels against sealing. See, e.g., 19 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-cv-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 5505068, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 20 Nov. 13, 2012). But that information bore little relevance to the substantive issues in the case and 21 did not at all influence the Court’s rationale in resolving the choice-of-law issues presented by 22 Defendant. Accordingly, restricting public access to that information would not contravene the 23 primary policies underlying the presumption of access—“promoting the public’s understanding of 24 the judicial process and of significant public events.” See Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for 25 26 1 As noted above, the September 5 hearing also concerned Defendant’s requests to exclude the testimony of two of Plaintiffs’ experts. However, the excerpts at issue concern discussion of 27 Defendant’s request to apply Virginia law and not to its requests to exclude expert testimony. See 1 Dist. of Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986). Further, Defendant seeks to seal only an 2 incredibly narrow portion of the transcript (about four lines out of 82 pages). Balancing 3 Defendant’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its business information against the 4 public’s interest in disclosure of a few morsels of essentially irrelevant information, the Court 5 concludes that compelling reasons exist to seal the information. See, e.g., TriQuint 6 Semiconductor, Inc v. Avago Techs. Ltd., No. 09-cv-01531-PHX, 2011 WL 4947343, at *3 (D. 7 Ariz. Oct. 18, 2011) (“On balance, because solely redacting TriQuint’s customer names from the 8 exhibits only withholds a comparatively small amount of information from the public, protects 9 TriQuint’s interest in its competitive standing, and does not affect the public’s interest in keeping 10 a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, the Court finds that TriQuint has shown 11 compelling reasons to redact its customer names from the exhibits . . . .”). 12 The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ arguments raised in opposition to the Motion. See Dkt. 13 109 (the “Opposition”). 14 First, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should deny the Motion as untimely because 15 Defendant did not file the Motion before the deadlines set forth in the docket text accompanying 16 the filing of the transcript. See id. at 1-2. But the Parties are not barred from moving to seal the 17 transcript after the deadlines in question pass. Rather, per the Court’s General Order No. 59, those 18 deadlines concern the process for redacting certain categories of information contained in a 19 transcript (e.g., dates of birth, names of minor children).2 They do not, however, concern the 20 process for sealing other categories of information in a transcript. Indeed, General Order No. 59 21 expressly acknowledges that parties may move to seal other categories of information not within 22 the scope of that order. Thus, Defendant timely filed the Motion. 23 Second, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant fails to satisfy the compelling-reasons standard 24 because it does not provide sufficient factual support for its request. See Opposition at 2. While 25 the Court agrees that Defendant offers thin factual support, Defendant has provided enough to 26 27 2 A copy of General Order No. 59 is available at: https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/rules/general- 1 || justify sealing for the reasons set forth above. 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion. The Clerk shall maintain Dkt. 106 under 3 seal. By November 21, 2024, Defendant shall file a publicly available copy of the transcript 4 || containing its proposed redactions. 5 SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: November 14, 2024 7 8 — Seat □□□ SUSAN VAN KEULEN 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 1] 12 23 16 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28