Jones v. Callahan ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Seandell Lee Dupree Jones, Case No.: 3:18-cv-0646-AJB-WVG Petitioner, 12 ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT v. 13 AND RECOMMENDATION, C. Callahan, (Doc. No. 11), and DISMISSING 14 Respondent. PETITIONER’S HABEAS 15 PETITION, (Doc. No. 1) 16 Before the Court is Petitioner’s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 1.) 17 The case was referred to Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo for a Report and 18 Recommendation (“R&R”). The R&R recommends the Court DENY Jones’ petition. 19 (Doc. No. 11.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES 20 Petitioner’s habeas petition. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 The R&R thoroughly details the case’s factual background as recounted by the state 23 appellate court and the procedural history. (Doc. No. 11 at 2–6.) In sum, Petitioner and 24 another defendant placed an ad on Craigslist to sell a computer, met the buyer, and robbed 25 him. The victim gave chase but gave up after Defendants threatened to kill him. A second, 26 similar robbery took place days later with new victims in which Defendants took cash and 27 two cell phones. After the second robbery, Defendants went to a house where their 28 1 girlfriends lived but left shortly thereafter. In the meantime, as the second robbery victims 2 were driving to the police station, they noticed Defendants driving in the car and followed 3 it. The two cars ended up in a cul-de-sac, and when Defendants drove by the victims to 4 leave, they shot into the car and struck one victim in the chest, who later died. Defendants 5 attempted to flee but were eventually caught, charged, and convicted of first-degree murder 6 and other crimes. (Id. at 2–4.) Petitioner was not the person who discharged the gun, but 7 the Defendant who did alleges it was inadvertently fired. (Id. at 4.) 8 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 9 The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate’s judge’s R&R are set 10 forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court 11 must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 12 is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 13 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United 14 States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617– 15 18 (9th Cir. 1989). As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court 16 may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion 17 on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); 18 Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such 19 circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that failure to file objections only relieves the 20 trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must 21 still be reviewed de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Petitioner alleges “his federal due process rights were violated when the trial judge 24 refused to instruct the jury that, for purposes of the felony murder rule under California 25 law, the target felony ends when the perpetrators reach a place of temporary safety.” 26 (Doc. No. 11 at 7 (citing Doc. No. 1 at 13–19).) 27 The R&R notes there is a jury instruction which includes the “escape rule.” The 28 escape rule instructs the jury that a crime continues only until the perpetrators have 1 “actually reached a place of safety.” Cal. Crim. Jury Instruction 549. The trial judge 2 declined to include this instruction relying on a California Supreme Court case, People v. 3 Cavitt, 33 Cal. 4th 187 (2003), which held the escape rule did not apply to felony murder— 4 which is what Petitioner was charged under. However, after Petitioner was convicted, but 5 before his sentencing, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Watkins, 56 Cal. 6 4th 333 (2013), which held the escape rule does apply to felony murder. Petitioner 7 motioned for a new trial, but the trial judge denied the motion finding “the failure to 8 properly instruct the jury with the escape rule was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 9 (Doc. No. 11 at 10; Doc. No. 7-20 at 39–47.) The California appellate court affirmed this 10 finding, stating it was not prejudicial error because: 11 the jury was instructed on the escape rule under two other instructions and necessarily made findings on the escape rule adverse to the defendants in 12 connection with those instructions. Based on those findings, we can safely 13 conclude that the jury determined the defendants had not reached a place of temporary safety before the killing. 14 15 (Doc. No. 7-27 at 12–18.) Indeed, the jury “made a true finding that [Jones’ co-defendant] 16 personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during the robbery of [the victims]. . . . 17 Therefore, in [making this finding], the jury necessarily concluded that the robbery 18 continued until the end of the car chase, when [co-defendant] shot [victim].” (Id.) This 19 finding was separate from the trial court’s instruction error. 20 The R&R found that “[a]lthough the jury was not instructed on the escape rule for 21 the felony murder counts, the jury was instructed on the escape rule for the robbery and 22 shooting at an occupied vehicle counts.” (Doc. No. 11 at 17.) The R&R notes to arrive at 23 the convictions they did, 24 the jury had to first find that Jones had committed a robbery and that the robbery was still in progress when the crime of shooting at an occupied 25 vehicle occurred. And, in order for the jury to have concluded that the robbery 26 was still in progress when the shooting occurred under these instructions, they necessarily had to have found that Jones had not reached a place of temporary 27 safety at any point prior to the shooting. 28 1 (Id. at 18–19.) 2 Petitioner objects to the R&R arguing the R&R fails to note that the state court 3 applied Chapman in an objectively unreasonable manner. (Doc. No. 12 at 2–4.) Chapman 4 v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) states when a federal constitutional error occurs at 5 trial, a reviewing court on direct appeal must determine whether the error was harmless 6 beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the R&R concluded by finding that “[g]iven the verdicts 7 on the robbery and shooting at an occupied vehicle counts, therefore, the state court’s 8 conclusion that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was 9 objectively reasonable.” (Id. at 19.) Petitioner’s conclusory objection that “[t]he state 10 court[’]s conclusion was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 11 and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fair-minded agreement,” 12 without more explanation, does not suffice. (Id. at 4.) Thus, the Court overrules this 13 objection. 14 Petitioner’s second objection argues the magistrate judge failed to address the denial 15 of his right to present a complete defense. (Id. at 4–5.) Petitioner argues that because the 16 trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the escape rule, he was not able to present a 17 complete defense. (Id.) Petitioner asserts the Supreme Court has held that a defendant “is 18 entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence 19 sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 20 58, 63 (1988). Here, the Court finds the R&R did cover this, albeit indirectly, throughout 21 its entire analysis. The R&R found that the appellate court’s reasoning that although 22 Petitioner was not able to assert the specific “escape rule” jury instruction in his defense, 23 this error was not prejudicial because the jury made factual findings that Petitioner did not 24 reach a place of safety and that the felony murder occurred during one continuous 25 transaction was not clearly erroneous. Nothing in the objection leads the Court to find 26 otherwise. Thus, the Court overrules this objection as well. 27 IV. CONCLUSION 28 For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the report and recommendation, 1 || (Doc. No. 11), and DENIES Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. No. 1). 2 When a district court enters a final order adverse to the petitioner in habeas 3 || proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 4 appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of 5 || appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the 6 || denial of a constitutional nght.” Miller—El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Under 7 || this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether 8 ||the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 9 || were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Slack v. 10 || McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could 11 ||not debate whether the petition should have been resolved differently and thus DENIES 12 ||issuing a certificate of appealability. 13 The Court Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: August 15, 2019 | | □□ rz Le 16 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28