Strojnik v. Torrey Pines Club Corporation ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PETER STROJNIK, SR., Case No.: 3:19-cv-00650-BAS-AHG 12 Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 13 v. 14 EVANS HOTELS, LLC, [ECF No. 66] 15 Defendant/Counter-Claimant. 16 17 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions Against 18 Nadia Bermudez for Unauthorized Use of Plaintiff’s E-Signature on Joint Case 19 Management Statement. ECF No. 66. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Peter Strojnik, Sr. 20 (“Plaintiff”) seeks sanctions because, after the parties had agreed upon a completed Joint 21 Case Management Statement, Nadia Bermudez, counsel for Defendant/Counter-Claimant 22 Evans Hotels, LLC (“Defendant”), made an addition to the Statement detailing the parties’ 23 dispute about whether to stipulate to continuing an upcoming evidentiary hearing before 24 the District Judge in this matter, and a related dispute about the independent medical 25 evaluation (“IME”) that the District Judge ordered Plaintiff to undergo. Id. at 2; see also 26 ECF No. 62 ¶ 21. 27 Before Ms. Bermudez added the paragraph detailing the parties’ dispute, she had 28 requested Plaintiff’s version of the document in Word format to make “changes to the 1 section on discovery.” Plaintiff agreed, but requested “to see the final version before 2 filing.” ECF No. 66, Ex. 1. Although Ms. Bermudez did email her updated version to 3 Plaintiff approximately a half-hour prior to filing it, Plaintiff argues her behavior is 4 sanctionable because she included his signature without first receiving his approval of the 5 additional paragraph or allowing him to include a response. Further, Plaintiff contends the 6 additional paragraph is misleading and, in his Motion, he offers his own paragraph 7 responding to Defendant’s characterization of the dispute. 8 Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, the Court finds sanctions are not 9 warranted. First, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any harm from Ms. Bermudez’s addition 10 of the paragraph. Specifically, Defendant states in the paragraph at issue that it “will need 11 to file an ex parte motion seeking a change to the evidentiary date as well as confirming 12 [Plaintiff’s] IME date.” ECF No. 62 ¶ 21. Defendant filed the anticipated ex parte motion 13 on January 16, 2020. ECF No. 67. Therefore, the parties will each have an opportunity to 14 be heard directly on that issue through ordinary motion practice before the District Judge. 15 A Joint Case Management Statement, submitted to the Magistrate Judge for the purpose of 16 scheduling discovery and pretrial deadlines, is not the appropriate vehicle to raise a dispute 17 regarding the continuance of the evidentiary hearing or the IME in the first place. Thus, 18 the Court did not and would not consider Defendant’s characterization of the dispute 19 therein for the purpose of addressing or resolving the dispute. Indeed, it is apparent from 20 Defendant’s filing of a separate motion on the dispute that it did not anticipate its added 21 paragraph to operate as a formal motion on that issue. Now that Defendant has filed its 22 motion, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to respond and be heard. Therefore, Plaintiff has 23 not been prejudiced by his inability to include his responsive paragraph in the Joint Case 24 Management Statement. 25 Second, Plaintiff offers no explanation or authority regarding the source or basis for 26 his sanctions request. Instead, after describing the underlying issue regarding the Joint Case 27 Management Statement, Plaintiff merely states, “Sanctions are warranted.” 28 ECF No. 66 at 3. Without more, it is difficult for the Court to analyze what sanctions should 1 |/issue or why. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (authorizing sanctions against a party or 2 || attorney who fails to appear at a hearing, is substantially unprepared to participate or does 3 participate in good faith at a hearing, or fails to obey a court order); 4 || Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that sanctions against an 5 || attorney for “reckless misstatements of law and fact,” without more, are not justified under 6 Court’s “inherent power[,]” but that such “inherent power” sanctions may issue if the 7 Court “specifically finds bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith,” or if recklessness 8 “combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper 9 || purpose.”’). If Plaintiff’s Motion is indeed meant to be premised on the Court’s “inherent 10 || power” to sanction an attorney for making a reckless misstatement of fact coupled with an 11 ||improper purpose, “[i]t is the moving party’s burden to demonstrate that the party against 12 || whom it seeks sanctions acted with the requisite bad faith or improper purpose.” Lofton v. 13 || Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, 308 F.R.D. 276, 285 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Plaintiff’s conclusory 14 || statement that “[s]anctions are warranted” fails to meet that burden. Therefore, □□□□□□□□□□ □ 15 || Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 66) is DENIED. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18 || Dated: January 21, 2020 19 _ Siow. Xion Honorable Allison H. Goddard 20 United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28