Salgado v. Iqvia, Inc. ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 CINDY SALGADO, Case No. 18-cv-2785-BAS-WVG 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 12 PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION TO SEAL A 13 v. PREVIOUSLY FILED DOCUMENT 14 IQVIA, INC., et al., [ECF No. 41] 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Cindy Salgado and Defendants Iqvia, Inc. and Quintiles Commercial 18 US, Inc. filed cross-motions for summary judgment. As attachments to their motion, 19 Defendants included various exhibits. Plaintiff now moves ex parte to seal three of 20 those exhibits. (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff provides that the documents were designated 21 as confidential as a part of the parties’ protective order because they “reflect 22 Plaintiff’s private medical and mental health information.” Plaintiff wishes to seal 23 ECF 34-8 (Dr. Carroll’s Report), ECF 34-19 (Plaintiff’s Medical Record), and ECF 24 34-21 (June 21, 2018 Letter from Unum to Plaintiff). 25 I. LEGAL STANDARD 26 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy 27 public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. 1 is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the 2 starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 3 2006) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 4 2003)). “The presumption of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although 5 independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure 6 of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of 7 justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 8 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 9 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the 10 strong presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to 11 meet this burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion 12 that is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 13 809 F.3d at 1102. When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to 14 the merits, the “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the 15 underlying motion does not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good 16 cause” standard applies. Id. 17 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest 18 in disclosure and justify sealing court records exists when such ‘court files might 19 have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify 20 private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade 21 secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, 22 “[t]he mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, 23 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the 24 court to seal its records.” Id. (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). 25 II. ANALYSIS 26 Certain background information is relevant. Plaintiff was employed by 27 Defendant Iqvia. Plaintiff provides that in 2017, she took pregnancy disability leave, 1 8.) Plaintiff claims she then “began treatment for postpartum depression and anxiety 2 and placed off work by her medical providers due to said postpartum depression and 3 anxiety.” (Id. at 8–9.) Plaintiff told Iqvia of her intended modified schedule when 4 she returned to work, and Iqvia informed her that they were unable to support such 5 an accommodation. (Id. at 10.) Iqvia eventually terminated Plaintiff’s employment. 6 (Id.) Plaintiff sued Iqvia for violating California’s Fair Employment and Housing 7 Act (“FEHA”) by failing to provide her reasonable accommodation for her 8 pregnancy-related disability and by terminating her because of her disability. She 9 also claims Iqvia violated the California Family Rights Act by failing to provide her 10 with 12 weeks of leave. Iqvia claims that Plaintiff “fabricated post-partum 11 depression (“PPD”) symptoms in order to convince her doctor to place her on 12 disability-related leave.” (ECF No. 28-1, at 6.) Iqvia claims it was unable to 13 accommodate Plaintiff’s proposed modified work schedule due to the job 14 responsibilities, and Plaintiff was terminated due to business needs. 15 Plaintiff seeks to seal certain medical records, history, and information. 16 Because the parties’ motions for summary judgment are more than tangentially 17 related to the merits of the case, the compelling reasons standard applies in 18 determining whether to grant the ex parte motion to seal. 19 Courts throughout the Ninth Circuit have recognized that the need to protect 20 medical privacy generally qualifies as a compelling reason to seal records. Weisberg 21 v. Takeda Pharm. U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 18-784 PA (JCX), 2018 WL 6252458, at *2 22 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2018); Racies v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, No. 15-cv-00292-HSG, 23 2017 WL 6405612, at *2, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017); Carmichael v. Aranas, Case 24 No. 3:17-cv-00025-MMD-WGC, 2017 WL 955183, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 10, 2017). 25 Furthermore, under California law, a patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and 26 to prevent others from disclosing, confidential communication between patient and 27 physician. Cal. Evid. Code § 994. However, a patient-litigant has no privilege as to 1 put that condition at issue. Cal. Evid. Code § 996 (“There is no privilege under this 2 article as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the 3 patient if such issue has been tendered by [t]he patient.”); Weisberg, 2018 WL 4 6252458, at *2. 5 To a certain extent, Plaintiff has put her medical history at issue in this case. 6 Of course, even where a plaintiff has put her medical history at issue, “that does not 7 mean that the entirety of [her] medical records filed in connection with a motion 8 (which frequently contain records that pertain to unrelated medical information) need 9 be unnecessarily broadcast to the public.” Carmichael, 2017 WL 955183, at *2. The 10 portions of the three exhibits that contain medical information unrelated to the issues 11 in this case are therefore sealable. However, the Court finds that at least part of the 12 three documents that Plaintiff wishes to seal are not sealable because Plaintiff has 13 put certain conditions and communications with her doctors at issue. And further, 14 Plaintiff does not provide the Court with redacted versions of the exhibits showing 15 which portions of the exhibits she believes sealable.1 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 / / / 23 24 1 Further, Plaintiff points out that some of the documents contain her full date of birth in violation 25 of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a) (filings may include only the year of the individual’s birth). Plaintiff’s full date of birth is sealable. Plaintiff also argues that 26 this district’s local rules prohibit filings with one’s home address. This is incorrect— this rule only applies to criminal cases. See U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Cal., Electronic Case Filing 27 Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual §1(h)(5) (2019), available at 1 Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's ex 2 || parte motion to seal. (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff may re-file the motion and respond to 3 || the Court’s concerns that Plaintiff has placed certain portions of the exhibits at issue. 4 || Plaintiff must provide compelling reasons to seal the documents. Plaintiff must 5 ||attach as exhibits redacted versions of the three exhibits with only the sealable 6 || material redacted. 7 In the meantime, the Court instructs the Clerk to temporarily place the three 8 ||exhibits (ECF 34-8, ECF 34-19, and ECF 34-21) on restricted access. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 f 11 ||DATED: January 23, 2020 (pil q_ □□□ 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28