Armenta v. Shakibah ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD ARMENTA, Case No.: 3:16-cv-03028-BTM-AGS 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. LEAVE TO FILE SECOND 14 AMENDED COMPLAINT D. PARAMO, et al., 15 [ECF No. 51] Defendants. 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended 18 Complaint. (ECF No. 51; see also ECF No. 51-2 (proposed Second Amended 19 Complaint).) Plaintiff is presently imprisoned at California State Prison – Corcoran 20 (“Corcoran”) in Corcoran, California. Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his operative 21 complaint – which alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate 22 indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against 23 several prison officials, sued in their individual capacities, employed at the Richard 24 J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California – to add a 25 separate claim of deliberate indifference seeking injunctive relief against the 26 current Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 27 Ralph Diaz, in his official capacity. (Compare ECF No. 28 (operative First Amend 28 Complaint); with ECF No. 51-2 (proposed Second Amended Complaint).) 1 Plaintiff’s claims in his operative complaint arise out of allegations that prison 2 officials at RJD ignored his medical needs with regard to a brain tumor, originally 3 diagnosed in March 2013, from which he presently suffers. (See ECF No. 36, at 4 2-4.) In his proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he “has been 5 transferred at least eight times to different prisons throughout California without 6 receiving any effective medical treatment of his brain tumor” since leaving RJD in 7 August 2016. (ECF No. 51-1, at 2; see also ECF No. 51-2, ¶¶ 83-92 (delineating 8 Plaintiff’s locations of imprisonment from August 2016 through the present).) 9 Plaintiff alleges that Secretary Diaz “implemented a policy that allowed Plaintiff’s 10 transfer from RJD and his other subsequent prison transfers which is continuing to 11 result in delay of the treatment of his serious medical needs” and “[t]his delay is 12 evidence that [Secretary] Diaz has a policy or practice of deliberate indifference to 13 Plaintiff’s medical needs” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 51-2, 14 ¶¶ 104-105.) Accordingly, the proposed Second Amended Complaint requests 15 injunctive relief prohibiting Secretary Diaz “from transferring Plaintiff to another 16 prison before he receives adequate medical treatment for his brain tumor at 17 Corcoran” and compelling Secretary Diaz “to provide Plaintiff with adequate 18 medical care, including ordering surgery for the treatment of his brain tumor at 19 Corcoran[.]” (Id. at 17, ¶¶ H, I.) Further, Plaintiff argues that “Secretary Diaz is 20 being added to the case because he is the one person who, should [Plaintiff] 21 prevail on the merits, is capable of ordering the [medical treatment he requires] 22 regardless of the location where [Plaintiff] may be imprisoned.” (ECF No. 56, at 23 2.) 24 Defendants Glynn, Paramo, Roberts, and Shakibah (the “RJD Defendants”) 25 oppose amendment on the grounds of futility. (ECF No. 52, at 2.) More 26 specifically, the RJD Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff’s medical needs do not 27 necessitate the surgery he requests; (2) Plaintiff fails to adequately allege the 28 existence of a policy or practice “that caused him to be transferred notwithstanding 1 his alleged serious medical condition[;]” (3) the injunctive relief requested is 2 improper because the relief requested contradicts medical advice, would allow 3 Plaintiff to dictate his location of imprisonment, and could potentially interfere with 4 prison safety concerns; (4) Plaintiff cannot demonstrate irreparable injury in the 5 absence of the requested injunctions, (5) equity does not favor the requested 6 injunctive relief; and (6) the public interest is not served by an injunction. (Id. at 5- 7 10.) 8 The RJD Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s medical needs do not 9 necessitate surgery is based upon disputes of material fact which would require 10 the Court to construe the pleadings or draw inferences against Plaintiff or rely upon 11 facts and evidence not referenced in the proposed Second Amended Complaint 12 and for which judicial notice has not been sought. (See ECF No. 52, at 5-6 (citing 13 ECF No. 53).) The same is true with regard to the RJD Defendants’ arguments 14 that the requested injunctive relief is improper, that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate 15 irreparable injury, that equity does not favor injunctive relief, and that the public 16 interest is not served by an injunction. (Id. at 7-10.) Such arguments are therefore 17 inapposite to a motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint. See Missouri 18 ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2017) (“An amendment is futile 19 when no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that 20 would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” (internal quotations and 21 citations omitted)); see also Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 22 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007) (“When ruling on a motion to dismiss, we may 23 generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to 24 the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice. We accept all factual 25 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 26 favorable to the nonmoving party.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 27 As to their argument that Plaintiff has failed to identify a policy or practice 28 “that caused him to be transferred notwithstanding his alleged serious medical 1 ||condition,” the RJD Defendants assert that the proposed Second Amended 2 ||Complaint “does not adequately allege a pervasive pattern reflecting department 3 || policy” to warrant enjoining a state agency. (ECF No. 52, at 6-7 (citing Thomas v. 4 || Cty. of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1992).) Drawing all reasonable 5 llinferences in favor of Plaintiff, however, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has 6 ||sufficiently pled such a pervasive pattern — at least with regard to Plaintiff 7 || individually — in light of the numerous transfers Plaintiff has allegedly endured since 8 ||leaving RJD. Accordingly, the RJD Defendants have failed to demonstrate futility 9 ||of amendment. 10 Finally, the RJD Defendants have failed to identify any other reason 11 |}counseling against amendment. See Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 12 ||373 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Five factors are frequently used to assess the propriety of a 13 ||motion for leave to amend: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the 14 || opposing party, (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether plaintiff has previously 15 amended his complaint.”). 16 Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second 17 || Amended Complaint (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED and Plaintiff may file an amended 18 complaint in the form of the proposed Second Amended Complaint attached to 19 || their motion as Exhibit A (ECF No. 51-2). Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint 20 ||on or before February 7, 2020. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: January 23, 2020 2 , 23 led Joel Honorable Barry Ted Moskéwitz United States District Judge 25 26 27 28