Contreras v. Diaz ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 RAMON CONTRERAS, Case No.: 3:19-cv-02108-BAS-WVG 11 CDCR #V-99014, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 Plaintiff, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 13 v. [ECF No. 13] 14 RALPH DIAZ; PATRICK COVELLO; K. COTTRELL; C. ROCHA; V. 15 CORTES; H. CRUZ; M. SEAMAN; PLASCENCIA; J. JUAREZ, 16 Defendants. 17 18 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 19 On November 1, 2019, Plaintiff Ramon Contreras, currently incarcerated at 20 Ironwood State Prison (“ISP”) located in Blythe, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a 21 civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Compl.”) against officials at the 22 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), along with prison 23 officials at the Richard J. Donovan (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (ECF No. 1.) 24 Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed 25 his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 26 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 27 On January 13, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and 28 simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1 § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an 2 amended pleading correcting the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. 3 (Id. at 12–13.) Plaintiff was cautioned that Defendants not named and any claim not re- 4 alleged in his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. (Id.) See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 6 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 7 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are 8 not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”). 9 On January 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 10 4.) The Court again conducted the required sua sponte screening and found that he again 11 failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 6 at 11.) Additionally, 12 in his FAC, Plaintiff no longer named Cruz, Seaman, and Plascencia as Defendants. 13 Accordingly, the claims against these Defendants were deemed waived and those 14 Defendants were dismissed from this action. (Id. at 2 (citing Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928).) 15 Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended pleading and on April 29, 2020, 16 Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff also filed 17 a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (ECF No. 9.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to 18 Appoint Counsel, dismissed his SAC for failing to state a claim, and, finding amendment 19 would be futile, denied him leave to amend. (ECF No. 10.) On June 23, 2020, Plaintiff 20 filed a Motion for Reconsideration (“Motion”). (ECF No. 13.) 21 II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 22 A. Standard of Review 23 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for “relief from a final 24 judgment, order or proceeding” may be filed within a “reasonable time,” but usually must 25 be filed “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the 26 proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Reconsideration under Rule 60 may be granted in the 27 case of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 28 evidence; or (3) fraud; or if (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; 1 or (6) for any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion for 2 reconsideration cannot be granted merely because a plaintiff is unhappy with the judgment, 3 frustrated by the court’s application of the facts to binding precedent, or because he 4 disagrees with the ultimate decision. See 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller 5 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2012) (“[R]econsideration of a judgment 6 after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”). 7 B. Plaintiff’s Motion 8 In Plaintiff’s SAC, he alleged that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights 9 were violated during a disciplinary hearing conducted in October 11, 2018. (SAC at 7.) 10 The disciplinary charges were later re-heard, and Plaintiff was “exonerated” following a 11 second disciplinary hearing. (Id. at 11.) 12 The Court found that Plaintiff’s claims of due process violations occurring during 13 his first disciplinary hearing were “moot in light of the grant of a new hearing which 14 resulted in a not guilty hearing.” (ECF No. 10 at 8 (citing Brown v. Marshall, No. CIV S- 15 07-0956 MCE DAD P, 2012 WL 12906131, *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2012) (“[P]laintiff’s 16 procedural due process claims related to either his first or second disciplinary proceedings 17 have been rendered moot by the subsequent re-issuing and re-hearing of the rules violation 18 charge against him.”); Shotwell v. Brandt, No. C 10–5232 CW (PR), 2012 WL 6569402, 19 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012) (finding that “the remedy for an unfair hearing is another 20 hearing” and “due process was satisfied when the results of the first disciplinary hearing 21 were vacated, [and] the RVR was ordered reissued and reheard”).) 22 In addition, the Court also found that Plaintiff did not allege that he suffered any loss 23 of credits or that his sentence was extended as a result of the first disciplinary hearing. (See 24 id. (citing Randolph v. Sandoval, No. 1:18-cv-00968-LJO-BAM (PC), 2019 WL 2410469, 25 *7 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2019) (finding no due process violation where “disciplinary 26 proceedings were rendered moot by the subsequent not guilty finding” and the plaintiff did 27 not lose credits, serve “additional time in segregation,” or maintain a “disciplinary record 28 for the alleged offenses after the RVRs were overturned”).) 1 Plaintiff argues in his Motion that the Court’s citing to Randolph supports a finding 2 ||that his due process rights were violated. (See ECF No. 13 at 1-2.) Specifically, Plaintiff 3 ||argues that, unlike the inmate in Randolph, he did “remain in administrative segregation 4 ||for an additional two months” after he was found guilty in his first disciplinary hearing. 5 || Ud. at 2.) 6 However, Plaintiff misstates the factual and legal findings in Randolph. 7 Specifically, the plaintiff in Randolph, like Plaintiff in this matter, did not serve any 8 || additional time in administrative segregation after the second disciplinary hearing which 9 |}overturned the findings of the first disciplinary hearing. After Plaintiff's second 10 disciplinary hearing, by his own admission, he was “released from administrative 11 ||}segregation on December 6, 2018, when the guilty finding was dismissed.” (ECF No. 13 12 |}at 2.) Thus, even though Plaintiff served time in administrative segregation while he was 13 |}awaiting the second disciplinary hearing, this does not rise to the level of a due process 14 || violation. See Randolph, 2019 WL 2410469, at *7 (finding any due process violations in 15 || disciplinary hearings rendered moot by the subsequent not guilty finding and overturning 16 || of the RVR where there was no indication that the plaintiff suffered a loss of credits, served 17 || additional time in segregation, or maintained a disciplinary record); see also Resnick v. 18 || Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448-49 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff had no protected liberty 19 ||interest in being free from confinement in administrative segregation pending his 20 || disciplinary hearing). The Court therefore finds no basis for granting reconsideration. 21 || CONCLUSION AND ORDER 22 For the reasons explained, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for 23 || Reconsideration (ECF No. 13). 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 A .. yy 26 Dated: July 7, 2020 nf. esha 6 United States District Judge 28