Hedayatzadeh v. City of Del Mar ( 2020 )

1 . | wu. 23 2020 | 2 Saran. 3 By DEPUTY 4 5 . 6 7 . 8 . UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT □□ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 || KAHILA H. HEDAYATZADEH, Case No.: 19-cv-842-BEN (BLM) □ 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S__. 13 || V. MOTION FOR CLASS 14 || CITY OF DEL MAR, CERTIFICATION © 15 |I. Defendant. . 16 . [ECF No. 19] Plaintiff Kahlia H. Hedayatzadeh alleges Defendant City of Del Mar, California, 18 violated her Fourth Amendment rights by applying chalk marks on the tire of her vehicle 19 for the purpose of enforcing parking space time limits. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of 20 at least 5,500 people who have had their tires chalked and a subclass of at least 4,000 21 people who have allegedly paid parking tickets.! The motion is denied. _ 22 □ 23 | | oo 24 It bears noting that this Court has yet to decide whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon 25 |) which relief can be granted. No motion has been filed challenging the cognizability of 26 Plaintiff's claim, whether under Rule 12(b), Rule 12(c), or Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It may be that one who parks in a public parking space impliedly 27 |;consents to chalk marks. Or it may be that by paying a parking ticket and conceding the 28 infraction, the bar applies from Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (when - plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983, court considers whether a judgment in favor of 1. . LULL FACTUAL BACKGROUND? . 2 Plaintiff alleges that between May 3, 2017, and May 3, 2019, she received “at least 3 || one or two parking tickets” for exceeding the time limit on parking spots imposed in the 4 || City of Del Mar. P.’s Decl., ECF. No. 19-4, at ¥ 2-3. Plaintiff alleges Defendant □ 5 ||regularly and systematically uses a process of “chalking,” which consists of applying a 6 ||small chalk mark to a car tire, to determine whether a car has over-stayed the parking 7 || spot time limit. Plaintiff alleges Defendant chalks vehicles without consent, in violation 8 the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and sezuires. 9 || Defendant admits it uses chalking to enforce parking regulations, Opp’n., ECF No. 20, at 10 11 While Plaintiff alleges she received “at least one or two” parking tickets, she 12 ||“not yet been able to locate any copies of these tickets.” P.’s Decl., ECF No. 19-4, 4 3. 13 || To this end, substantial discovery has already occurred. Specifically, Defendant has 14 || located and produced records for thousands of individuals cited during the applicable 15 |/time frame. Despite this substantial discovery, there is no record Defendant’s officers 16 |/ever issued a ticket to Plaintiff, and no record Plaintiff ever paid a parking ticket to 17 || Defendant. 18 . Legal Standard 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs federal class action lawsuits. A 20 || plaintiff seeking to certify a class must first meet all of the requirements under Rule 23(a) 21 ©. 23 || plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed), contra Verdun v. City of San Diego, Case No, 19cv839- AJB. For purposes of addressing the motion to certify a class, the Court assumes without 25 || deciding that Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. The Court here is not making any findings of fact, but rather summarizing the relevant 27 ||allegations of the Complaint for purposes of evaluating Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. — . 1 must also satisfy at least one of the prongs of Rule 23(b), Under Rule 23(a), 2 |jmembers of a class may sue as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: - (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 4 (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 5 (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 6 claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 8 || oftheclass. 9 ||Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). This determination is not made lightly, but is instead based on a 10 “rigorous analysis that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Wal-Mart 11 || Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011). “[S]ometimes it may be necessary for 12 ||the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to a rest on the certification 13 question.” Jd. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). 14 ||“Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the 15 plaintiff's underlying claim. That cannot be helped.” Jd. at 351. 16 If a plaintiff meets the Rule 23(a) requirements, a plaintiff must then present 17 | evidentiary proof that one of the prongs of Rule 23(b) has been satisfied. Comcast Corp, 18 || v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). Under Rule 23(b)(2), a court may certify a class 19 || where “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 20 || generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief ... is appropriate respecting the class 21 a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). A class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) if the 22 || court finds that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 23 || questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 24 || available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The party . 25 seeking certification under Rule 23 (b)(3) must also provide a “workable” class definition 26 |i by showing that members of the class are identifiable. Connelly v. Hilton Grand 27 || Vacations Co., LLC, 294 F.R.D. 574, 576 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted). 28 1 Discussion 2 Plaintiff seeks to certify a class and a subclass under Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(6)(3), 3 respectively. The class would be composed of drivers and car owners who had or will 4 || have chalk applied to their car tires. The subclass would be composed of those in the 5 class who paid a parking ticket as a result of chalking. As noted above, for purposes of 6 || the certification motion, the Court is assuming without deciding that Plaintiff has stated a 7 |{cognizable claim for relief. □ 8 A. Standing 9 As a preliminary matter, Defendant challenges Plaintiff's standing to bring this 10 j}claim. Standing requires a plaintiff to have suffered a “concrete and particularized” 11 |/injury in fact, which is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. 12 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). To have standing, the alleged injury 13 || must also be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, and must be likely to be 14 || “redressed by a favorable decision.” Jd.; see also Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 15 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 2007). “In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the 17 requirements.” Bates, 511 F.3d at 986 (citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9th 18 || Cir. 2001)). At least one plaintiff must both meet the constitutional standing 19 requirements and show that “he has standing for each type of relief sought.” Summers v. 20 || Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). “The plaintiff class bears the burden of □ 21 showing that the Article III standing requirements are met.” /d.; see also Krottner v. 22 || Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). While that burden increases at 23 ||each stage throughout litigation, “at the pleading stage, general factual allegations of the 24 || injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see 25 || also Inre First Am. Corp. ERISA Litig., 258 F.R.D. 610, 617 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding 26 || allegations contained in the complaint sufficient to establish standing when ruling on a 27 || motion to certify the class). 28 Here, Defendant contends Plaintiff cannot show a concrete and particularized 2 |/injury because she does not have evidence of tickets she was issued and Defendant is 3 || unable to locate any record indicating she was issued a citation. Opp’n., ECF No. 20, at 4 Plaintiff states while she has “not yet been able to locate any copies of these tickets,” 5 || she specifically recalls “that the tickets reflected on their face that they were issued by. 6 || parking officers working for the City,” and recalls seeing chalk marks on her tire, □□□□ 7 ||Decl., ECF. No. 19-4, 93. Plaintiff also alleges she has “observed Del Mar officers marking vehicle tires with chalk, including the tires of vehicles [she] was driving when 9 [she] received the tickets.” Jd. 10 _ At this stage, Plaintiff’s Article III standing is tenuous. The Court recognizes its 11 || ongoing obligation to assess standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. This is “not merely a 12 || pleading requirement[] but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case...[and] each 13 {| element must be supported...with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 14 || successfive stages of the litigation.” Id. (citations omitted). However, the present motion 15 before the court based on the pleadings alone and not on a motion to dismiss or motion 16 || for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court assumes without deciding Plaintiff has 17 || standing to assert her claim. 18 B. Rule 23(a) Requirements . 19 Plaintiff must show that her proposed class satisfies the numerosity, commonality, 20 || typicality, and adequacy of representation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). □ 21 1. Numerosity . 22 Rule 23(a) requires “the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is 23 |;impractical.” Plaintiff alleges that numerosity is met because Defendant has produced 24 || documentation indicating that at least 5,500 parking tickets have been issued and at least 25 ||4,000 of those issued have been paid. Mot. for Class Cert., ECF. No. 19-1, at 13. 26 || Defendant disputes the overall size of the potential class, but does not dispute that joinder 27 || of these plaintiffs would be impractical and that numerosity is satisfied. Opp’n., ECF No. 28 || 20, at 2, n. 2, The Court agrees. 5 1 2. Commonality 2 Rule 23(a) further requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” || Plaintiff alleges there is a common question of law with respect to whether chalking and 4 || ticketing constitutes a violation of class members’ Fourth Amendment rights. “The > |, existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a 6 |}common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” 7 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant does not 8 || dispute Plaintiff's allegations would show commonality with the purported class. The 9 || Court agrees. 10 3. Typicality 11 Rule 23(a) requires “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 12 || of the claims or defenses of the class.” Plaintiff alleges that in this case, “[t]he claims of 13 || Plaintiff and the class are substantially identical” and “[t]he determination of liability will 14 on the same legal question, and on the same simple and generalized proofs for each 15 ||member.” Mot. for Class Cert., ECF. No. 19-1, at 16 (emphasis added). Plaintiff points 16 || out that injuries may be typical “even if the amount of the injury is different from other 17 class members, or if other class members suffered their injury at a different time.” Jd. 18 || (citing In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation, 247 F.R.D. 98, 117 (S.D. Cal. 2007)). 19 |} While this latter point may be correct, Plaintiff overlooks a significant issue in her own 20 |} claim. 21 Plaintiff alleges she received parking tickets and that the citations were issued 22 ||through chalking. She alleges she observed Defendant’s officers marking vehicles with 23 || chalk, and that the tires on her car were chalked when she received tickets. Plaintiff even 24 alleges she paid these parking tickets. However, Plaintiff also concedes that during the 25 months between filing her complaint and filing the instant motion, she has “not yet 26 || been able to locate any copies of these tickets.” P.’s Decl., ECF. No. 19-4, at § 2. 27 The evidence, however, requires pause. Defendant has located and produced 28 || records for thousands of individuals cited during the applicable time frame. Opp’n., ECF ‘ I 20, at 5. These tickets were issued within the areas of the City of Del Mar where 2 || Defendant admittedly used the chalking procedure. /d. None of these records indicate a 3 || citation issued to Plaintiff. Id. None of these records indicate a payment made by 4 Plaintiff to the City of Del Mar. Jd. In other words, when the Court “probe[s] behind the 5 pleadings” it cannot find any record support for Plaintiff’s allegation that she actually 6 |/received — or paid — a parking ticket. Thus the legal question of standing will be an 7 |limportant issue in Plaintiff's claim. 8 While the Court is mindful that typicality is a “permissive” standard, class 9 certification may not be appropriate “where a putative class representative is subject to 10 || unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.” Hanon, 976 F.2d 11 |/at 508 (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 12 ||Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991)) (internal 13 || quotations omitted). Given the substantial discovery that has already occurred in this 14 || case and the continuing questions about Plaintiff's standing, the Court finds that this issue 15 unique to the purported class representative — “threatens to become the focus of the 16 || litigation.” Id. 17 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a). 18 4. Adequacy of Representation □ 19 Rule 23(a) finally requires the class representative “fairly and adequately protect 20 interests of the class.” This is a two-part test. First, Plaintiff must demonstrate that 21 ||she is a part of the class and that there is no conflict of interest between her and the class 22 ||members. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-626 (1997). The Ninth 23. || Circuit has restated this requirement to demand the Plaintiff be free from conflicts of 24 ||interest with the unnamed class members such that she is able to prosecute the action 25 || vigorously on behalf of the class. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 26 |/2003). The Court must also determine whether Plaintiffs counsel will adequately protect 27 ||the interests of the class. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1233 (9th Cir. 2007). 28 . 1 |] Defendant asserts that there are serious questions as to whether Plaintiff is actually 2 |) part of the class she seeks to represent. Courts within the Ninth Circuit have denied class 3 ||certification on adequacy grounds where arbitration clause defenses available against the 4 || unnamed class members were not available against the named plaintiff. See Berman v. 5 || Freedom Financial Network, LLC, 400 F.Supp.3d. 964, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (declining 6 || to certify a class because named plaintiff was not subject to an arbitration clause to which 7 || unnamed members were subject). However, the Court is of the view that this argument 8 || lies more appropriately in the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a), which was addressed 9 || above. 10 Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs counsel do not have adequate experience to 11 |/represent the purported class. The Court finds this is a garden variety class action claim 12 that Plaintiff's counsel are adequately equipped. Accordingly, the Court concludes 13 || that the adequacy requirement of Rule 23{a) is met. 14 Conclusion 15 The Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied the typicality element required under 16 || Rule 23{a). Accordingly, it does not reach the question of whether. Plaintiff's allegations 17 |\ satisfy one or more prongs of Rule 23(b). Assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff has 18 || stated a claim upon which relief can be granted at this stage of the proceedings, the 19 || Motion for Class Certification is denied. 20 ITISSO ORDERED. / / 21 ||Dated: JulyZ@ 2020 Ny 22 es A A 33 / Hon/ ogerT . Benitez LL “United States District Judge 24 25 . 26 27 28