Jones v. Madden ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RYAN JONES, Case No.: 18-cv-02173-LAB-DEB 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 13 v. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 14 RAYMOND MADDEN, et al., [DKT. NO. 24] 15 Respondents. 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Ryan Jones’ Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 18 Dkt. No. 24. Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on a 19 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). This 20 action is currently stayed pending the exhaustion of Petitioner’s claims (claims 3–6). 21 Dkt. No. 18. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s motion is DENIED without 22 prejudice. 23 I. DISCUSSION 24 Petitioner requests appointment of counsel because: (1) he is unable to afford 25 counsel; (2) he has less access to the law library due to “perpetual lock-downs;” (3) he has 26 limited education and understanding of the law; (4) the issues in this case are complex; and 27 (5) without counsel, Petitioner may inadvertently overlook potential claims for relief. 28 Dkt. No. 24 at 2–4. 1 A. Legal Standard 2 Petitioners do not have an absolute right to counsel in habeas corpus actions. See 3 Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, by statute, district 4 courts have discretion to appoint counsel in habeas proceedings for “any person financially 5 unable to obtain adequate representation” when “the interests of justice so require.” 6 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). “In deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, 7 the district court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability 8 of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 9 involved.” Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 10 B. Analysis 11 Petitioner argues the Court should appoint him counsel because he “lacks any 12 meaningful sources of income to utilize at employing the services of experienced counsel.” 13 Petitioner’s indigent status, however, does not alone entitle him to appointment of counsel. 14 The Court must also consider Petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits and his ability 15 to articulate his claims. 16 Despite Petitioner’s contention that “[t]he issues raised in this matter are all very 17 complex,” a review of the record before the Court indicates Petitioner’s claims appear to 18 be the typical claims that arise in criminal appeals and habeas petitions. They are not 19 especially complex. See Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954. Additionally, Petitioner has not 20 provided any information demonstrating his likelihood of success on the merits, and at this 21 stage of the proceedings, the record is not sufficiently developed for the Court to make this 22 determination. 23 There is no reason to conclude Petitioner lacks the ability to articulate and prosecute 24 his claims pro se. Petitioner has sufficiently represented himself on multiple occasions in 25 this action—in his Petition, Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, Motions for 26 Withdrawal and Abeyance, and the instant Motion to Appoint Counsel. Dkt. Nos. 1, 9, 12, 27 14, 24. Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and 28 limited law library access do not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant 1 ||appointment of counsel. Thus, the Court finds Petitioner 1s capable of presenting his 2 || arguments to the Court without any assistance. 3 I. CONCLUSION 4 Petitioner fails to demonstrate appointment of counsel will best serve the interests 5 || of justice. Additionally, as this action is stayed, appointment of counsel is unnecessary at 6 || this time. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, (Dkt. No. 24), is DENIED 7 || without prejudice. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 ||Dated: August 10, 2020 — Dok PT ll Honorable Daniel E. Butcher United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28