Vashisht-Rota v. Howell Management Services ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 APARNA VASHISHT-ROTA, an Case No.: 20-CV-321 JLS (KSC) individual, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiff, 13 DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL IN 14 SUPPORT OF MOTION TO HOWELL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 15 DISMISS OR TRANSFER a Utah limited liability company; CHRIS 16 HOWELL, an individual; and JUSTIN (ECF No. 28) SPENCER, an individual, 17 Defendants. 18 19 Presently before the Court is Defendants Howell Management Services, LLC 20 (“HMS”) and Chris Howell’s a Motion to File Under Seal Documents in Support of Motion 21 to Dismiss or Transfer (“Mot.,” ECF No. 28), as well as Plaintiff Aparna Vashisht-Rota’s 22 Opposition (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 33) and Defendants’ Reply in Support of (“Reply,” ECF 23 No. 38) the Motion. The Court vacated the hearing and took the Motion under submission 24 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 40. Having carefully considered the 25 Parties’ arguments, the documents and other materials in question, and the relevant law, 26 the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion, as follows. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 3 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 4 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 5 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 6 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz 7 v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption 8 of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, 9 particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the 10 public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler 11 Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 12 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 13 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 14 presumption of access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this burden 15 depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more than 16 tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. When 17 the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the “compelling 18 reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does not surpass 19 the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. 20 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 21 disclosure and justify sealing court records exists when such ‘court files might have 22 become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, 23 promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 24 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, “[t]he mere fact that the 25 production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure 26 to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. (citing 27 Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound 28 / / / 1 discretion of the trial court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of 2 the particular case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 3 ANALYSIS 4 “Under the Court’s inherent powers to control its docket and pursuant to Federal 5 Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and Local Rule 79.2(c), Defendant[s] . . . move[] the Court 6 for an order (1) striking from the public docket the materials filed by Plaintiff as ECF 7 Docket No. 1, 8, 13, and 14; (2) sealing materials; and (3) requiring Plaintiff file redacted 8 versions of those documents that omit Defendant[s’] . . . confidential material at the 9 paragraphs and the exhibits specifically identified herein.”1 Mot. at 1. Specifically, 10 Defendants seek to strike confidential business and trade secret information appearing in 11 paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 to the original complaint (ECF No. 1) and Exhibits B, C, 12 D, Da, E, F, H, I, and K thereto (ECF No. 1-2); paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 19 to the 13 first amended complaint (ECF No. 8); paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, and 28 to the operative 14 second amended complaint (ECF No. 13); and Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate (ECF No. 15 14). Id. at 2–3. Defendants contend that compelling reasons exist to file these materials 16 under seal because “[a]llowing continued public access to the sensitive business 17 information that Defendant HMS seeks seal would put the company at a competitive 18 disadvantage because it would reveal information about HMS’s pricing, business model, 19 identity of clients and the business relationships with the clients, compensation and 20 structure of its contractor arrangements, and would also make public the content of several 21 salacious emails that are irrelevant to the business dispute and claims that Plaintiff still 22 asserts.” Id. at 5. Defendants also seek to strike paragraphs 21, 58 through 100, and 102 23 through 128 to the first amended complaint (ECF No. 8) and paragraph 55 of the second 24 amended complaint (ECF No. 13) as “salacious and impertinent.” Id. at 3. Defendants 25 contend that these allegations are “not relevant to this business dispute and appear to have 26 27 1 In their Reply, Defendants notes that Plaintiff subsequently has filed confidential materials in ECF Nos. 28 29, 29-2, 29-4, 29-6, 29-7, 31-1, 34, and 35. See Reply at 2–4. Defendants must address these materials 1 been included by Plaintiff only for the purpose of bad faith embarrassment and harassment 2 of Defendants.” Id. 3 Relying on California Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, Plaintiff opposes, 4 arguing that she “fully rejects and opposes the motion to strike until there is a meet and 5 confer and a joint report from that meet and confer should be required for any such motion 6 to be tolerated.” Opp’n at 1. If the Court does not deny the Motion, Plaintiff requests that 7 “the court should grant the motion to strike and grant leave to amend and order the parties 8 into a conference before any amended pleading or motion to strike may be filed.” Id. at 2. 9 Having reviewed the documents in question, the Court concludes that Defendants 10 have established that compelling reasons exist to file under seal portions of paragraphs 10, 11 12, and 13 to the original complaint (ECF No. 1) and Exhibits B, C, D, Da, E, F, H, I, and 12 K thereto (ECF No. 1-2); paragraphs 11, 13, and 14 to the first amended complaint (ECF 13 No. 8); paragraphs 9, 11, and 55 to the operative second amended complaint (ECF No. 13); 14 and Exhibits N and O to Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate (ECF No. 14). The Court 15 concludes that Defendants’ have failed to establish compelling reasons to file under seal 16 paragraphs 8 and 9 to the original complaint (ECF No. 1); paragraphs 9, 10, and 19 to the 17 first amended complaint (ECF No. 8); paragraphs 7, 8, 17, and 28 to the operative second 18 amended complaint (ECF No. 13); and the remainder of Plaintiff’s Motion to Consolidate 19 (ECF No. 14). The Court further concludes that Defendants have failed to establish 20 compelling reasons to strike paragraphs 21, 58 through 100, and 102 through 128 to the 21 first amended complaint (ECF No. 8), which contain no allegations that appear gratuitously 22 salacious. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“The mere fact that the production of records 23 may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment . . . will not, without more, compel the court to seal 24 its records.”) (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART 25 AND DENIES IN PART the Motion. 26 CONCLUSION 27 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 28 Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 28). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court SHALL STRIKE 1 || ECF Nos. 1, 1-2, 8, 13, and 14. Within fourteen (14) days of the electronic docketing of 2 Order, the Parties SHALL MEET AND CONFER regarding any narrowly tailored 3 ||redactions necessary to protect Defendants’ confidential business information.” Defendant 4 ||also MAY FILE a renewed motion to seal those portions of Plaintiff's complaints and 5 |{exhibits for which the Court determined that Defendants had failed to establish 6 || “compelling reasons” within fourteen (14) days of the electronic docketing of this Order. 7 || See, e.g., Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136. With Defendants’ approval, Plaintiff SHALL LODGE 8 || UNDER SEAL unredacted versions of ECF Nos. 1, 1-2, 8, 13, and 14 and SHALL 9 || PUBLICLY FILE redacted versions of ECF Nos. 1, 1-2, 8, 13, and 14 within twenty-one 10 days of the electronic docketing of this Order. To avoid superfluous motion practice, 11 Court urges the Parties to meet and confer regarding a stipulated protective order 12 || and/or before filing information that may be confidential or gratuitously inflammatory. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 ||Dated: August 13, 2020 (ee 16 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 light of the COVID-19 situation, the Parties may meet and confer telephonically or by video.