Phillips v. Pilgrim Creek Estates Homeowners Association ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY PHILLIPS et al., Case No.: 19-CV-0102-AJB(WVG) Plaintiffs, 12 ORDER: v. 13 PILGRIM CREEK ESTATES (1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 14 HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATION, (Doc. No. 41); 15 Defendant. (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 16 MOTION TO ENFORCE 17 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, (Doc. No. 29); 18 19 (3) IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF JEFFREY PHILLIPS; 20 AND 21 (4) ENTERING JUDGMENT 22 23 Presently before the Court is Defendant Pilgrim Creek Estates Homeowner 24 Association’s (“Defendant”) motion to enforce settlement agreement. (Doc. No. 29.) The 25 matter was fully briefed. (Doc. Nos. 36–38.) Plaintiff June Phillips (“June”)—without 26 Plaintiff Jeffrey Phillips (“Jeffrey”)—joined in Defendant’s motion to enforce settlement 27 agreement. (Doc. No. 37.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Judge William V. Gallo 28 submitted a report and recommendation (“R&R”) to this Court on March 2, 2020, 1 recommending “the Court grant Defendant’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, 2 impose sanctions, award attorneys’ fees, enter final Judgment, and close the case.” (Doc. 3 No. 41 at 1.) Plaintiff Jeffrey objected to the R&R.1 (Doc. No. 54). Plaintiff June did not 4 file objections. After careful consideration of the pleadings and briefs submitted by the 5 parties, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections, 6 and ADOPTS Judge Gallo’s R&R in its entirety. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 Plaintiffs Jeffrey, along with his mother, Plaintiff June are disabled individuals 9 suffering from mobility impairments. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1, ¶ 4.) Defendant is a senior 10 citizen housing community. Jeffrey is the owner of a home within the housing community, 11 and resides within the community to assist his mother, June. Plaintiffs filed this action 12 under the Fair Housing Act, California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the Unruh 13 Act, alleging Defendant: (1) refused to provide Plaintiffs reasonable accommodations to 14 allow them to park vehicles overnight on the street, and (2) retaliated against Plaintiffs for 15 placing the requests. (Id. ¶ 1.) 16 Both June and Jeffrey were initially represented by the same attorney until August 17 8, 2019, when the Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw as to Jeffrey only. (Doc. 18 No. 22.) Counsel continues to represent June. Since the withdrawal, Jeffrey has proceeded 19 pro se in this matter. Prior to the withdrawal, counsel represented Jeffrey during two 20 settlement conferences on March 18, 2019 and May 9, 2019. (Doc. No. 41 at 2.) 21 A. The First Settlement Conference on March 18, 2019 22 On March 18, 2019, Judge Gallo held a settlement conference in-person, which was 23 attended by all the parties. (Doc. No. 7.) The parties—including Jeffrey—negotiated a 24 partial settlement of the case, agreeing to certain non-monetary terms. The Court placed 25 26 1 The Court notes that Plaintiff contacted chambers on June 25, 2020 to request a hearing date for a motion 27 for leave to file amended objections to the R&R. The Court provided Plaintiff with a hearing date of September 10, 2020. However, September 10, 2020 has come and gone, and Plaintiff did not file his 28 motion with the Court. 1 the terms of that settlement on the record, the transcript of which appears on the docket as 2 docket entry number 10. After listing the non-monetary terms, Judge Gallo confirmed that 3 all parties understood the terms and agreed to be bound by them. Specifically, Jeffrey stated 4 he understood and agreed to be bound by the terms. (Doc. No. 10 at 12:2-8.) 5 B. The Second Settlement Conference on May 9, 2019 6 Because the parties only partially settled on the non-monetary terms at the first 7 settlement conference, Judge Gallo held a second settlement conference on May 9, 2019 8 with all parties present again, including Jeffrey. (Doc. No. 11.) Although the parties did 9 not agree to monetary settlement terms, the parties addressed issues that had come up with 10 the delayed implementation of some of the non-monetary terms from the first settlement 11 conference. The parties negotiated further resolution of these terms, and the Court placed 12 the clarified terms on the record. (See Doc. No. 16.) At this second settlement conference, 13 Jeffrey again expressly stated his understanding of the terms, and agreement on the record. 14 (Doc. No. 16 at 7–8.) 15 C. The Third Settlement Conference on September 10, 2019 16 Judge Gallo convened a third in-person settlement conference on September 10, 17 2019, and all parties, including Jeffrey, were again present. (See Doc. No. 25.) At this 18 conference, the parties agreed to monetary terms to complete the resolution of this case. 19 Judge Gallo specifically addressed Jeffrey to confirm that he understood the monetary 20 terms of the Settlement Agreement, that the global settlement included the non-monetary 21 terms reached in the two prior settlement conferences, that he agreed to be bound by all of 22 these terms, and that by agreeing to these terms the litigation would be concluded. (Id. at 23 5–6.) In each instance, Jeffrey stated that he understood and agreed to the monetary and 24 non-monetary terms. (Id.) However, despite expressly and unequivocally agreeing to the 25 global terms, Jeffrey refused to sign the Settlement Agreement, urging that the terms should 26 be modified. (Doc. No. 41 at 4–5.) 27 D. The Settlement Disposition Conference on October 29, 2019 28 Judge Gallo then held a settlement disposition conference on October 29, 2019 to 1 inquire into the delay in finalizing settlement and filing a joint motion to dismiss the case. 2 (Doc. No. 26.) Defendant and Jeffrey’s mother, Plaintiff June both agreed that the 3 Settlement Agreement completely and accurately reflected the terms agreed to by the 4 parties in Court. However, Jeffrey continued to argue that the terms should instead be 5 altered. (Doc. No. 41 at 5.) To resolve this stalemate, Defendant created a comprehensive 6 list of the nine terms agreed to by all parties at the multiple settlement conferences. This 7 list was attached to the Settlement Agreement as “Attachment A.” (“Attachment ‘A’ to 8 Settlement Agreement and Release Agreement,” Ex. 1 to Burfening Declaration, Doc. No. 9 29-1 at 17.) Plaintiff June confirmed that Attachment A correctly and completely reflected 10 the settlement terms placed on the record by the Court. Judge Gallo also reviewed each of 11 these terms on the record and confirmed that Attachment A accurately recited the terms 12 reached before the Court. (Id. at 35–39.) Judge Gallo then set a deadline to file a joint 13 motion to dismiss. 14 E. The Second Settlement Disposition Conference on November 18, 2019 15 On November 18, 2019, Judge Gallo held yet another settlement disposition 16 conference. There, Jeffrey sought to modify the settlement terms, and sought numerous 17 “clarifications” as to the terms. (Doc. No. 41 at 7.) At this conference, Plaintiff June again 18 expressed that the settlement terms were acceptable to her. (Id. at 2.) However, Jeffrey has 19 still refused to sign the Settlement Agreement. Thus, Defendant filed a motion to compel 20 enforcement of the settlement agreement on November 25, 2019. (Doc. No. 29.) Plaintiff 21 June also joined Defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 37.) Judge Gallo issued an R&R on the 22 motion to enforce on March 2, 2020. (Doc. No. 41.) Jeffrey filed objections to the R&R, 23 while June did not object. (Doc. No. 54.) Defendant replied to the objections. (Doc. No. 24 55.) This order follows. 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 The district court’s role in reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s report and 27 recommendation is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, the district court 28 “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 1 is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 2 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. When no objections are filed, a 3 district court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and 4 decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 5 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). In 6 addition, “a district court has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented 7 for the first time in a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s recommendation.” United 8 States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000). 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 A. Defendant’s Motion to Enforce 11 Under federal law, the Court has inherent authority to enforce a settlement 12 agreement in an action pending before it. See In re City Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 13 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1994). This inherent authority applies to settlement agreements entered 14 on the record but later reneged on by one party. See Henderson v. Yard House Glendale, 15 LLC, 456 F. App’x 701, 702 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion 16 in enforcing the settlement agreement after [Plaintiff] entered into it on the record in open 17 court, but later refused to execute a formal agreement to dismiss the action. . . .”). To be 18 enforced, a settlement agreement must meet two requirements. First, it must be a complete 19 agreement. See Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, 20 both parties must have either agreed to the terms of the settlement or authorized their 21 respective counsel to settle the dispute. See Harrop v. Western Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 22 1143, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 1977). 23 As correctly explained by Judge Gallo in the R&R, it is crystal clear that the 24 Settlement Agreement is a complete agreement, agreed to by all the parties to the litigation. 25 The terms of the settlement, memorialized in writing by defense counsel, mirrors the 26 monetary and non-monetary terms agreed to by all the parties at the settlement conferences 27 on March 18, 2019, May 9, 2019, and September 10, 2019 before Judge Gallo. To be sure, 28 the Court cites verbatim from the Official Court Transcript of the global settlement 1 conference on September 10, 2019, confirming both that the Settlement Agreement terms 2 incorporates all terms agreed to at the March and May settlement conferences, and are a 3 full and complete resolution of the case: 4 THE COURT: Okay. I understand the parties have reached a resolution of this 5 case to resolve it in its entirety. I am going to incorporate by reference the two 6 previous settlement discussions that we’ve had on the record from March 18th, as well as May the 9th. Those agreements will be incorporated by 7 reference here today. 8 . . . 9 THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Phillips, do you understand the terms of the 10 resolution that was reached today, as well as -- MR. PHILLIPS: Yes. 11 THE COURT: -- incorporating the terms from our prior two discussions in 12 March and in May? MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: And do you understand those terms? 14 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And do you agree to be bound by those terms? 15 MR. PHILLIPS: I do, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: And do you understand that by agreeing to those terms, it will conclude this litigation today? 17 MR. PHILLIPS: Yes, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 (Doc. No. 25 at 3:8–14; 5:14–6:4.) 20 At this point of the litigation, Jeffrey was proceeding pro se, and there is no question 21 as to his assent to the terms that he himself negotiated and agreed to. See Doi v. Halekulani 22 Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Any question as to [the plaintiff’s] intent to 23 be bound was answered when she appeared in open court, listened to the terms of the 24 agreement placed on the record, and when pressed as to whether she agreed with the terms, 25 said ‘yeah.’”). In addition to confirming whether Jeffrey understood and accepted these 26 terms, Judge Gallo also confirmed that these terms were acceptable to June, (see id. at 27 4:21–5:13), and to Jim Burbidge, the President of Defendant Pilgrim Creek Estates 28 1 Homeowner’s Association, (see id. at 6:9–7:7). The Court is hard-pressed to find a clearer 2 articulation of a complete and accurate Settlement Agreement than this Settlement 3 Agreement agreed to by all parties in open court and on the record. 4 Jeffrey’s objections to the R&R do not compel a contrary conclusion. First, in his 5 objections to the R&R, Jeffrey again expresses dissatisfaction at his designated reserved 6 parking spot, arguing that the parking spot is 600 feet away from his mother’s house. (Doc. 7 No. 54 at 7.) But Jeffrey does not argue that this term is somehow inconsistent with the 8 terms agreed to on the record. See Doi, 276 F.3d at 1140 (“Further, [the plaintiff] has failed 9 to demonstrate how any of the terms of the written settlement agreement are in discord 10 with the terms of the agreement stated in open court.”). For example, Jeffrey does not argue 11 that in open court, he only agreed to a parking spot which was 200 feet away, but yet the 12 written Settlement Agreement now reflects a parking spot which is 600 feet away. As aptly 13 explained by Judge Gallo, that distance “was a readily-available fact he was fully aware of 14 during settlement discussions since he knew where his mother’s house was located in 15 relation to the proposed parking spot.” (Doc. No. 41 at 11.) Jeffrey was provided with 16 ample opportunity to object to this term, or to renegotiate this term. He did not do so. 17 Instead Jeffrey agreed in open court, on the record, that the settlement terms were 18 acceptable to him. (Doc. No. 25 at 3:8–14; 5:14–6:4). 19 Second, in his objection to the R&R, Jeffrey wants the settlement terms to provide 20 him with the ability to park non-RV vehicles in the RV lots. (Doc. No. 54 at 7–8.) However, 21 this proposed additional term was not part of settlement discussions, and is an attempt to 22 unravel the hours of settlement negotiations already engaged by all parties. See Doi, 276 23 F.3d at 1141 (“At a time where the resources of the federal judiciary, and this Circuit 24 especially, are strained to the breaking point, we cannot countenance a plaintiff’s agreeing 25 to settle a case in open court, then subsequently disavowing the settlement when it suits 26 [him].”). 27 Lastly, Jeffrey objects to the R&R stating that he understood the settlement was only 28 a partial settlement, (Doc. No. 54 at 8), and that not all material terms and elements were 1 discussed and clarified at the settlement conferences, (id. at 8–9.) But this assertion is 2 belied by the record before the Court. As explained above, at the September 10, 2019 3 settlement conference before Judge Gallo, Jeffrey confirmed multiple times he understood 4 that the terms incorporated all prior settlement conferences, that he accepted those terms, 5 and that the settlement would end the litigation. (Doc. No. 25 at 3:8–14; 5:14–6:4.) 6 Jeffrey’s claim today that he did not understand the settlement to be a full and complete 7 settlement strains credulity. 8 B. The Court Need Not Hold an Evidentiary Hearing, Judgment Should Be 9 Entered, and Sanctions Imposed 10 Jeffrey’s objections to the R&R do not contain any meaningful opposition to the 11 Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that: (1) the Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing, (2) 12 that judgment should be entered instead of compelling Jeffrey to sign the Settlement 13 Agreement, (3) that sanctions and attorneys’ fees be imposed against Jeffrey. Having 14 reviewed these portions of the R&R, the case law contained therein, and the objection and 15 reply, the Court concludes that the R&R is thorough, well-reasoned, and contains no clear 16 error. 17 First, there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing because the terms of the 18 settlement and the parties’ assent to those terms cannot be any clearer. See Doi, 276 F.3d 19 at 1139 (“[T]here was no need for an evidentiary hearing on whether an agreement existed, 20 or what its terms were: the parties dispelled any such questions in open court.”). 21 Second, reducing the Settlement Agreement to judgment—instead of compelling 22 Jeffrey’s signature—is appropriate in the interests of justice and the conservation of 23 judicial resources. As stated by the Magistrate Judge, entry of judgment is warranted 24 because Jeffrey has failed to act in good faith in executing the written settlement agreement 25 and prevented the parties—including his mother, Plaintiff June—from jointly dismissing 26 the case. See, e.g., Shandong Wanbao Grp. Co. v. reRubber LLC, No. 16CV765-VAP- 27 DTBx, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152453 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2019) (finding the parties had 28 entered into a binding settlement agreement to have judgment entered for $5,000,000 and 1 reducing the agreement to judgment after the defendants failed to make a payment). 2 Third, Judge Gallo appropriately recommends the imposition of sanctions against 3 Jeffrey because “[t]his was not a complicated case, but it was made unduly contentious and 4 burdensome solely because of Jeffrey Phillips’s manipulation and hijacking of the 5 settlement process.” (Doc. No. 41 at 17). The Court has held numerous settlement 6 conferences and has spent multiple additional hours in teleconferences as a result of 7 Jeffrey’s bad faith delay tactics. Defendant seeks $3,150 “for the extraordinary delay 8 caused by Pro Se Plaintiff Jeffrey Philips” and $1,260 in attorneys’ fees for having to bring 9 the motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (Doc. No. 29 at 2.) In his declaration, 10 defense counsel Peter Burfening explains that he has spent at least 15 hours responding to 11 and attending additional hearings with this Court as a result of Jeffrey’s bad faith conduct 12 in refusing to sign the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. No. 29-1 ¶ 41.) Burfening also states 13 he spent an additional six hours preparing the motion to enforce settlement agreement. 14 With an hourly rate of $210, (id. ¶ 42–43), the Court finds Defendant’s request reasonable 15 and appropriate. See Doi, 276 F.3d at 1138 (affirming district court’s award of $1,000 in 16 sanction for the plaintiff’s “unreasonable failure to sign the written [settlement] 17 agreement.”). 18 IV. CONCLUSION 19 Based on the foregoing, the Court accordingly: 20 (1) ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, (Doc. No. 41). 21 (2) GRANTS Defendant’s motion to enforce settlement agreement without an 22 evidentiary hearing, (Doc. No. 29). 23 (3) IMPOSES sanctions against Plaintiff Jeffrey Phillips, awarding attorneys’ fees 24 to Defendant in the amount of $3,150 for the extraordinary delay caused by Plaintiff 25 Jeffrey Philips, and $1,260 for Defendant having to bring the motion to enforce. 26 (4) ENTERS JUDGMENT consistent with the terms of the parties’ Settlement 27 Agreement, (Doc. No. 29-1 at 10–17). 28 1 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to ATTACH the Settlement Agreement, Doc. 2 || No. 29-1 at 10-17 to the JUDGMENT and CLOSE the case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: September 28, 2020 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10