Wellons v. PNS Stores, Inc. ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 S. WELLONS, et al., Case No.: 18-CV-2913 TWR (DEB) 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER (1) SUA SPONTE 13 v. REMANDING CASE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER 14 PNS STORES, INC. et al., JURISDICTION; AND 15 Defendants. (2) DISMISSING ALL REMAINING PENDING MOTIONS WITHOUT 16 PREJUDICE 17 (ECF Nos. 117–39, 141, 142, 144) 18 19 Presently before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Sever (ECF No. 117), for 20 Summary Judgement (ECF Nos. 118–138), and for Attorney Fees (ECF No. 139) and 21 Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Applications for Leave to Re-allocate Page Limitations in Oppositions 22 to Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 141), to Confirm Subject Matter Jurisdiction 23 (“Mot. to Confirm,” ECF No. 142), and to Continue the Hearing on Defendants’ Motions 24 for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 144) (together, the “Remaining Pending Motions”). For 25 the reasons set forth below, the Court sua sponte REMANDS this action for lack of 26 subject-matter jurisdiction and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE all Remaining 27 Pending Motions. 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 On December 31, 2018, Defendants removed this action to this Court under the Class 3 Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). (See ECF No. 1.) On January 14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a 4 motion to remand. (See ECF No. 12.) On May 14, 2019, the Honorable Dana M. Sabraw 5 denied Plaintiffs’ motion, finding that the Court had original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 6 class action claims under CAFA and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law 7 California Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) claims. (See ECF No. 23.) 8 On May 15, 2019, Plaintiffs sought to voluntarily dismiss their class action claims, 9 electing to pursue only their individual PAGA claims. (See ECF No. 24.) On May 31, 10 2019, Defendants filed a statement of non-opposition, (see ECF No. 27), and Judge Sabraw 11 granted Plaintiffs’ request on June 10, 2019. (See ECF No. 28.) 12 On October 8, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Confirm, (see ECF No. 13 142), to which Defendants filed a Response in Opposition (see ECF No. 143 (“Opp’n”)). 14 LEGAL STANDARD 15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matter jurisdiction 16 only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian 17 Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised 18 at any time by any party or sua sponte by the court. Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 n.3 19 (9th Cir. 1982). Federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional 20 power and are “obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its] existence.” 21 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). “If at any 22 time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 23 the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “in any civil action of which the district courts have 25 original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 26 claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 27 form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 28 Constitution.” But even when “judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of 1 supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary,” Acri v. 2 Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997), and a “district court may decline 3 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed 4 all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Indeed, the 5 Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the 6 state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 7 715, 726 (1966); see also Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 261 8 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[W]hen a district court dismisses all federal claims prior to trial, it should 9 not retain jurisdiction over pendent state claims.”). 10 Once every claim over which the court has original jurisdiction has been dismissed, 11 retention of supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims under Section 12 1367(c) is discretionary. Acri, 114 F.3d at 1000. The district court’s decision on whether 13 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims is informed by the 14 weighing of the following factors: judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. 15 See Bryant v. Adventist Health System/W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 16 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). 17 ANALYSIS 18 Without mentioning the dismissal of their jurisdiction-creating CAFA claims, 19 “Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court consider whether it deems it appropriate to 20 conduct an, ‘. . . independent . . . determin[ation] whether subject-matter jurisdiction 21 exists[’] . . . , prior to proceeding further with the exercise of jurisdiction over the present 22 controversy.” (Mot. to Confirm at 4.) Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ dismissal of 23 their CAFA claims “does not divest this Court of subject matter jurisdiction; it is axiomatic 24 that subject matter jurisdiction is assessed as of the time of removal, and subsequent events 25 do not divest the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.” (Opp’n at 2.) 26 While Defendants are correct that jurisdiction is assessed at the time of removal, the 27 Court retains discretion as to whether to continue to exercise jurisdiction when no federal 28 claims remain. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 351–52. Upon review of the Carnegie- 1 Mellon factors, the Court concludes that remand is appropriate here. First, considerations 2 of comity weigh in favor of remanding to state court. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the 3 only claims over which the Court had original subject-matter jurisdiction—the CAFA 4 claims—at an early stage in the litigation. (See ECF Nos. 24, 28.) Proceeding with only 5 state law claims in federal court will not serve a federal interest in the absence of complete 6 diversity between the parties; rather, allowing a state court to adjudicate the remaining state 7 law claims would better serve the interest of comity because “PAGA is a purely state law 8 creature, and the primary responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with 9 the California courts.” Echevarria v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 16-CV-04041-BLF, 2019 WL 10 2503377, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 17, 2019) (quoting Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 11 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015)). 12 Judicial economy and convenience also weigh in favor of remand. To date, the Court 13 has not considered the merits of Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims and, therefore, no economy will 14 be lost by remanding the claims. There has been little substantive motion practice to date 15 and, although several motions for summary judgment have been filed by the Defendants, 16 (see ECF Nos. 118–38), Plaintiffs have not yet filed oppositions, and those motions can be 17 refiled, briefed, and argued in state court. Further, no trial date has been set. Accordingly, 18 the Court’s continued adjudication of the PAGA claims would not serve judicial efficiency 19 or economy and remand is proper. See Nevarez v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:19-CV- 20 03454-SVW-SK, 2020 WL 1139810, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020) (declining to exercise 21 supplemental jurisdiction of the PAGA claims after dismissal of the non-PAGA claims 22 over which the Court had original jurisdiction and holding that the continued adjudication 23 of the PAGA claims would not serve judicial efficiency or economy because, among other 24 things, the court had not yet examined the merits of the PAGA claims). 25 Lastly, fairness does not weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction as the state court 26 will provide an equally fair adjudication of the Plaintiffs’ remaining PAGA claims. 27 Because all of the Carnegie-Mellon factors weigh against the continued exercise of 28 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ PAGA claims, the Court concludes that remand 1 jJ/under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) is appropriate. Echevarria, 2019 WL 2503377, at *6 2 || (declining, under its discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA claim 3 || after the class claims over which it had original jurisdiction had been dismissed). 4 CONCLUSION 5 In light of the foregoing, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental 6 || jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ sole remaining claims, which arise under state law, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court therefore sua sponte REMANDS this action to the 8 ||Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, and DISMISSES 9 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE all Remaining Pending Motions (ECF Nos. 117-39, 141, 144). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 ||Dated: October 22, 2020 —— I [dD (Show 14 Honorable Todd W. Robinson 15 United States District Court 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28