Ward v. Berryhill ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RONALD WARD, Case No.: 17-CV-2371 W (WVG) 13-CV-2098 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER 42 14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of U.S.C. § 406(b) [DOC. 23] Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel Young Cho’s (“Counsel”) motion 20 for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §406(b). Counsel requests an order granting him 21 $24,060.00 in fees, with a credit to Plaintiff for the two EAJA fees previously paid in the 22 amount of $8,600.00, netting a fee of $15,460. 23 Plaintiff was served with the motion and notified that any response had to be filed 24 within 14 days. (Notice of Mot. [Doc. 23] 2:4–17.) Defendant was also served with the 25 motion. (Proof of Service [Doc. 23].) To date, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant have filed 26 a response to Counsel’s attorney’s fee request. 1 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted, and without oral argument. 2 See Civ.L.R. 7.1.d. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 23]. 3 4 I. DISCUSSION 5 Section 406(b) provides, in relevant part: 6 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may 7 determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 8 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . . 9 10 Id. “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 11 the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not 12 responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.2009) (en 13 banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802, (2002)). “The goal of fee awards 14 under section 460(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while 15 ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted.” 16 Thomas v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1529331, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Cotter v. Bowen, 879 17 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807). 18 In evaluating an attorney’s fee request, courts “must respect ‘the primacy of lawful 19 attorney-client fee arrangements,’ … ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then 20 testing for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gilbrecht, 535 U.S. at 21 793, 808). Factors courts may consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the attorney 22 fee award are: (1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved; (3) whether 23 the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison 24 to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours 25 worked and counsel's regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Thomas, 26 2015 WL 1529331, *2 (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148). 1 Here, Counsel was successful in obtaining two favorable decisions for Plaintiff in 2 || this Court, which remanded the cases to the Social Security Administration. (See Jan. 28, 3 2019 Order [Doc. 20 in 17-CV-2371] and August 1, 2014 Order [Doc. 21 in 13-CV- 4 2098].) After the second remand, the Commissioner granted Plaintiff's application for 5 || benefits, entitling him to receive $96,243.60 in retroactive benefits. (Cho Decl. [Doc. 23- 6 || 1] 99 3, 4, citing Ex. 2 [Doc. 23-3] and Ex. 3 [Doc. 23-4].) Thus, no reduction is 7 || warranted due to a substandard performance, nor is there any basis to reduce fees based 8 dilatory conduct, as there is no indication Counsel caused any excessive delay. 9 || Additionally, the Court has reviewed the amount of time spent on this matter and is 10 familiar with Counsel’s experience in these cases. (See Cho Decl., | 5, 6, Ex. 4 [Doc. 11 ||23-5].) Considering all these factors, the Court finds the effective hourly rate is 12 ||consistent with the market and the work on this matter reasonable. 13 14 ||II. CONCLUSION & ORDER 15 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Counsel’s motion [Doc. 23], 16 || AWARDS section 406(b) attorney’s fees in the net amount of $15,460 (equaling a gross 17 award of $24,060, minus the EAJA fees of $8,600), and ORDERS the Commissioner to 18 || certify the net fee of $15,460 payable to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: November 25, 2020 \ 22 Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 3 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27