Davall v. Cordero ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH DAVALL, Case No.: 3:20-cv-1968 JLS (KSC) CDCR #AW-8294, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR Plaintiff, 13 RECONSIDERATION vs. 14 A. CORDERO; D. WHITE; 15 WHITMAN, (ECF No. 7) 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Joseph Davall’s Motion for Reconsideration 20 of the dismissal of Defendant White, which the Court construes as a motion brought 21 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. (See “Mot.,” ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff, an 22 inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison, filed the present civil rights action 23 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff also filed a Motion to 24 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) On 25 November 5, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, dismissed 26 Defendant White for failing to state a claim against him, and directed the United States 27 Marshals Service to effect service of the Complaint on the remaining Defendants. (See 28 ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff filed the present motion on November 18, 2020. 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 Under Rule 60, a motion for “relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding” may 3 be filed within a “reasonable time,” but usually must be filed “no more than a year after 4 the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). 5 Reconsideration under Rule 60 may be granted in the case of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 6 surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) fraud; or if (4) the 7 judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) for any other reason justifying 8 relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 9 ANALYSIS 10 In Plaintiff’s Motion, he claims the dismissal of Defendant White was improper 11 because “Captain White did not have authority to confine me longer than 10 days,” and 12 Plaintiff’s 180-day sentence to administrative segregation was “simply illegal under any 13 circumstance.” (Mot. at 1.) 14 In the Court’s November 5, 2020 Order, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claims 15 regarding his administrative segregation placement following his disciplinary hearings 16 presided over by Defendant White failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process 17 claim. (ECF No. 4 at 6.) Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claims of 18 deprivations he suffered as a result of his disciplinary conviction, i.e., “C” status detention, 19 lost custody credits, and the loss of 180 days of television, phone, and dayroom privileges, 20 see Compl. at 4, failed to demonstrate the type of “atypical and significant hardships” 21 required by Sandin to invoke any liberty interest entitled to Wolff’s procedural protections. 22 (Id. at 6 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 23 539, 564–71 (1974)).) 24 Plaintiff appears to argue that the Court should have ignored Sandin and find that 25 White violated Wolff’s procedural protections. (Mot. at 2.) However, Plaintiff is incorrect. 26 As the Supreme Court held in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005), the “Sandin 27 standard requires us to determine if [assignment to segregation] ‘imposes atypical and 28 significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Id. 1 The Court did so in the November 5, 2020 Order. Plaintiff argues that White failed to 2 follow prison procedure and “[w]e need not consider what is ordinary prison life in 3 segregation.” (ECF No. 7 at 2.) That simply is incorrect and directly conflicts with the 4 holding of Sandin. 5 A prisoner is entitled to certain due process protections when he is charged with a 6 disciplinary violation. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 7 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564–71). “Such protections include the rights to call witnesses, to 8 present documentary evidence and to have a written statement by the fact-finder as to the 9 evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.” Id. These 10 procedural protections, however, “adhere only when the disciplinary action implicates a 11 protected liberty interest in some ‘unexpected matter’ or imposes an ‘atypical and 12 significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Id. 13 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 14 In addition, the Court found that even if he had stated a Fourteenth Amendment 15 claim against White, his claim for relief seeking restoration of good time credits would 16 potentially create a procedural hurdle. (ECF No. 4 at 8.) In Heck v. Humphrey, the United 17 States Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim cannot proceed when “a judgment in favor 18 of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 19 512 U.S. at 486–87. 20 Heck’s bar applies in the prison disciplinary context if the “defect complained of by 21 [Plaintiff] would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of [his] 22 good-time credits[,]” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Nonnette v. Small, 23 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002), and if the restoration of those credits “necessarily” 24 would “affect the duration of time to be served.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 25 (2004); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Heck applies only 26 to administrative determinations that ‘necessarily’ have an effect on ‘the duration of time 27 to be served.’” (citations omitted)); Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 856 (“[T]he applicability of 28 [Heck’s] favorable termination rule turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 action 1 || would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that 2 || affected the length of the prisoner’s confinement.’’). 3 In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that he is currently serving a term of life without the 4 || possibility of parole. (See ECF No. 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the restoration of 5 || good time credits would not make any difference in the duration of the time he will serve. 6 || (See id.) It is not clear why Plaintiff then sought “restoration of 180 days of lost credits” 7 this Complaint. (Compl. at 7.) Regardless of whether the Heck bar applies to □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 Fourteenth Amendment due process claims as to White, the outcome would remain the 9 ||same as Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment due 10 || process claim against White. 11 A motion for reconsideration cannot be granted merely because Plaintiff is unhappy 12 || with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the facts to binding preceden,t 13 because he disagrees with the ultimate decision. See 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 14 Miller Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed.) (“[R]econsideration of a 15 || judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”). 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the reasons explained, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for 18 || Reconsideration (ECF No. 7). 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 ||Dated: December 11, 2020 . tt 21 jen Janis L. Sammartino 9 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 4