Blackmon v. Ad Astra Recovery Services, Inc. ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRITTNEY BLACKMON, Case No.: 20-CV-800-CAB-JLB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION FOR 13 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 AD ASTRA RECOVERY SERVICES, [Doc. No. 22] INC., 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ad Astra Recovery Services, Inc.’s 19 motion for summary judgment. [Doc. No. 22.] The motion has been fully briefed, and the 20 Court deems it suitable for submission without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For 21 the reasons stated below, Ad Astra’s motion is granted. 22 I. Statement of Facts 23 On November 13, 2014, SCIL Texas, LLC (DBA www.speedycash.com) (“Speedy 24 Cash”) issued a $325.00 loan to a borrower purporting to be Plaintiff Brittney Blackmon. 25 [Doc. No. 23-4 at 43-48.] Pursuant to the Credit Access Services Agreement, the borrower 26 agreed to pay Speedy Cash $1,432.67 by May 8, 2015 or prepay the loan any time prior to 27 reduce the total amount owed. [Id. at 43.] The borrower never made a payment on the 28 loan. [Doc. No. 22-1 at 6; Doc. No. 23 at 5.] On March 11, 2015, Speedy Cash assigned 1 the loan account to Defendant Ad Astra Recovery Services, Inc. (“AARS”) for collection. 2 [Doc. No. 22-3 at 14.] 3 AARS was unable to reach Blackmon to collect on the loan account until January 8, 4 2019 when Blackmon called AARS to verbally dispute the debt. [Doc. No. 22-2 ¶ 12; Doc. 5 No. 23-1 ¶ 8.] During the call, Blackmon told the AARS representative that she had seen 6 a $535 loan on her credit report with AARS listed as the creditor and that she believed the 7 loan to be fraudulent. [Doc. No. 22-4 at 1-2.] The AARS representative confirmed that 8 Blackmon had an AARS account with an outstanding balance of $535.47 for a six-month 9 payday loan issued by Speedy Cash. [Id.] The representative then informed Blackmon 10 that to get the loan off her credit report, Blackmon would have to fax AARS either a police 11 report detailing the fraud on the account or a completed, signed and notarized fraud 12 affidavit, along with a letter of dispute explaining why she believed the account to be 13 fraudulent. [Id.] The representative told Blackmon the website where she could obtain a 14 fraud affidavit, the fax number to send the requested documentation to, and the AARS 15 account number associated with the loan. [Id.] Blackmon then asked, “And is that all I 16 need to start this?” and the representative responded, “That is correct. So, if you were to 17 need any other further information you are more than welcome to give us a call back.” [Id.] 18 Following Blackmon’s call, AARS continued to report the loan account to the credit 19 reporting agencies. [Doc. No. 23-1 ¶ 9.] However, AARS changed the credit reporting 20 status of the loan account to “disputed” on January 8, 2019, the same day that Blackmon 21 called AARS. [Doc. No. 22-3 at 5; Doc. No. 23-2 at 4 (“Account information disputed by 22 consumer”).] Blackmon never sent AARS a police report, a fraud affidavit, or any other 23 documentation evidencing the alleged fraud. [Doc. No. 22-7 at 2 (“Q: She said that you 24 could either submit a copy of the police report to [AARS] or complete a fraud affidavit, 25 correct? A: Correct. Q: Did you do either of those things? A: I don’t believe so.”).] 26 On November 19, 2019, Blackmon’s attorney, Jeremy Golden, emailed AARS a 27 formal written dispute of the alleged debt pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices 28 Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). [Doc. No. 23-2 at 13.] Golden requested 1 documentation regarding the debt, including verification of the debt and the name and 2 address of the original creditor. [Id.] AARS verified the debt by reviewing and validating 3 the original loan agreement and documentation from Speedy Cash. [Doc. No. 24-2 at 4.] 4 AARS then responded to Golden’s letter on November 25, 2019, stating that “the facts in 5 reference to this debt are consistent with the information provided by our client [Speedy 6 Cash]” and enclosing a copy of the loan agreement and a history of charges and payments 7 to the account. [Id. at 15.] AARS again provided instructions for filing an identity theft 8 affidavit. [Id.] 9 AARS continued to report the loan account as disputed until the account was recalled 10 by Speedy Cash in March 2020. [Doc. No. 22-2 ¶ 19.] In April 2020, AARS deleted the 11 record of the loan and ceased all reporting of the loan account to the credit reporting 12 agencies. [Id. ¶ 20.] 13 Blackmon filed her Complaint on April 29, 2020, asserting four causes of action for: 14 (1) violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.; (2) violation of the Rosenthal Fair 15 Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788, et seq.; (3) 16 violation of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 17 1785, et seq.; and (4) violation of the California Identity Theft Act (“CITA”), CAL. CIV. 18 CODE § 1798.92, et seq. [Doc. No. 10.] AARS filed its Answer to the Complaint on June 19 10, 2020. [Doc. No. 3.] AARS then filed the present motion for summary judgment on 20 February 12, 2021 [Doc. No. 22], which is now ripe for resolution. 21 II. Legal Standard 22 The familiar summary judgment standard applies here. Under Federal Rule of Civil 23 Procedure 56, the court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is 24 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 25 of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court 26 must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the 27 nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 28 (1986). 1 The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls 2 on the moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). If the 3 moving party can demonstrate that its opponent has not made a sufficient showing on an 4 essential element of his case, the burden shifts to the opposing party to set forth facts 5 showing that a genuine issue of disputed fact remains. Id. at 324. To avoid summary 6 judgment, disputes must be both 1) material, meaning concerning facts that are relevant 7 and necessary and that might affect the outcome of the action under governing law, and 2) 8 genuine, meaning the evidence must be such that a reasonable judge or jury could return a 9 verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 10 (1986); see also Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Summary 11 judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 12 therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues 13 of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). “Factual 14 disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 15 248; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 16 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of 17 summary judgment.”). 18 III. Discussion 19 A. Claims for Violation of the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act 20 Blackmon first claims that AARS violated several provisions of the FDCPA (and 21 therefore the Rosenthal Act1), including: 22 1) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by using a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 23 means in connection with the collection of a debt; 24 25 1 Blackmon’s second cause of action arises under the Rosenthal Act, California Civil Code section 26 1788.17, which states that every debt collector collecting a consumer debt shall comply with the provisions of the FDCPA. Blackmon’s Rosenthal claim solely alleges that AARS violated section 27 1788.17 by failing to comply with the FDCPA. [Doc. No. 1 ¶ 29.] Because the Rosenthal Act “mimics or incorporates by reference the FDCPA’s requirements,” Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 28 1 2) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by giving a false representation of the character, 2 amount, or legal status of a debt; 3 3) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) by communicating or threatening to communicate to any 4 person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, 5 including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed; 6 4) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by using a false representation or deceptive means to 7 collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information regarding a 8 consumer; 9 5) 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt 10 to collect a debt; and 11 6) 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect an amount not authorized by the 12 agreement that created the debt or permitted by law. 13 [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 25-27.] 14 Blackmon’s first cause of action does not specify how AARS violated the FDCPA. 15 It is merely a recitation of the FDCPA provisions listed above. Nevertheless, even 16 assuming that the few factual allegations in Blackmon’s complaint are true and supported 17 by the evidence, Blackmon has failed to demonstrate that AARS’s conduct surrounding the 18 debt at issue constitutes an FDCPA violation. 19 The FDCPA is a strict liability statute that “makes debt collectors liable for 20 violations that are not knowing or intentional.” Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 21 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Reichert v. Nat'l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1005 22 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Whether conduct violates §§ 1692e or 1692f requires an objective 23 analysis that takes into account whether the least sophisticated debtor would likely be 24 misled by a communication.” See Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 934 25 (9th Cir. 2007). “In judging the actions of a debt collector, we invariably ask whether the 26 information it provided was or its actions were confusing or misleading. . . . Quite simply, 27 we seek to ensure that even the least sophisticated debtor is able to understand, make 28 informed decisions about, and participate fully and meaningfully in the debt collection 1 process.” Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2 2006) (internal citations omitted). 3 1) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e Claims 4 15 U.S.C. § 1692e broadly prohibits the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading 5 representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt. This includes giving 6 a false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt under subsection 7 1692e(2)(A); communicating credit information which is known or which should be known 8 to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed, under 9 subsection 1692e(8); and using a false representation or deceptive means to collect or 10 attempt to collect any debt under subsection 1692e(10). 11 Though not clearly articulated in her complaint, Blackmon’s opposition brief 12 suggests that her § 1692e claims are premised on AARS’s continual reporting of the 13 Speedy Cash loan account to the credit reporting agencies after Blackmon notified AARS 14 that she believed the account to be fraudulent. [Doc. No. 23 at 9-10.] Blackmon argues 15 that because she does not owe the debt,2 Defendant’s attempts to “hold her responsible for 16 the balance” and “seek collection on the fraudulent account” by reporting the loan to the 17 credit reporting agencies constitute FDCPA violations. [Id.] 18 First, AARS continuing to report the loan account after Blackmon notified AARS of 19 potential fraud does not constitute a false, deceptive or misleading representation under the 20 FDCPA. Blackmon initially notified AARS that the Speedy Cash loan was fraudulent on 21 January 8, 2019. During the January 8th call, the AARS representative did not assert that 22 23 24 25 26 27 2 Because the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, for purposes of this motion the Court assumes that Blackmon did not take out a loan from Speedy Cash and 28 1 Blackmon was responsible for the debt or attempt to collect from her. Rather, the 2 representative told Blackmon that getting the account off her credit was “not a problem” 3 and gave her instructions for providing AARS with documentation to support her fraud 4 claim. [Doc. No. 22-4 at 2.] An allegation of fraud or identity theft, without more, does 5 not give rise to an FDCPA violation. See Patton v. Fin. Bus. and Consumer Sols., Inc., 6 No. 2:16-CV-2738 JCM (CWH), 2018 WL 3620488, at *3 (D. Nev. July 30, 2018) 7 (“Patton’s contention that he was a victim of identity theft and that he never opened the 8 [disputed account] does not give rise to a FDCPA violation.”); Story v. Midland Credit 9 Funding, LLC, No. 15-cv-194-AC, 2015 WL 7760190, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 2, 2015) 10 (“[C]ommunications regarding that debt are not deemed false, misleading, or deceptive 11 simply because the alleged debt was incurred through identity theft.”); Taylor v. Midland 12 Credit Mgmt., No. 1:07-CV-582, 2008 WL 544548, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2008) 13 (“Even if Taylor is correct in his assertion that he does not owe the Debt, his assertion that 14 he is being pursued for a debt he does not owe is not sufficient in and of itself to make out 15 a claim of false or misleading representations under § 1692e.”). 16 Further, AARS fulfilled its legal duties upon Blackmon’s notification that she 17 disputed the debt. Blackmon asserts that AARS wrongly continued to report the debt after 18 its initial phone call with her on January 8, 2019. However, “a collection agency does not 19 have a duty to delete all references to a debt whenever such debt is contested.” Bloom v. 20 I.C. Sys., Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.1992) (finding no “false” representation when 21 the debt collector requested further written verification that no debt was owed and 22 23 24 3 In her opposition brief, Blackmon alleges that during the call, “[AARS] requested Ms. Blackmon to 25 resolve the account which is an attempt to collect payment.” [Doc. No. 23 at 10.] This misstates the evidence before the Court. The transcript of the January 8, 2019 call, lodged as Exhibit B to the 26 Declaration of Tracy Bengtson [Doc. No. 22-4], reveals that the AARS representative asked Blackmon, “Were you wanting to go ahead and get [the loan] resolved today?” Blackmon responded, “Um, it’s 27 fraud . . . But, yeah, I just want to get it off my credit.” The representative responded, “Okay, not a problem.” Blackmon’s counsel is admonished to keep in mind Rule 11 duties when making 28 1 immediately reported the debt as disputed). AARS began reporting the debt as “disputed” 2 to the credit reporting agencies the very same day that it initially spoke to Blackmon. 3 Despite Blackmon’s failure to provide the requested documentation substantiating her 4 fraud claim,4 AARS continued to report the debt as disputed and made no attempt to collect 5 the debt from that day forward. 6 Moreover, when Blackmon’s counsel sent AARS a formal written dispute of the 7 account, AARS fulfilled its duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g to verify the account by 8 validating the original loan agreement and related documentation from its client, Speedy 9 Cash. [Doc. No. 24-2 at 4.] See Clark, 460 F.3d at 1173-74 (“Verification of a debt 10 involves nothing more than the debt collector confirming in writing that the amount being 11 demanded is what the creditor is claiming is owed.”) (internal citations omitted). The 12 FDCPA does not impose upon the debt collector a duty to independently investigate the 13 claims presented by the alleged debtor. AARS was only required to confirm with its client 14 the amount being claimed, which it did, and it was therefore entitled to rely on its client’s 15 statements in continuing to report the debt. See id. at 1174; see also Landaker v. Bishop, 16 White, Marhall & Weibel, P.S., No. C12-5898 RJB, 2012 WL 6025741, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 17 Dec. 4, 2012) (“A debt collector is entitled to rely on the creditor's statements to verify the 18 debt, within reasonable limits, and a debt collector does not have a duty to independently 19 investigate claims presented by creditor. There is nothing false, unfair, or unconscionable 20 in the actions of Bishop,” where after receiving Plaintiff’s statement that the debt was not 21 his, Bishop verified the debt and requested documentation to support Plaintiff’s claim). 22 In assessing FDCPA liability, the Court is concerned with “genuinely misleading 23 statements that may frustrate a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her 24 25 26 4 Blackmon argues that she was “unable to send in a police report because the police did not provide one to her,” but that she was able to subpoena a copy of the report after initiating this case. [Doc. No. 23 at 27 6.] However, the Court notes that the police report Blackmon attaches to her declaration as Exhibit 2 [Doc. No. 23-2] is a Crime/Incident Report for a separate instance of alleged identity theft and is 28 1 response.” Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1034. None of AARS’s communications undermined 2 Blackmon’s ability to intelligently choose her action concerning the loan account. After 3 Blackmon told the AARS representative on the January 8, 2019 call that she wanted to get 4 the loan account off her credit report, the representative gave her specific instructions for 5 how to do so. The representative advised Blackmon that she could obtain a police report 6 or complete, sign and notarize a fraud affidavit available on www.ftc.gov, send either one 7 to AARS’s office via fax, and include a letter of dispute describing her fraud allegation. 8 [Doc. No. 22-4.] The representative also gave Blackmon the account number associated 9 with the loan and invited her to call back if she needed any further information. [Id.] 10 Subsequently, in the November 25, 2019 letter to Blackmon’s counsel, AARS again 11 delineated how Blackmon could substantiate the alleged identity theft. [Doc. No. 22-5 at 12 1.] There was nothing about AARS’s statements that would confuse or mislead even the 13 least sophisticated debtor’s attempt to remove the fraudulent account from their credit 14 report. 15 The record reflects that AARS did not use any false, deceptive, or misleading 16 representation or means in connection with the collection of the debt at issue here. 17 Accordingly, AARS is entitled to summary judgment on Blackmon’s § 1692e claims. 18 2) 15 U.S.C. § 1692f Claims 19 To prevail on a claim under § 1692f, a plaintiff must show that a debt collector used 20 “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” This includes 21 attempting to collect an amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental 22 to the principal obligation) not expressly authorized by the agreement that created the debt 23 or permitted by law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). Although Blackmon’s claim contains no more 24 than a recitation of the relevant statute provision, Blackmon appears to allege in her 25 opposition that AARS violated § 1692f and § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect a debt that 26 Blackmon did not owe. [Doc. No. 23 at 11.] 27 The Court first notes that there is no indication in the record that AARS engaged in 28 any debt collection activity after January 8, 2019 beyond reporting the debt to the credit 1 reporting agencies. Nor has Blackmon explained how AARS’s truthful credit reporting, 2 after verifying the debt with its client and reporting the debt as disputed, constitutes unfair 3 or unconscionable action under the FDCPA. Moreover, section 1692f(1) more aptly 4 addresses the abusive practice of attempting to collect an amount greater than that which 5 is owing—not an attempt to collect a debt from the wrong person. See Clark, 460 F.3d at 6 1178 (“[W]hen Capital pursues a debt it knows is overstated, . . . [it] seeks to collect an 7 amount that is not permitted by law in contravention of § 1692f(1).” (emphasis in 8 original)). Accordingly, “where the amount being collected by the collection agency [is] 9 not different than the amount owed, § 1692f(1) [is] inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claim that 10 the collection agency was attempting to collect the debt from the wrong person.” Taylor, 11 2008 WL 544548, at *4. 12 Blackmon’s threadbare allegations are not supported by the record and are 13 insufficient to state a claim under section 1692f. Accordingly, AARS is entitled to 14 summary judgment on Blackmon’s remaining FDCPA claims. 15 B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Violation of the CCRAA 16 Blackmon’s third cause of action alleges that AARS violated the CCRAA by 17 furnishing information to a consumer credit reporting agency that it knew or should have 18 known was incomplete or inaccurate. The relevant part of the CCRAA states that a person 19 “shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer 20 credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete 21 or inaccurate.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.25(a). 22 There is no indication before the Court that AARS knew or should have known that 23 the information it reported to the credit reporting agencies regarding Blackmon’s alleged 24 debt was incomplete or inaccurate. As discussed above, AARS fulfilled its duty to verify 25 the debt by confirming with Speedy Cash that the loan account was valid. See Clark, 460 26 F.3d at 1173-74. AARS was under no obligation to conduct further independent 27 investigation of Blackmon’s fraud claim. Additionally, despite AARS’s requests for 28 corroborating evidence, Blackmon never provided AARS with written documentation of 1 the alleged fraud. Blackmon’s unsubstantiated claim of identity theft, without more, is 2 insufficient to create liability under the CCRAA. See Toroussian v. Asset Acceptance, 3 LLC, No. CV 12-03519 DDP (AGRx), 2013 WL 5524831, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013) 4 (finding that Plaintiff’s claim that she was a victim of identity theft alone did not establish 5 Defendant’s liability under CCRAA when Plaintiff never provided Defendant with 6 requested documentation supporting her claims). 7 Based on this record, Blackmon has not established that AARS knew or had any 8 reason to know that the Speedy Cash loan account was fraudulent. Therefore, AARS is 9 entitled to summary judgment on Blackmon’s third cause of action under the CCRAA. 10 C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Violation of the CITA 11 Blackmon’s final claim for relief alleges that AARS violated the CITA, CAL. CIV. 12 CODE § 1798.92, et seq., by failing to diligently investigate after Blackmon notified AARS 13 that she was a victim of identity theft and by continuing to pursue its claim against her. 14 [Doc. No. 1 at 6.] Pursuant to CITA, a “person may bring an action against a claimant to 15 establish that the person is a victim of identity theft in connection with the claimant’s claim 16 against that person.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.93(a). The alleged identity theft victim may 17 recover actual damages or attorney’s fees from the claimant if she shows that she provided 18 written notice to the claimant at least 30 days prior to filing suit that a situation of identity 19 theft might exist, including, upon written request of the claimant, a valid copy of the police 20 report regarding the alleged identity theft. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.93(c)(5).5 21 22 23 5 The alleged victim may also recover civil penalties from the claimant, in addition to other damages, if she establishes by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) at least 30 days prior to filing suit, she 24 provided written notice to the claimant that a situation of identity theft might exist; (2) the claimant 25 failed to diligently investigate the possible identity theft; and (3) the claimant continued to pursue its claim against the victim after it was presented with facts that were later held to entitle the victim to a 26 judgment pursuant to CITA. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.93(c)(6). Civil penalties under section 1798.93(c)(6) are only available “in addition to” the remedies of section 1798.93(c)(5). Therefore, if 27 Blackmon cannot meet the requirements of section 1798.93(c)(5)—which the Court finds that she has not—she cannot meet the stricter requirements of section 1798.93(c)(6). See Toroussian v. Asset 28 1 California Civil Code section 1798.92(a) defines “claimant” as “a person who has 2 or purports to have a claim for money or an interest in property in connection with a 3 transaction procured through identity theft.” The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 4 term “claimant” “reflects a present tense interest in a debt or attempt to collect.” Satey v. 5 JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus a “claimant” under 6 CITA does not include “a person who had an interest in a disputed debt at some point in 7 the past, but who no longer retains the interest at the time suit is filed.” Id. at 1093. 8 It is undisputed that in March 2020, the AARS loan account at issue was recalled by 9 the original lender, Speedy Cash. [Doc. No. 22-2 ¶ 19; Doc. No. 23-4 at 30, lns. 14-18.] 10 When Speedy Cash recalled the loan account, AARS lost any collection rights to the 11 account. [See Doc. No. 23-4 at 20 (“Q: Does Ad Astra still have the collection rights to 12 this account? A: No. . . . This account was recalled back to Speedy Cash. . . . I believe it 13 was in early 2020, late 2019. I believe early 2020.”).] It is also undisputed that by April 14 2020, AARS deleted the “trade line” record of the loan account, which ceased all reporting 15 of the account to credit reporting agencies. [Doc. No. 22-2 ¶ 20; Doc. No. 23-4 at 30, lns. 16 14-18.] Therefore, prior to the filing of Blackmon’s complaint on April 29, 2020, AARS 17 no longer had any interest in any debt owed by Blackmon. 18 Because AARS closed Blackmon’s loan account by April 2020 and did not possess 19 an interest in any debt or collection efforts against Blackmon when she filed this lawsuit, 20 Blackmon’s CITA claim against AARS was not viable when she filed suit on April 29, 21 2020. See Romero v. Monterey Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 19cv1781 JM (KSC), 2021 WL 22 268635, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2021) (finding that debt collector was not a “claimant” as 23 a matter of law after it closed Plaintiff’s account and permanently divested itself of its 24 interest in the account prior to Plaintiff’s lawsuit being filed); see also Soria v. U.S. Bank 25 N.A., No. SACV 17-00603-CJC(KESx), 2019 WL 8167925, at *9 (C.D. Cal. April 25, 26 27 (“Having failed to meet the more permissive requirements of [section 1793(c)(5)], Plaintiff cannot 28 1 2019) (“As U.S. Bank has closed the loans, it is undisputed that U.S. Bank does not assert 2 claim against [the alleged identity theft victim] related to the [closed loans].’). 3 || Accordingly, AARS is entitled to summary judgment on Blackmon’s CITA claim. 4 IV. Conclusion 5 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 6 GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant are DISMISSED WITH 7 || PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Defendant and 8 || against Plaintiff. 9 It is SO ORDERED. 10 ||Dated: April 20, 2021 (ib 1] Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28