Springs v. Raber ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JORDAN SPRINGS, Case No.: 21cv0862-MMA (AGS) CDCR #AS-6800, 12 ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH vs. LEAVE TO AMEND PURSUANT TO 14 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 15 1915A(b) CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS RABER, 16 REYES and FERRAT, 17 Defendants. 18 19 On May 3, 2021, Jordan Springs (“Plaintiff”), incarcerated at Calipatria State 20 Prison (“Calipatria”) in Calipatria, California, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights 21 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff alleged that the Warden 22 of Calipatria, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 23 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and six Calipatria Correctional Officers violated his First 24 Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, his Fifth 25 Amendment right to due process, his Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate 26 indifference to his health and safety, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 27 protection, in connection with an injury caused by his cell door closing on him and the 28 processing of inmate grievances regarding that injury. See id. at 2-10. Plaintiff did not 1 prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing and instead 2 filed a Motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. 3 No. 2. 4 On May 28, 2012, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis 5 and screened the Complaint pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 6 1915A(b). See Doc. No. 4. Those statutes provide the Court must sua sponte dismiss a 7 prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, 8 fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. 9 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 10 1915(e)(2); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 11 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). The Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend after 12 finding there is no independent constitutional right to a particular manner in which a 13 prison grievance system is run, that Plaintiff failed to allege any Defendant acted with a 14 purpose or intent to discriminate against him and failed to set forth factual allegations 15 which plausibly show any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his health or safety. 16 See Doc. No. 4 at 6-11. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his Complaint and was 17 notified that any amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without reference 18 to his prior Complaint and that any Defendants or claims not re-alleged would be 19 considered waived. Id. at 13. 20 Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). See Doc. No. 5. He 21 names only three of the original eight Defendants, Calipatria Correctional Officers Raber, 22 Reyes and Ferrat, and alleges they were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety in 23 violation of the Eighth Amendment because he was hit and injured by his cell door 24 operated by Raber, and because Reyes and Ferrat did not summon medical aid. Id. at 3-4. 25 I. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 26 A. Standard of Review 27 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must 28 sua sponte dismiss the FAC, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to 1 state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez, 203 F.3d 2 at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff 3 has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is 4 the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a 5 claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. 6 Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening 7 “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 9 Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 10 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 11 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 12 (2007)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 13 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 15 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 16 judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 17 “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 18 that standard. Id. 19 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 20 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 21 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 22 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 23 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal 24 quotation marks and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must 25 show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 26 States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state 27 law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 28 // 1 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 2 Plaintiff alleges that about 7:00 p.m. on April 30, 2020, while housed at Calipatria, 3 his “cell door opened while he was praying.” Doc. No. 5 at 3. He stood at the entrance 4 to his cell and asked Defendant Correctional Officer Raber, the control booth officer, 5 why he had opened the cell door. Id. Defendant Raber “shouted out the booth window 6 the Ramadan evening meal had arrived.” Id. Plaintiff asked Defendant Raber for a 7 minute to get dressed because he had been praying. Id. The door closed, and 30 seconds 8 later Defendant Raber opened the cell door a few inches and then slammed it shut. Id. 9 “This was done several times.” Id. Plaintiff approached the door with his hands up in a 10 gesture to Defendant Raber to “give Plaintiff a few seconds.” Id. Plaintiff “ran back to 11 grab his ID card,” then “returned to the doorway holding up his ID and attempting to put 12 his shirt on properly,” and “as he stood in the opening, without provocation, Defendant 13 Raber closed the cell door on him.” Id. The door hit him in the head and he stumbled to 14 the floor in front of his cell. Id. As he attempted to get up, Defendant Raber shouted for 15 him to hurry. Id. When Plaintiff stood up Defendant Raber shouted “you needed to 16 hurry up!” Id. Blood was running down Plaintiff’s face and his “head started to pound in 17 pain.” Id. He claims Defendant Raber’s actions were: “Done maliciously and 18 sadistically and constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 19 Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 4. 20 “Plaintiff immediately waived to Defendants Correctional Officers Reyes and 21 Ferrat who were seated at the podium laughing and requested medical attention.” Id. at 3. 22 As blood poured down his face, an inmate porter gave Plaintiff a towel to try to stop the 23 bleeding. Id. Defendant Reyes told Plaintiff “he had to walk to medical.” Id. at 4. 24 Plaintiff told Defendants Reyes and Ferrat he was dizzy and asked if medical could come 25 to him. Id. Defendant Reyes told Plaintiff “either you walk to medical or grab your 26 Ramadan meal and go back to your cell.” Id. Plaintiff then walked to medical about 7:10 27 p.m. and was treated for “swelling of a hematoma and laceration to the forehead.” Id. 28 He contends the “Defendants failed to report the incident.” Id. 1 Plaintiff claims that: “As a result of Defendant Raber’s unjustified misuse of force, 2 Plaintiff now suffers from on-going migraine headaches three or four times a week,” 3 which will impact his ability to work after his release from custody, and that he “has been 4 prescribed migraine medication since the incident.” Id. He claims his “Eighth 5 Amendment right to be protected from misuse of force was violated by Defendant Raber 6 closing him in the cell door, and Defendants Reyes and Ferrat for failing to report the 7 incident.” Id. 8 C. Analysis 9 1. Defendant Raber 10 Plaintiff seeks to bring an Eighth Amendment claim based on the infliction of his 11 injury by the manner in which Defendant Raber operated the cell door. Plaintiff alleged 12 in his original Complaint that he sought to impose liability on Defendant Raber for 13 grossly negligent operation of the cell door. See Doc. No. 1 at 7. Plaintiff was informed 14 in the Court’s prior Order of dismissal that neither negligence, gross negligence nor an 15 accident which cause injury is actionable under § 1983 in the prison context. See Doc. 16 No. 4 at 9 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 & n.4 (1994), Wood v. 17 Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (gross negligence insufficient to state 18 an Eighth Amendment claim) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (an 19 accident does not constitute deliberate indifference)). Rather, Plaintiff was instructed 20 that: 21 “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 22 ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, Plaintiff must allege 23 the prison official he seeks to hold liable had a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’ . . . [T]hat state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate 24 health or safety.” Id. A prison official can be held liable only if he “knows 25 of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety;” he “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 26 risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 27 28 Doc. No. 4 at 10. 1 Plaintiff now alleges in the FAC that Defendant Raber’s actions in operating the 2 cell door were malicious and sadistic rather than grossly negligent. See Doc. No. 5 at 4. 3 Plaintiff was previously instructed that although detailed factual allegations are not 4 required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 5 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Doc. No. 4 at 4 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 6 Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that Defendant Raber’s action in operating the cell door 7 was: “Done maliciously and sadistically and constituted cruel and unusual punishment in 8 violation of the Eighth Amendment” is a threadbare conclusory recital of an Eighth 9 Amendment cause of action. The facts alleged in the FAC are that the cell door had been 10 opened and closed several times during the 30-second period between when Plaintiff was 11 told to exit the cell to get his meal and when he was ready to exit, that when he was ready 12 “Plaintiff approached the cell door with his hands up in a gesture to Defendant Raber to 13 give Plaintiff a few seconds” and was hit by the cell door while he stood in the doorway 14 adjusting his shirt, after which Defendant Raber told Plaintiff he was hit by the door 15 because he “needed to hurry up.” Those allegations do not plausibly allege that 16 Defendant Raber knew Plaintiff faced a risk in being hit by the cell door and deliberately 17 disregarded that risk because Plaintiff does not allege Raber knew Plaintiff was standing 18 in the cell doorway when he closed the door, or, for example, that Defendant Raber’s 19 statement was a taunt expressed in a manner indicating he purposely closed the door on 20 Plaintiff in response to the delay in exiting the cell rather than an explanation for why he 21 was hit by the cell door. In other words, there are no facts alleged from which a plausible 22 inference could be drawn that Defendant Raber intentionally closed the cell door on 23 Plaintiff when he knew it was not safe to do so, or that Plaintiff was led to believe by 24 Raber it was safe to exit the cell when Raber knew it was unsafe. 25 The FAC, as with the original Complaint, at best alleges negligence by Defendant 26 Raber in operating the cell door in a manner which rendered it unsafe for Plaintiff to exit. 27 See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a 28 high legal standard.”). There are no factual allegations in the FAC regarding how the 1 doors are typically operated or required to be operated to allow an inmate to exit safely 2 and that Defendant Raber deliberately violated those safety protocols knowing Plaintiff 3 could be injured, or why Plaintiff was standing in the doorway, whether he was required 4 to stand in the cell doorway awaiting permission to exit, for example, or whether Raber 5 could see Plaintiff standing in the doorway and closed the door anyway. To cure this 6 pleading defect, Plaintiff must allege facts which plausibly suggest Defendant Raber was 7 “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that [Plaintiff faced] a 8 substantial risk of serious harm” and “also drew the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 9 Even if the FAC passes the “low threshold” for screening purposes with respect to the 10 first half of the standard, the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim, in that 11 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Raber operated the cell door in a manner which posed a 12 substantial risk of injury, there are no factual allegations supporting the subjective prong. 13 There are no factual allegations which plausibly show Defendant Raber, knowing 14 Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm, deliberately disregarded that risk when 15 he closed the cell door on Plaintiff, as opposed to having negligently operated the cell 16 door. 17 The Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against 18 Defendant Raber for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 19 1915A(b)(1); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 20 2. Defendants Reyes and Ferrat 21 Plaintiff seeks to bring an Eighth Amendment claim for the denial or delay in 22 medical care arising from Defendants Reyes and Ferrat laughing at his injury and failing 23 to summon medical help. Plaintiff was instructed in the Court’s prior Order of dismissal 24 that “[i]n order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, a 25 plaintiff must show ‘deliberate indifference’ to his ‘serious medical needs.’” Colwell v. 26 Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 27 “Deliberate indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally 28 interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison 1 physicians provide medical care.’” Id. (quoting Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 2 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988)). A prison official can be held liable only if he “knows of and 3 disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety;” he “must both be aware of facts 4 from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 5 and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 6 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Reyes and Ferrat laughed when they saw the cell door 7 hit him, and in response to his request to them to summon medical aid they told him to 8 “walk to medical” or pick up his meal and return to his cell. See Doc. No. 5 at 4. The 9 Court noted in its prior Order of dismissal there were no allegations in the original 10 Complaint which plausibly suggest these Defendants knew of and deliberately 11 disregarded Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in requiring him to walk to the medical 12 station to obtain medical care. See Doc. No. 4 at 10. Plaintiff was informed that actions 13 by prison guards which intentionally deny or delay medical care may constitute the 14 “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” where those actions evince a deliberate 15 indifference to the need for medical treatment. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 16 104-05). However, guards who know of a substantial risk to an inmate’s health but 17 respond reasonably to that risk are not deliberately indifferent. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 18 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff once again fails to allege that by requiring 19 him to walk to the medical station for treatment of his head injury rather than summoning 20 medical aid, Defendants Reyes and Ferrat deliberately disregarded a substantial risk to 21 his health. For example, Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding what difficulties if 22 any he faced walking to the medical aid station or that it worsened his condition. See 23 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where a claim is 24 based on delay in providing medical treatment a prisoner has no claim for deliberate 25 indifference unless the delay was harmful), overruled on other grounds by WMX 26 Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997). 27 Accordingly, the Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 28 deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Reyes and Ferrat for failure to state a 1 claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1); Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; 2 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 3 D. Leave to Amend 4 In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants him one final opportunity to 5 amend to attempt to sufficiently allege a § 1983 claim if he can. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 6 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se 7 complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is 8 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 9 amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). 10 II. Conclusion and Orders 11 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 12 1. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim 13 upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 14 1915A(b)(1) and GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this 15 Order in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of 16 pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be complete by itself 17 without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re- 18 alleged in his Second Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See CIVLR 15.1; 19 Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 20 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 21 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which 22 are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 23 24 25 26 27 28 // l If Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended Complaint within the time provided, the 2 || Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure 3 || to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 4 ||1915(e)(2)(B)G) & 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court 5 || order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) 6 || “If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district 7 court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || DATE: July 29, 2021 Mibu □ Ta _ / / Vf, 10 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10