Phillips v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 SUSAN PHILLIPS, EKATERINI Case No.: 21-cv-987-WQH-KSC CAMPOS, ROBERT JELLINEK, 14 and JANINE HARRISON, ORDER 15 Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated, 16 Plaintiffs, 17 v. 18 ROYAL APPLIANCE MFG. CO. 19 d/b/a Hoover, 20 Defendant. 21 HAYES, Judge: 22 The matters before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint and 23 Motion for a More Definite Statement filed by Defendant Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. (ECF 24 No. 5) and the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiffs Susan Phillips, Ekaterini Campos, 25 Robert Jellinek, and Janine Harrison (ECF No. 8). 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On April 6, 2021, Plaintiffs Susan Phillips, Ekaterini Campos, Robert Jellinek, and 3 Janine Harrison filed a Class Action Complaint against Defendant Royal Appliance Mfg. 4 Co. d/b/a Hoover (“Royal Appliance”) in the San Diego County Superior Court. (Compl., 5 Ex. A to Notice of Removal (“NOR”), ECF No. 1-2 at 4). Plaintiffs bring consumer claims 6 against Defendant Royal Appliance under California state law arising from Royal 7 Appliance’s alleged unlawful warranty practices. 8 On May 24, 2021, Royal Appliance removed the action to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1441(b) and “28 U.S.C. § 1332 . . . based on diversity of citizenship of the parties.” 10 (NOR, ECF No. 1 ¶ 3). In the Notice of Removal, Royal Appliance asserts that each named 11 Plaintiff is “a citizen of the State of California” and is diverse from Royal Appliance, which 12 is “incorporated in the State of Ohio, with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North 13 Carolina.” (Id. ¶¶ 4-8). Royal Appliance asserts that the Statement of Damages filed by 14 Plaintiffs demonstrates that “the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest[] and costs, 15 exceeds $75,000.” (Id. ¶ 9). 16 On June 1, 2021, Royal Appliance filed a Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint 17 and Motion for a More Definite Statement. (ECF No. 5). Royal Appliance moves to dismiss 18 the Complaint pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to 19 allege fraud with particularity. In the alternative, Royal Appliance moves for a more 20 definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 21 On June 10, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 8). Plaintiffs move 22 to remand this case to the San Diego County Superior Court, or, in the alternative, “remand 23 at least Plaintiffs’ equitable claims.” (ECF No. 8 at 2). Plaintiffs contend that Royal 24 Appliance fails to demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiffs 25 further contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ equitable 26 claims pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Sonner v. 27 Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020), because “Defendant does not 28 1 demonstrate, nor even allege, that Plaintiffs’ legal remedies are inadequate.” (ECF No. 8- 2 1 at 7). 3 On June 22, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 4 9). On June 28, 2021, Royal Appliance filed a Reply in support of the Motion to Dismiss. 5 (ECF No. 10). 6 On July 2, 2021, Royal Appliance filed an Opposition to the Motion to Remand. 7 (ECF No. 11). Royal Appliance contends that this action meets the requirements for 8 diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), because the parties 9 are minimally diverse, there are more than 100 putative class members, and the aggregate 10 amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Royal Appliance further contends that Sonner 11 is inapplicable, and it would be premature for the Court to remand Plaintiffs’ equitable 12 claims. 13 On July 12, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Reply in support of the Motion to Remand. (ECF 14 No. 12). Plaintiffs contend that Royal Appliance fails to provide sufficient evidence that 15 the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 under CAFA. 16 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 17 Defendant Royal Appliance “is a manufacturer of products and advertises that its 18 products are sold with express warranties.” (Compl., Ex. A to NOR, ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 2). 19 Royal Appliance “makes a warranty registration form available online and includes 20 warranty registration cards with the packaging of its products.” (Id. ¶ 3). In 2019, Plaintiffs 21 each viewed an advertisement by Royal Appliance for a vacuum or carpet cleaner, which 22 “advertised . . . that the Product was accompanied by Defendant’s express warranties.” (Id. 23 ¶¶ 26, 36, 43, 53). The advertisements “did not contain any other terms, conditions, 24 exclusions or limitations with respect to the warranty availability.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 37, 44, 54). 25 Plaintiffs relied on the warranty promises and purchased the Royal Appliance products. 26 When Plaintiffs opened the product packaging, they “discovered that the Product[s] 27 did not come with a warranty as Plaintiff[s] [] were led to believe.” (Id. ¶¶ 29, 39, 46, 56). 28 The online warranty registration form and the warranty card registration included with the 1 packaging “failed to inform Plaintiff[s] [] that it was for product registration only, and did 2 not inform Plaintiff[s] [] that failure to complete the online form did not diminish 3 Plaintiffs[’] warranty rights as required by California Civil Code § 1793.1.” (Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 4 40, 49-50, 57). “[A]s a result of Defendant’s unlawful and deceitful business practices, 5 Defendant is able to chill warranty claims and benefit economically by duping consumers 6 into thinking that they do not have warranty rights unless they fill out the form and provide 7 their personal information to Defendant.” (Id. ¶ 6). “[C]onsumers actually do not have the 8 warranties that were promised to them when they purchased their products as they must 9 now register their warranties, a requirement that was not disclosed at the time of purchase.” 10 (Id.). If the exterior packaging of the products Plaintiffs purchased “disclosed that the 11 warranty was contingent on registration by Plaintiffs providing their personal information, 12 Plaintiffs would not have purchased the Products, or alternative would not have paid a 13 premium for the Products.” (Id. ¶ 61). 14 Plaintiffs seek to represent the following classes: 15 a. All persons who purchased one or more of Defendant’s products within California during the four (4) years immediately preceding the filing of the 16 Complaint through the date of class certification, which were accompanied 17 by a warranty or product registration card or form, or an electronic online warranty or product registration form, to be completed and returned by the 18 consumer, which do not contain statements, each displayed in a clear and 19 conspicuous manner, informing the consumer that: i) the card or form is for product registration, and ii) informing the consumer that failure to 20 complete and return the card or form does not diminish his or her warranty 21 rights. 22 b. All persons who purchased one or more of Defendant’s products within 23 California during the three (3) years immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint through the date of class certification, which were 24 advertised as being accompanied with an express warranty but which do 25 not contain a warranty, and/or contain warranty activation, confirmation or registration cards requiring persons to provide their personal data or take 26 additional steps in order to receive a warranty. 27 28 1 (Id. ¶ 64). Plaintiffs bring the following claims against Royal Appliance: (1) violation of 2 California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790, et seq.; (2) 3 violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq.; 4 and (3) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 5 17200, et seq. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, actual damages, punitive damages, 6 restitution “in an amount equal to the total amounts paid and payable for the Class 7 products,” a civil penalty of two times the amount of actual damages, injunctive relief, and 8 attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 22). 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an action filed in state court to 11 federal court if the federal court would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the 12 action.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 District courts have original jurisdiction over “all actions where the matter in controversy 14 exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and the dispute is 15 between “[c]itizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Congress, in 2005, passed 16 CAFA, which significantly expanded federal jurisdiction in diversity class actions” to 17 include certain class actions “in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 18 of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and “in which . . . any member of a class 19 of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.” Lewis v. Version 20 Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 2010); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). However, 21 “federal diversity jurisdiction still exists for [] class actions that satisfy the general diversity 22 jurisdiction provision of § 1332(a).” Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1021 23 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007). “A class action [may] be heard in federal court under [traditional] 24 diversity jurisdiction only if there [i]s complete diversity, i.e., all class representatives [a]re 25 diverse from all defendants, and if at least one named plaintiff satisfie[s] the amount in 26 controversy requirement of more than $75,000.” Lewis, 627 F.3d at 398 (citing Exxon 27 Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549-51 (2005)). 28 1 “A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” Moore- 2 Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). “[R]emand may be ordered either 3 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for ‘any defect’ in the removal procedure.” Aguon- 4 Schulte v. Guam Election Comm’n, 469 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1447(c)). Generally, there is a “strong presumption against removal” such that the 6 removing party “always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. 7 Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if 8 there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. (citing Libhart v. 9 Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). “The removal statute is 10 strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of 11 remand.” Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244 (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566). “[N]o 12 antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 13 Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 Plaintiffs assert that Royal Appliance removed this action on the basis of traditional 16 diversity jurisdiction and “did not remove under CAFA.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 5 n.1). Plaintiffs 17 assert that Royal Appliance fails to meet its burden to demonstrate that the amount in 18 controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiffs contend that Royal Appliance’s assertion that the 19 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 is speculative, and “the mere assertion [in the 20 Statement of Damages] that Plaintiffs are seeking up to a certain amount in punitive 21 damages is insufficient to establish that the requisite amount in controversy is met.” (Id. at 22 5). Plaintiffs contend that “the fact that Plaintiffs may alternatively seek up to nine (9) times 23 the amount received by each Plaintiff in punitive damages does not disclose to either the 24 Court nor the Defendant the initial amount being multiplied nor the final amount in 25 controversy being requested.” (Id. at 6). 26 Royal Appliance asserts that this action “is properly removed under Section 27 1332(d)”—CAFA—and “the requirement that there be $5,000,000 in controversy is clearly 28 met in this case.” (ECF No. 11 at 4). Royal Appliance contends that in the Notice of 1 Removal, “Defendant cited generally to section 1332, which of course includes subsection 2 (d).” (Id. at 2). Royal Appliance contends that “Plaintiffs seek restitution of the purchase 3 price of [the] products, . . . [and] direct-to-consumer sales of the products in question in 4 California during the relevant period far exceed $5,000,000.” (Id. at 4). Royal Appliance 5 contends that “class action CLRA cases are frequently the subject of verdicts and 6 settlements of more than $5 million,” and the Statement of Damages demonstrates that 7 “Plaintiffs intend to seek punitive damages in the amount of $100,000,000 or nine times 8 actual damages, whichever is greater.” (Id. at 4). 9 On Reply, Plaintiffs assert that Royal Appliance fails to demonstrate that the amount 10 in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Plaintiffs contend that the Declaration submitted by 11 Royal Appliance “does not state what portion of [] sales were for products which were 12 subject to the warranty registration cards or online forms which are the crux of the suit and 13 which define the classes,” and “the proposed classes are likely a much smaller subset and 14 would likely have a much smaller sales figure.” (ECF No. 12 at 3). 15 “A defendant seeking removal must file in the district court a notice of removal 16 ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal . . . .’” Ibarra v. 17 Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting 18 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). Where the grounds for removal are apparent on the face of the 19 complaint, the defendant must file the notice of removal “within thirty days of being served 20 with the complaint.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Quality, 21 213 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). “The Notice of Removal 22 ‘cannot be amended to add a separate basis for removal jurisdiction after the thirty day 23 period.’” Id. (quoting O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)). 24 After the thirty-day period, “the removal petition cannot be [] amended to add allegations 25 of substance but solely to clarify defective allegations of jurisdiction previously made.” 26 Barrow Dev. Co. v. Fulton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 317 (9th Cir. 1969) (allowing 27 amendment where the notice of removal alleged that plaintiff was a citizen of Alaska and 28 1 defendant was a citizen of New York but should have “disclose[d] both the state of 2 incorporation and the location of the corporation’s principal place of business”). 3 In this case, the Notice of Removal asserts that it was timely filed “within 30 days 4 of Plaintiffs’ service on Defendant of the Summons and Complaint.” (NOR, ECF No. 1 ¶ 5 11). The Notice of Service of Process attached to the Notice of Removal reflects that the 6 Complaint was served on April 22, 2021. (Ex. A to Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1-2 at 2). 7 Royal Appliance filed the Notice of Removal on May 24, 2021, the Monday after the thirty- 8 day deadline, which fell on a Saturday. The Notice of Removal states, in relevant part: 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court has original jurisdiction of this civil action based on diversity of citizenship of the parties . . . . 10 . . . 11 [T]he requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are satisfied, as there is complete diversity among the parties, and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum 12 or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 13 (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 10). 14 In the Notice of Removal, Royal Appliance does not assert CAFA jurisdiction as a 15 basis for removal or allege that CAFA’s requirements for minimal diversity, class size, and 16 amount in controversy are met. Royal Appliance raised CAFA jurisdiction for the first time 17 in Opposition to the Motion to Remand filed on June 22, 2021. Traditional diversity and 18 CAFA constitute separate and distinct bases for removal jurisdiction. See Dart Cherokee, 19 574 U.S. at 84-85 (noting CAFA’s distinct requirements: “the class has more than 100 20 members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 21 million” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(5)(B)). The Opposition was filed after the 22 thirty-day removal period expired. See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 23 2002) (construing opposition to motion to remand as an amendment to the notice of 24 removal). Royal Appliance’s assertions regarding CAFA jurisdiction are untimely. The 25 Court considers whether this action was properly removed based on traditional diversity 26 jurisdiction as asserted in the Notice of Removal. See Victoriano v. Classic Residence 27 Mgmt., LP, No. 14cv2346-LAB (JLB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77886, at *10-11 (S.D. Cal. 28 1 June 15, 2015) (“The Notice of Removal alleged jurisdiction under the traditional diversity 2 jurisdiction, and—for the first time—the Amended Notice alleged an entirely new basis 3 for jurisdiction: CAFA. . . . [T]he Court . . . will [] only consider the original Notice of 4 Removal in reviewing traditional diversity jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). 5 “[T]he amount in controversy is determined by the complaint operative at the time 6 of removal and encompasses all relief a court may grant on that complaint if the plaintiff 7 is victorious[,] . . . whatever the likelihood that [the plaintiff] will actually recover [the 8 requested relief].” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414-15, 417 (9th Cir. 9 2018), as corrected (June 7, 2018). 10 [The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit] ha[s] defined the amount in controversy as the “amount at stake in the underlying litigation,” Theis 11 Research, Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005); this 12 includes any result of the litigation, excluding interests and costs, that “entail[s] a payment” by the defendant. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 13 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007). This amount includes, inter alia, damages 14 (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise) and the cost of complying with an injunction, as well as attorneys’ fees awarded under fee shifting statutes. 15 Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.3 (9th Cir. 16 2000). 17 Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2016) (third 18 alteration in original). 19 “Generally, the amount in controversy is determined from the face of the pleadings.” 20 Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). “Where it is not 21 facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing 22 party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets 23 the jurisdictional threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 24 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). “A removing party must initially file a notice of removal that includes 25 ‘a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 26 threshold.’” LaCross v. Knight Transp., Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 27 Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89). When “a defendant’s assertion of the amount in 28 1 controversy is challenged . . . both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a 2 preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been 3 satisfied.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88. “The parties may submit evidence outside the 4 complaint, including affidavits or declarations, or other ‘summary-judgment-type evidence 5 relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.’” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 6 (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)). 7 “[T]he defendant’s showing on the amount in controversy may rely on reasonable 8 assumptions.” Acad. of Country Music v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 991 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 9 2021) (quoting Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2019)). 10 “[T]hose assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground 11 underlying them.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. 12 In this case, the amount in controversy is not apparent from the face of the 13 Complaint. Plaintiffs challenge Royal Appliance’s assertion that “the amount in 14 controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, exceeds $75,000.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9). Both 15 parties had “the opportunity to place evidence on the record supporting their respective 16 positions as to the amount in controversy.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 702 17 (9th Cir. 2020), as corrected (Nov. 20, 2020), reh’g en banc denied, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 18 8340 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2021). Royal Appliance is the only party that submitted evidence, 19 consisting of Plaintiffs’ Statement of Damages attached to the Notice of Removal (Ex. B 20 to NOR, ECF No. 1-3 at 2-3) and the Declaration of the Director of Finance for Royal 21 Appliance attached to the Opposition to the Motion to Remand (Williams Decl., ECF No. 22 11-1 at 1-2). 23 In the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek the following monetary relief: restitution in an 24 amount “equal to the total amounts paid and payable for the Class products;” “actual 25 damages;” a “civil penalty of two-times actual damages;” “punitive damages;” “restitution 26 and disgorgement of all profits and unjust enrichment that Defendant obtained from 27 Plaintiffs;” and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Compl., Ex. A to NOR, ECF No. 1-2 at 22). 28 Plaintiff Phillips alleges that he purchased a $90 vacuum manufactured by Royal 1 Appliance. Plaintiff Jellinek alleges that he purchased a $120 vacuum manufactured by 2 Royal Appliance. Plaintiff Harrison and Plaintiff Campos allege that they each purchased 3 a $198 carpet cleaner manufactured by Royal Appliance. In the Statement of Damages, 4 Plaintiffs “reserve the right when pursuing a judgment against Defendant . . . to seek 5 punitive damages in the amount of $100,000,000 or nine (9) times the amount received by 6 each class member, whichever is greater.” (Ex. B to NOR, ECF No. 1-3 at 3). The Director 7 of Finance for Royal Appliance states in a Declaration that “[b]etween May 1, 2017 and 8 April 30, 2021, Royal Appliance had direct-to-consumer sales in the amount of 9 $9,912,346.98 in the state of California,” which, on information and belief, “were 10 accompanied by express warranties.” (Williams Decl., ECF No. 11-1 ¶¶ 2, 6). 11 The highest amount allegedly paid by any named Plaintiff for a Royal Appliance 12 product in this case was $198. The amount of any actual damages from the alleged breach 13 of warranty obligations is speculative, so the amount of any civil penalty is speculative. 14 See Chavez v. FCA US LLC, No. CV 19-06003-ODW-GJSX, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15 14783, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining that because “the amount of actual 16 damages is speculative, [] an attempt to determine the civil penalty is equally uncertain”). 17 The allegations in the Complaint and the evidence presented by Royal Appliance do not 18 establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the potential recovery for any named 19 Plaintiff exceeds $75,000. See Gibson v. Chrystler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945-47 (9th Cir. 20 2001) (in evaluating punitive damages, the court considers those sought by the named 21 plaintiff rather than by the putative class as a whole); see also Surber v. Reliance Nat’l 22 Indem. Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“[D]efendant proffers absolutely 23 no evidence of potential punitive damages other than plaintiff’s March 2000 ‘statement of 24 damages.’ Nor does anything in the record indicate that plaintiff’s $ 1,000,000 estimate is 25 anything but a bold and optimistic prediction.”). The Court concludes that Royal Appliance 26 has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that removal in this case was proper. 27 /// 28 /// CONCLUSION 2 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiffs Susan 3 || Phillips, Ekaterini Campos, Robert Jellinek, and Janine Harrison (ECF No. 8) is granted. 4 || This case is remanded to the San Diego County Superior Court, where it was originally 5 || filed as Case No. 37-2021-00015486-CU-BT-NC. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint 7 Motion for a More Definite Statement filed by Defendant Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. 8 || No. 5) is denied as moot. 9 ||Dated: September 3, 2021 itt Z. A a 10 Hon. William Q. Hayes ll United States District Court 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28