Bahrambeygui v. Robertson ( 2021 )

1 NOT FOR PUBLICATION 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Ali Hassem BAHRAMBEYGUI, Case No.: 3:21-cv-1153-BAS-AGS 11 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PETITIONER’S 12 v. MOTION FOR STAY AND 13 Jim ROBERTSON, Warden, et al., ABEYANCE (ECF 2) 14 Respondents. 15 16 Petitioner Ali Hassem Bahrambeygui filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 17 a Motion for Stay and Abeyance in this Court. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) Respondent does not 18 oppose Bahrambeygui's request. (ECF 13.) 19 BACKGROUND 20 Bahrambeygui’s second state appeal’s judgment became final on September 9, 2020, 21 forty days after the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified. See 22 2021 California Rules of Court Rules 8.366(b)(1) & 8.500(e)(1). Bahrambeygui filed a 23 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Superior Court of California on December 22, 24 2020, which was denied on February 16, 2021. (ECF 1, at 3, 108-09.) A few weeks later, 25 on March 3, 2021, Bahrambeygui filed the same petition in the California Court of Appeal, 26 which was denied on April 8, 2021. (ECF 1, at 4, 110-15.) On April 19, 2021, he filed that 27 petition in the California Supreme Court (S268310), which is pending. (ECF 1, at 4.) 28 1 In this habeas action, petitioner asserts the same four grounds for relief as the 2 pending state petition. (ECF 1, at 6-9.) Bahrambeygui brought his federal case as “a safety 3 petition” because he is “reasonably confused regarding the applicable law” surrounding the 4 federal statute of limitations for bringing habeas petitions. (ECF 1, at 4; ECF 2, at 2.) So, 5 he seeks to preserve his federal claims while the state petition is pending by requesting this 6 Court stay his as-yet unexhausted federal petition until the California Supreme Court rules. 7 (See generally ECF 2.) 8 DISCUSSION 9 A state prisoner must exhaust all available state remedies before seeking federal 10 habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), the Supreme 11 Court adopted a “total exhaustion rule,” requiring federal courts to “dismiss habeas 12 petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Id. at 522. After dismissal, 13 a prisoner could delete unexhausted claims and “resubmit a petition with only exhausted 14 claims,” or return to state court “to exhaust the remainder of [his] claims.” Id. at 520. In 15 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The AEDPA 16 imposed a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal petitions, which had dramatic 17 repercussions on the total-exhaustion rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Now prisoners “whose 18 mixed petitions were dismissed under Rose” risked “being time-barred from bringing their 19 claims again, once exhausted, in federal court.” King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 20 2009). Courts responded to this dilemma by developing a procedure known as a Rhines 21 stay. 22 Rhines allows petitioners to stay an entire petition, including both exhausted and 23 unexhausted claims, while they return to state court to exhaust their remedies. Rhines v. 24 Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). Unlike the claims in Rhines, Bahrambeygui's claims are 25 fully unexhausted. See id. But the Ninth Circuit has held that a Rhines stay may be 26 appropriate even for fully unexhausted petitions. See Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 27 (9th Cir. 2016). 28 l A district court may grant a Rhines stay when (1) “the petitioner had good cause for 2 ||his failure to exhaust,” (2) “his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious,” and 3 “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation 4 || tactics.” Id. Good cause requires more than just a “bald assertion.” Blake v. Baker, 745 5 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). Instead, a good-cause showing “turns on whether the 6 || petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient evidence, to justify [the 7 || failure to exhaust].” Jd. 8 Bahrambeygui argues that there is good cause for his failure to exhaust the claims 9 ||because he is confused regarding the applicable law regarding AEDPA statutory time 10 limitations. (ECF 2, at 4.) Specifically, Bahrambeygui states he is reasonably confused on 11 || the filing time limitations because two state courts (the Superior Court of Imperial County, 12 || California, and the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District) previously 13 || barred his Habeas Petition as untimely. (ECF 2, at 2.) And reasonable confusion concerning 14 || state timeliness rules can constitute good cause. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 15 (2005). Respondent agrees that Bahrambeygui’s confusion is reasonable. (See 16 || generally ECF 13.) So, a stay is justified. 17 CONCLUSION 18 The Court recommends that the following order be entered: 19 1. Petitioner’s motion for a Rhines stay is GRANTED. 20 2. Within 14 days of the state court’s decision resolving his claims, 21 Bahrambeygui must file a motion requesting that the stay be lifted. 22 Within 14 days of service of this report, the parties must file any objections to it. See 23 ||28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The party receiving any such objection has 14 days to file any 24 response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 25 ||Dated: December 3, 2021 26 — | 17 Hon. ndrew G. Schopler United States Magistrate Judge 28