(HC) Rodriguez v. Fisher ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, Case No.: 21cv1442-BAS (MSB) 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING 13 v. PETITIONER’S EX PARTE REQUEST FOR ORDER 14 WARDEN FISHER, DIRECTING SAN DIEGO 15 Respondent. SHERIFFS TO RECOGNIZE PETITIONER AS PRO PER 16 LITIGANT [ECF NO. 18] 17 18 19 Pedro Rodriguez (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition 20 for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent has 21 until January 21, 2022, to file a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23 at 2.) As presently 22 scheduled, Petitioner will then have until February 23, 2022, to file an opposition. (Id.) 23 On November 16, 2021, Petitioner filed an “Ex Parte Request for Order Directing 24 San Diego Sheriffs to Recognize Petitioner as Pro Per Litigant.” (ECF No. 18.) In his ex 25 parte motion, Petitioner indicates that since he was transferred from Valley State Prison 26 to the custody of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department on September 30, 2021, he is being 27 detained at George Bailey Detention Facility where he is deprived access to the resources 28 available at San Diego Central Jail for pro per inmates. (Id. at 1-2.) Petitioner explains 1 that he has been told he can purchase stamps and envelopes from commissary, but his 2 friends and family are not permitted to send him stationary supplies. (Id. at 2.) He 3 further explains that where he is housed, he has no “access to legal property which 4 contains supporting evidence to the petitioner’s current claims.” (Id.) Based on the 5 foregoing, Petitioner argues that the San Diego Sheriff’s Department is denying him his 6 First Amendment right to access the courts and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 7 protection. (Id. at 2-3.) He therefore asks this Court to order the Sheriff’s Department to 8 recognize his “pro per status and allow [him] the same privileges of other pro per inmates 9 including: access to stored legal work product, access to law library, access to copies, and 10 unlimited mail to the courts.” (Id. at 3.) 11 The Supreme Court has stated that it is “beyond doubt that prisoners have a 12 constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). 13 The Court in Bounds held that this right “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in 14 the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with 15 adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 16 430 U.S. at 828. However, “inmates alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual 17 injury,” a prerequisite to establish standing. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 18 Because the basic right provides simply for access to courts rather than any particular 19 means of access—such as library resources or free transcripts—an actual injury to the 20 right requires a showing that the prisoner was “hindered [in] his efforts to pursue a legal 21 claim.” Id. at 351. The right of access-to-courts remains extremely limited. For 22 instance, it applies only in cases where inmates “attack their sentences, directly or 23 collaterally, and[] challenge the conditions of their confinement, id. at 355, and only 24 during the pleading stage of such actions, Cornett v. Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 25 1995). 26 Forward-looking access-to-courts claims—like the one Petitioner asserts here— 27 allege that a state actor is currently frustrating the plaintiff’s attempt to prepare or file a 28 suit. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002) (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828 1 as an example of a forward-looking claim seeking a law library to prepare a present case). 2 Two distinct elements must be present in a forward-looking claim: (1) an arguable or 3 nonfrivolous underlying claim, and (2) the present foreclosure of any meaningful 4 opportunity to pursue that claim. See Parrish v. Solis, No. 11-CV-01438, 2014 WL 5 1921154 , at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (citing Broudy v. Mather, 460 F.3d 106, 120- 6 21 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (synthesizing the requirements of forward-looking claims in Harbury 7 and Lewis); see also Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413 (a plaintiff who alleges a forward-looking 8 claim must be “presently den[ied] an opportunity to litigate”); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 9 (holding that an inmate bringing a forward-looking claim must point to a “nonfrivolous 10 legal claim [that is] being frustrated [or] impeded”). 11 In the instant case, Petitioner has already filed a 310-page habeas petition. (See 12 ECF No. 1.) Because Respondent has until January 21, 2022, to file a motion to dismiss, 13 Petitioner has not shown that he is currently being prevented from preparing further 14 pleadings in his case. (See ECF No. 23.) Even once Respondent has filed a responsive 15 document, it will be incumbent on Petitioner to show under Lewis how he is being 16 prevented from responding, or in other words, what he specifically is lacking to be able to 17 complete his pleadings. At present, Petitioner simply explains that he doesn’t have 18 access to a well-appointed law library at the San Diego Central Jail; that he must 19 purchase stamps and envelopes from the commissary, despite its unreliability and his 20 indigence; and that he is “not allowed access to legal property which contains supporting 21 evidence to [his] current claims.” (ECF No. 18 at 2.) These generalized claims regarding 22 the present day do not directly relate to his ability to file a specific document between 23 January 21, 2022, and his February 23, 2022 deadline. While Petitioner submitted his 24 inmate request regarding his request for access to the law library and his legal material, 25 he did not include the Sheriff’s Department’s response. (ECF No. 17 at 5.) Further, 26 Petitioner does not state whether there are any other legal resources available to him in 27 the facility where he is housed. Based on the foregoing, the right of access to courts does 28 not support Petitioner’s request at this time. 1 Petitioner also claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause 2 that he “has a right to be treated equally to similarly situated inmates convicted of similar 3 crimes.” (ECF No. 17 at 3.) When, as here, “an equal protection claim is premised on 4 unique treatment rather than on a classification,” the party bringing the claim must 5 establish that the accused party “intentionally, and without rational basis, treated the 6 plaintiff differently from others similarly situated.” North Pacifica LLC v. City of 7 Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (2008). Petitioner has not stated that there are similarly 8 situated people to him who are receiving the resources he seeks, nor that the San Diego 9 County Sheriff’s Department lacks a rational basis for denying him “pro per litigant” 10 status. Furthermore, the Court notes that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which 11 may be active for many pretrial detainees, is not shared by habeas petitioners. Habeas 12 Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting 13 that there is no federal constitutional right to appointment of counsel in postconviction 14 collateral attacks on a conviction or sentence in state or federal court). 15 Equally important, the Court is not prepared to address Petitioner’s freestanding 16 equal protection or access to courts claims, to the extent that the relief sought is not 17 directly tied to the habeas petition that constitutes this case. See, e.g., Dunsmore v. 18 Beard, No. 13CV1193-GPC(PCL), 2014 WL 7205659, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014) 19 (“To the extent Petitioner raises arguments concerning violations of his constitutional 20 right to meaningful access to the courts, or seeks to obtain his legal property, his 21 appropriate remedy is filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the 22 proper method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of confinement.”) (citations 23 omitted). Petitioner may seek redress through the regular rules and regulations of the 24 institution where he is confined. 25 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s current motion is DENIED. However, the 26 Court encourages Petitioner to seek redress through the Sheriff’s Department’s internal 27 processes. Despite the Court’s current denial, the Court notes that “[t]he procedures 28 employed by the federal courts are highly protective of a pro se petitioner's rights.” 1 || Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 1986). If Petitioner lacks access to 2 resources necessary to meet future deadlines, he should bring such issues (together 3 || with specifics as related to his habeas petition in this case) to the Court’s attention before 4 ||he misses any deadlines. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: December 20, 2021 □ _ 2 g Honorable Michael S. Berg United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28