United States v. Liddle , 2 Wash. C. C. 205 ( 1808 )

WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice.

The assault and battery is fully proved, and the question is, whether the defendant has justified it, in law or fact. The attorney has very candidly admitted, what the court intended to have stated to the jury; viz. that as to the law arising on the facts, the case stands upon the same ground as if the assault and battery had been committed on a citizen: that is, the prior assault of De Lima, if the jury should think he committed it, would excuse the battery by the defendant, whether De Lima were a public minister, or not entitled to that character. The whole cause, then, upon the merits, depends upon the credibility of two of the witnesses. If the one examined, on the part of the prosecution, be believed, then De Lima was guilty of no assault, and the battery cannot be justified. If, on the other' hand, the witness for the defendant is believed, then the first, assault was by De Lima, and your verdict should be in favour of the defendant. As to the points of law raised and discussed, it is unnecessary to give any opinion upon them to the jury. The objections, if good, appear on the indictment; and may be taken advantage of, on a motion to arrest the judgment, should the verdict find the defendant guilty.

The jury found a special verdict, that the defendant is guilty of the assault and battery as laid; that previous thereto. De Lima had been introduced to the president, (pro ut, Mr Madison’s certificate,) but at the time of the assault and battery laid, the defendant did not know of such introduction.

The court afterwards gave the following opinion upon the special verdict found by the jury:

WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice. The question reserved for the opinion of the court, is, in effect, whether this case be within the operation of the twenty-eighth section of the act of congress [1 Stat. 1198], for the punishment of crimes against the United States; from the circumstance that Liddle did not know, at the time of the assault and battery, of which he was found guilty, that Don Ignatius De Lima was a public minister? This must depend upon the true construction of that section of the law; which, it must be admitted, is by no means free from ambiguity. It is contended by the counsel for the defendant, that assault, battery, &c. mentioned in this section, must be so coupled with the descriptive words which immediately follow, as to qualify and restrain their meaning, to those acts when done in violation of the law of nations; and if this position be right, the conclusion also is right; since it is not to be denied, that if the aggressor be ignorant of the character of the minister, the assault is not considered as an offence against the law of nations. The court was at first strongly inclined to adopt this construction; considering the words, “or in any other manner infract the law of nations,” as implying, that the acts before mentioned were meant to be such as did infract the law of nations. But, upon a more deliberate examination of the whole subject, we are satisfied, that the intention of the legislature corresponds with what we consider to be the liberal interpretation of the expressions used. Let it be recollected, that the constitution vests in the courts of the United States jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. This delegation of jurisdiction to the tribunals of that government which is charged with all the foreign relations of the nation, and with the consequent duties to preserve its peace and honour, seems to have been proper and necessary; and' in respect to those, at least, who represent the persons of their sovereigns. It follows, that the national judiciary, a branch of the general government, was peculiarly marked out for the decision of national questions. Hence, it is probable, that congress would perceive the propriety of occupying so much, at least, of the ground of jurisdiction granted by the constitution, as might be necessarj’ for the general peace, and would leave no part of the subject of the cognisance of state tribunals, which might possibly involve the responsibility of the government.

Thus far as to the probable intention of the legislature. It is agreed, that a battery committed upon the person of. a public minister, though his character be unknown to the aggressor, is a trespass for which the latter may be criminally or civilly punished. The trespass equally affects the minister, as rf it had been committed scienter; and the commission of it might equally involve the peace of the nation; as, in general, the plea of ignorance would seldom be deemed a satisfactory excuse by the sovereign, offended in the person of his minister; As to cases which might produce such consequences, it is highly improbable, that congress could intend to make the degree of offence the criterion of jurisdiction, between the national and state tribunals. The words of the law, literally interpreted, seem to express, what we consider to have been the intention of the legislature. “If any person shall assault, strike, wound, or imprison the person of an ambassador, or other public minister,” he commits an offence at common law, whether the character of the minister be known or not; and it is an offence, within this section of the law, for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to the federal courts. These acts of violence, on account of their enormity, and being principally in the view of the legislature, are of course specifically enumerated. But, as minor acts of violence might be committed against a foreign minister, which could not be so easily foreseen or described; and it was not intended, on the one hand, to punish every possible injury to the person of a foreign minister, nor. on the other hand, to leave every other than the specified acts unpunished; the legislature, as to those not specified, seems to have thought it proper to require, that they should be such only as infracted the law of nations. But the degree of punishment to be inflicted, upon conviction, resting in the breast of the court, the circumstances relied upon, to exclude this case from the jurisdiction of the court, would, nevertheless, form a proper subject of consideration, in deciding what the punishment shall be. It has, in this instance, had its influence upon us.