POSCO v. United States , 335 F. Supp. 3d 1283 ( 2018 )


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  •                                         Slip Op. 18-115
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    POSCO, et al.,
    Plaintiffs,
    and
    AK STEEL CORPORATION, et al.,
    Plaintiff-Intervenors,
    Before: Mark A. Barnett, Judge
    v.
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant,
    and
    STEEL DYNAMICS, INC., et al.,
    Defendant-Intervenors.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    [Sustaining the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination.]
    Dated: September 10, 2018
    Donald B. Cameron, Brady W. Mills, Julie C. Mendoza, R. Will Planert, Mary S.
    Hodgins, and Eugene Degnan, Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, of Washington, DC, for
    Plaintiff POSCO.
    Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for Defendant United States. With her
    on the brief were Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Jeanne E.
    Davidson, Director. Of counsel on the brief was Natan P. L. Tubman, Attorney, Office of
    the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of
    Commerce, of Washington, DC.
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                           Page 2
    Timothy C. Brightbill, Alan H. Price, Tessa V. Capeloto, and Adam M. Teslik, Wiley Rein
    LLP, of Washington, DC, for Consolidated Plaintiff and Defendant-Intervenor Nucor
    Corporation.
    Barnett, Judge: This matter is before the court following the U.S. Department of
    Commerce’s (“Commerce” or the “agency”) redetermination upon remand in this case.
    See Confidential Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand
    (“Remand Results”), ECF No. 112-1. For the reasons stated below, Commerce’s
    Remand Results are sustained. 1
    BACKGROUND
    The court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case as stated in POSCO v.
    United States (“POSCO I”), 42 CIT ___, 
    296 F. Supp. 3d 1320
     (2018). The factual and
    legal background relevant to this remand is summarized herein.
    In this consolidated action, Plaintiff POSCO (“POSCO”) challenged Commerce’s
    final determination in its countervailing duty (“CVD”) investigation of cold-rolled steel
    products from the Republic of Korea (“Korea”). See Countervailing Duty Investigation of
    Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea, 
    81 Fed. Reg. 49,943
     (Dep’t Commerce July 29, 2016) (final aff. determination) (“Final
    Determination”), ECF No. 41-4, and accompanying Issues and Decision Mem., C-580-
    882 (July 20, 2016) (“I&D Mem.”), ECF No. 41-5, as amended by Certain Cold-Rolled
    Steel Flat Products from Brazil, India, and the Republic of Korea, 
    81 Fed. Reg. 64,436
    1
    The administrative record filed in connection with the Remand Results is divided into a
    Public Administrative Record, ECF No. 114-2, and a Confidential Administrative Record,
    ECF No. 114-3.
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                           Page 3
    (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 20, 2016) (am. final aff. countervailing duty determination and
    countervailing duty order) (“Amended Final Determination”), ECF No. 41-3. In
    particular, POSCO (a Korean cold-rolled steel producer) challenged Commerce’s use of
    the facts available with an adverse inference (referred to as “adverse facts available” or
    “AFA”) for several reporting errors and its selection and corroboration of the adverse
    facts available rates. See Confidential Mot. of Pl. POSCO for J. on the Agency R., ECF
    No. 53, and Confidential Pl. POSCO’s Br. in Supp. of its Mot. for J. on the Agency R. at
    2-3, ECF No. 59-1. 2 The court previously sustained Commerce’s use of the adverse
    facts available. See POSCO I, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1336-47. The court remanded
    Commerce’s selection of the highest calculated rates to use as the adverse facts
    available rate and its corroboration of one of the selected rates. Id. at 1347-54.
    Selection of Subsidy Rates
    Commerce’s selection of subsidy rates when making an adverse inference is
    governed by 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(d) (2015). 3 Subsection (d)(1) permits Commerce to
    2
    Consolidated Plaintiff Nucor Corporation (“Nucor”) and Plaintiff-Intervenors
    ArcelorMittal USA LLC, AK Steel Corporation, and United States Steel Corporation
    (domestic cold-rolled steel producers) also challenged certain aspects of Commerce’s
    final determination. Because the court sustained Commerce’s determinations thereto,
    the Remand Results address challenges raised solely by POSCO. See POSCO I, 296
    F. Supp. 3d at 1354-63.
    3
    The Trade Preferences Extension Act (“TPEA”), Pub. L. No. 114–27, § 502, 
    129 Stat. 362
    , 383–84 (2015), made several amendments to the antidumping and countervailing
    duty laws, including the addition of subsection (d) to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e. The TPEA
    amendments affect all CVD determinations made on or after August 6, 2015. See
    Dates of Application of Amendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws
    Made by the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, 
    80 Fed. Reg. 46,793
     (Dep’t
    Commerce Aug 6, 2015). All references to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e are to the amended
    version of the statute.
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                          Page 4
    “use a countervailable subsidy rate applied for the same or similar program in a
    countervailing duty proceeding involving the same country,” or “if there is no same or
    similar program, use a countervailable subsidy rate for a subsidy program from a
    proceeding that the administering authority considers reasonable to use.” 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677e(d)(1)(A). Subsection (d)(2) directs Commerce to base its selection of the
    subsidy rate, which may include the highest rate, on an “evaluation . . . of the situation
    that resulted in the [agency] using an adverse inference.” Id., § 1677e(d)(2).
    In the Issues and Decision Memorandum accompanying the Final Determination,
    Commerce explained that “[i]t is the [agency’s] practice in CVD proceedings to compute
    an AFA rate for non-cooperating companies using the highest calculated program-
    specific rates determined for a cooperating respondent in the same investigation, or, if
    not available, rates calculated in prior CVD cases involving the same country.” I&D
    Mem. at 12 (emphasis added). 4 The court remanded Commerce’s selection of the
    4
    Specifically, Commerce selected its rates pursuant to the following hierarchical
    methodology:
    [Commerce] applies the highest calculated rate for the identical subsidy
    program in the investigation if a responding company used the identical
    program, and the rate is not zero. If there is no identical program match
    within the investigation, or if the rate is zero, [Commerce] uses the highest
    non-de minimis rate calculated for the identical program in a CVD
    proceeding involving the same country. If no such rate is available,
    [Commerce] will use the highest non-de minimis rate for a similar program
    (based on treatment of the benefit) in another CVD proceeding involving
    the same country. Absent an above-de minimis subsidy rate calculated for
    a similar program, [Commerce] applies the highest calculated subsidy rate
    for any program otherwise identified in a CVD case involving the same
    country that could conceivably be used by the non-cooperating
    companies.
    I&D Mem. at 12.
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                                Page 5
    highest calculated subsidy rates as lacking the case-specific evaluation required by
    subsection (d)(2). POSCO I, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1349-50. The court reasoned that
    subsection (d)(2) contemplates a range of possible rates from among which Commerce
    may choose based on its “evaluation of the specific situation,” and faulted the agency
    for “fail[ing] to fulfill its statutory duty because it failed to explain why this case justified
    its selection of the highest rates.” Id. at 1349; see also id. at 1350 (“[Section]
    1677e(d)(2) contemplates the selection of the highest rate when the situation merits the
    highest rate. . . . Commerce failed to evaluate whether the circumstances in this case
    merited the highest rate.”).
    On remand, Commerce explained that by selecting the highest rate within each
    prong of its adverse facts available hierarchy, it “strikes a balance between [] three
    necessary variables: inducement, industry relevancy, and program relevancy.” Remand
    Results at 10-12. Commerce further explained that it interprets 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(d)(2)
    to constitute
    an exception to the selection of an adverse facts available rate under [§
    1677e(d)(1)]; that is, after ‘an evaluation of the situation that resulted in
    the application of an adverse inference,’ Commerce may decide that given
    the unique and unusual facts on the record, the use of the highest rate
    within that step is not appropriate.
    Id. at 12. Commerce evaluated the situation that resulted in the use of adverse
    inferences and concluded that no deviation from the highest rates was merited. See id.
    at 12-16.
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                         Page 6
    Corroboration of Subsidy Rates
    “Corroborat[ion] means that the [agency] will examine whether the secondary
    information to be used has probative value,” 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (d), which includes an
    examination of its reliability and relevance, Özdemir Boru San. ve Tic. Ltd. Sti. v. United
    States, 41 CIT ___, ___, 
    273 F. Supp. 3d 1225
    , 1247 (2017) (citing Ad Hoc Shrimp
    Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 
    802 F.3d 1339
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). For the
    Amended Final Determination, pursuant to the aforementioned hierarchy, Commerce
    applied a 1.64 percent rate associated with an insurance program deemed
    countervailable in Bottom Mount Combination Refrigerator–Freezers from the Republic
    of Korea, 
    77 Fed. Reg. 17,410
     (final aff. countervailing duty determination) (Dep't
    Commerce March 26, 2012) (“Refrigerators from Korea”), for several of POSCO’s
    countervailable programs. POSCO I, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1335-36; see also Am. Final
    Determination, 81 Fed. Reg. at 64,437. The court remanded Commerce’s selection of
    the 1.64 percent rate because the rate was “derived from estimates Commerce made
    on the basis of an adverse inference” and, thus, was not an “[a]ctual rate[ ] calculated
    based on actual usage of a countervailable program by a Korean company.” POSCO I,
    296 F. Supp. 3d at 1353 (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citation omitted).
    Accordingly, the court determined that the reliability of that rate was unsupported by
    substantial evidence. See id. at 1351, 1353.
    In the Amended Final Determination, Commerce had also applied a 1.05 percent
    rate associated with a tax deduction program found countervailable in Large Residential
    Washers from the Republic of Korea, 
    77 Fed. Reg. 75,975
     (final aff. countervailing duty
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                           Page 7
    determination) (Dep't Commerce December 26, 2012) (“Washers from Korea”), to
    certain other programs found to be countervailable. The court found that Commerce
    properly corroborated that rate. POSCO I, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1353-54.
    On remand, Commerce replaced the 1.64 percent rate from Refrigerators from
    Korea with the 1.05 percent rate from Washers from Korea that the court previously
    concluded was properly corroborated. See Remand Results at 19-20.
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 516A(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
    as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012), and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (c). The court
    will uphold an agency determination that is supported by substantial evidence and
    otherwise in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “The results of a
    redetermination pursuant to court remand are also reviewed for compliance with the
    court’s remand order.” SolarWorld Americas, Inc. v. United States, 41 CIT ___, ___,
    
    273 F. Supp. 3d 1314
    , 1317 (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    DISCUSSION
    POSCO summarily contends that Commerce’s rate selection analysis lacks
    compliance with the court’s decision in POSCO I. Pl. POSCO’s Comments on the U.S.
    Dep’t of Commerce’s June 6, 2018 Final Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand
    (“POSCO Comments”) at 2, ECF No. 116. POSCO further contends that “the 1.05
    percent rate is overstated.” 
    Id.
     However, in the interest of “a speedy end to this
    litigation,” POSCO refrained from “commenting further” on either issue. 
    Id.
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                          Page 8
    Nucor and Defendant United States urge the court to sustain the Remand
    Results. Resp. to Pl. POSCO’s Comments on the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce’s June 6,
    2018 Final Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (“Nucor Reply”), ECF No. 117;
    Def.’s Resp. to Comments on Remand Results, ECF No. 118. Nucor specifically
    requests the court to “treat the Remand Results as unopposed” because POSCO “failed
    to exhaust its administrative remedies and otherwise failed to articulate any basis for the
    [c]ourt [to] fault the agency’s Remand Results.” Nucor Reply at 1.
    The court first directed Commerce to base its selection of the subsidy rate on an
    evaluation of the specific situation that merited the adverse inferences, and apprise the
    court of the basis for its findings thereto. POSCO I, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1349-50. On
    remand, Commerce explained, with citations to supporting evidence, why this case did
    not merit a deviation from the highest calculated rate selected pursuant to Commerce’s
    hierarchical methodology. Remand Results at 12-16. To the extent POSCO seeks to
    challenge Commerce’s findings or its interpretation of subsection (d)(2) as functioning
    as an “exception” to its practice of selecting the highest rates from within each prong of
    its hierarchy, see POSCO Comments at 2, POSCO has failed to exhaust its
    administrative remedies, see, e.g., Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 
    548 F.3d 1375
    , 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (failure to raise an issue on remand precludes parties
    from raising that issue before the court); Remand Results at 21 (noting that POSCO did
    not provide substantive comments on the draft remand results). Likewise, the court
    considers POSCO’s failure to articulate any grounds for its assertion that Commerce
    failed to fully comply with the court’s remand order as an implied waiver of that
    Consol. Court No. 16-00225                                                       Page 9
    argument. See Home Prods. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 36 CIT ___, ___, 
    837 F. Supp. 2d 1294
    , 1301 (2012) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17 (1st
    Cir.1990) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort
    at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not enough merely to mention a
    possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work,
    create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.”)).
    Next, the court directed Commerce to reconsider its selection and corroboration
    of the 1.64 percent subsidy rate derived from Refrigerators from Korea. POSCO I, 296
    F. Supp. 3d at 1353. Commerce did so, and replaced it with the 1.05 percent subsidy
    rate derived from Washers from Korea, which the court had found to be properly
    corroborated. Remand Results at 19-20; POSCO I, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1354. POSCO
    failed to substantively challenge Commerce’s redetermination at the agency level and
    before the court. See Remand Results at 22; POSCO Comments at 2. Accordingly, the
    court sees no reason to disturb Commerce’s redetermination. See Mittal Steel, 
    548 F.3d at 1383
    ; Home Prods. Int’l, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
    CONCLUSION AND ORDER
    For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Commerce’s
    Remand Results are sustained. Judgment will enter accordingly.
    /s/   Mark A. Barnett
    Mark A. Barnett, Judge
    Dated: September 10, 2018
    New York, New York
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Consol. 16-00025

Citation Numbers: 2018 CIT 115, 335 F. Supp. 3d 1283

Judges: Barnett

Filed Date: 9/10/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024