Inmax Sdn. Bhd. v. United States , 2017 CIT 101 ( 2017 )


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  •                                 Slip Op. 17 - 101
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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    INMAX SDN. BHD. and INMAX INDUSTRIES   :
    SDN. BHD.,
    Plaintiffs,   :
    v.                         :
    UNITED STATES,                                 :    Court No. 17-00205
    Defendant,
    -and-                        :
    MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE, INC.,              :
    Intervenor-Defendant.    :
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    Memorandum & Order
    [Plaintiffs’ application(s) for immediate injunctive relief
    from cash deposits on entries subject to antidumping-duty
    order pending completion of administrative and judicial
    reviews of the basis therefor denied.]
    Dated: August 8, 2017
    Gregory S. Menegaz, J. Kevin Horgan, and Alexandra H. Salzman,
    deKieffer & Horgan, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for the plaintiffs.
    Stephen C. Tosini, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
    D.C., for the defendant. With him in opposition Chad A. Readler,
    Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director,
    and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director.
    Adam H. Gordon, The Bristol Group PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
    the intervenor-defendant.
    AQUILINO, Senior Judge: The above-encaptioned plaintiffs
    commenced this action contesting Certain Steel Nails from Malaysia:
    Final   Results   of     the    Changed   Circumstances   Review   (“CCR”),
    Court No. 17-00205                                                Page 2
    published at 82 Fed.Reg. 34476 (July 25, 2017) by the International
    Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (“ITA”), as
    discussed   in   the   agency’s   accompanying   issues   and   decision
    memorandum (“IDM”) dated July 17, 2017.     In thereby invoking this
    court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1581¥c¦, on August 2,
    2017 the plaintiffs interposed an application for a temporary
    restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunction,
    enjoining the defendant
    until the final and conclusive court decision in this
    litigation from requiring Inmax Industries Sdn. Bhd. to
    pay the increased antidumping cash deposit rate of 39.35%
    currently assigned to Inmax Sdn Bhd. instead of the
    previous 2.66% cash deposit rate on imports assigned to
    Inmax Industries lawfully by the [ITA] at the conclusion
    of the original investigation[,]
    to quote from the latter’s proposed order.
    To be granted such extraordinary, interim, equitable
    relief, a movant must show (1) immediate and irreparable harm, (2)
    likelihood of success on the merits, (3) the balance of hardship on
    all parties favors it, and (4) such relief is in the public
    interest.   See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. United States, 
    3 F.3d 424
    , 427
    (Fed.Cir. 1993); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 
    710 F.2d 806
    ,
    809 (Fed.Cir. 1983). In assessing such requirements, the court may
    employ a “sliding scale”, which means that not every one must be
    established to the same degree, and a strong showing on one can
    Court No. 17-00205                                              Page 3
    overcome a weaker showing on others. Corus Group PLC v. Bush, 
    26 CIT 937
    , 942, 
    217 F. Supp. 2d 1347
    , 1353 (2002), aff’d, 
    352 F.3d 1351
    (Fed.Cir. 2003), citing FMC 
    Corp., 3 F.3d at 427
    . “Central to the
    movant’s burden are the likelihood of success and irreparable harm
    factors.” Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 
    74 F.3d 1216
    , 1219 (Fed.Cir. 1996).
    I
    Here,   the   plaintiffs   claim   “unique”   circumstances
    necessitate the relief prayed for.       By way of background, they
    explain that they are Malaysian exporters of certain steel nails to
    the United States subject to ITA’s Certain Steel Nails From the
    Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Oman, Taiwan and the
    Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Antidumping Duty Orders, 80 Fed.Reg.
    39994 (July 13, 2015).      The plaintiffs apparently are related
    companies, but during the underlying agency investigation they were
    not “collapsed” pursuant to ITA’s regulation thereon into a single
    entity.1   The plaintiffs intimate that this may have been due to
    the fact that only one of them was commercially exporting subject
    1
    See 19 C.F.R. §351.401(f)(1) ("the Secretary will treat
    two or more affiliated producers as a single entity where those
    producers have production facilities for similar or identical
    products that would not require substantial retooling of either
    facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities and the
    Secretary concludes that there is a significant potential for the
    manipulation of price or production").
    Court No. 17-00205                                                        Page 4
    merchandise     during   the   investigation      and    point    out   that   the
    domestic petitioner essentially waived argument over collapsing
    during the investigation.
    When that investigation’s final results were published,
    Inmax Sdn. Bhd. received the 39.35 percent antidumping-duty rate as
    a result of application of total adverse facts available, and Inmax
    Industries, not individually investigated, was subjected to the
    amended “all others” rate of 2.66 percent.           As a result of the CCR,
    however, ITA collapsed the two entities into one and subjected
    both, as one, to the 39.35 percent cash deposit rate.
    The plaintiffs now contend immediate relief is necessary
    to prevent irreparable harm in that they would lose their right to
    obtain meaningful judicial review with respect to the cash deposits
    for entries of merchandise before the completion of the first ITA
    administrative review, which they anticipate will be in December
    2017    and   during   which   the    agency   has      already   preliminarily
    determined a margin for them as collapsed entities of 1.03 percent,
    and they would thereby lose any benefit of a favorable ruling by
    the court. They aver that, upon learning of the CCR final results,
    Inmax    Industries      ceased      production    and     forewent     business
    opportunities, but also that that entity has shipments en route to
    the United States that will incur the “extreme high margin” because
    Court No. 17-00205                                                          Page 5
    they   cannot    be     redirected    in   a    cost-effective      way,   and   the
    plaintiffs complain they are unable to finance the nearly $4
    million in cash deposits that would be required until completion of
    the first administrative review.               See Plaintiffs’ Application, p.
    10.
    As    for    likelihood    of      success   on   the    merits,     the
    plaintiffs argue the initiation of the CCR
    [wa]s based upon factors already known and verified in
    the investigation and well prior to the Department’s
    final determination in the investigation. No new facts
    or circumstances exist from the investigation. Nothing
    in fact changed. The Department’s cost verification
    report from the original investigation observed expressly
    both “production and sales [by Inmax Industries] had
    commenced as of the date of the cost verification.”[ ]
    Accordingly, the Department had no basis to find a
    changed circumstance.
    
    Id. at 14-15,
    referencing Memorandum from Taija A. Slaughter to
    Neal M. Halper regarding “Verification of Inmax Sdn. Bhd. in the
    Antidumping Investigation of Certain Steel Nails from Malaysia,”
    dated February 17, 2015, page 3.
    As to balance of hardships, the plaintiffs contend that
    no other party will suffer hardship and that the current schedule
    anticipates      completion    of    the   first    administrative     review    in
    December 2017; hence, at most, injunction would merely “postpone a
    potential new cash deposit rate for the companies” which only
    Court No. 17-00205                                                        Page 6
    amounts to an “inconvenience” to the United States.                  
    Id. at 20,
    citing SKF USA, Inc. v United States, 
    28 CIT 170
    , 175, 316 F.
    Supp.2d 1322, 1328 (2004).
    Lastly, the plaintiffs point to the steadfast judicial
    position on the subject of the public interest as being best served
    when the trade laws of the United States are accurately and fairly
    administered.      
    Id. at 21,
    referencing, e.g., Chilean Nitrate Corp.
    v. United States, 
    11 CIT 538
    , 540 (1987).
    II
    The defendant responds that the plaintiffs submit nothing
    to substantiate their claim of irreparable harm and “[a]ttorney
    argument is not evidence” thereof, Def’s Resp. at 5, quoting Icon
    Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 
    849 F.3d 1034
    , 1043 (Fed.
    Cir.    2017),    and   that   because    the   plaintiffs    seek   to   enjoin
    collection of cash deposits rather than liquidation, there is no
    basis for presuming harm as a matter of law here, 
    id. See also
    id.
    at 6 
    ("Congress did not intend that the ordinary operation of the
    antidumping duty law -- which includes the collection of estimated
    duties in the form of cash deposits, see, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §
    1673d(c)(1)(B)(ii) -- could be considered irreparable harm, or it
    would    not     have   limited   section       1516a(c)(2)   injunctions    to
    liquidation"), referencing Hohn v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 236
    , 249
    Court No. 17-00205                                                       Page 7
    (1998), and Shandong Dongfang Bayley Wood Co. v. United States, 41
    CIT ___, Slip Op. 17-77 at 7, 
    2017 WL 2838344
    at *3 (July 3, 2017)
    (rejecting attempt to enjoin collection of cash deposits after
    preliminary determination for want of residual jurisdiction because
    plaintiff “ma[de] no argument that this is imminent harm to [it]
    showing that the ordinary means of obtaining judicial review of a
    Commerce determination will be inadequate in the circumstances of
    this litigation”).         The defendant also contends that the alleged
    “harm”     is   actually    the   result    of   plaintiffs’   own   business
    decision(s), and that good cause did exist to initiate and conduct
    the CCR, as indicated in the IDM.                See generally Defendant’s
    Response at 2-3, quoting IDM at 5 (citing petitioner’s CCR Request
    at   Ex.   4,   attached     as   Ex.   1   to   Def’s   Resp.),   and   at   6.
    Consequently, the defendant argues the plaintiffs are unlikely to
    succeed on the merits and that “maintaining a maximum level of
    security for the unliquidated entries would serve broadly the
    public interest of revenue collection.” 
    Id. at 9,
    quoting National
    Fisheries Institute, Inc. v. United States Bureau of Customs &
    Border Protection, 
    34 CIT 1371
    , 1377, 
    751 F. Supp. 2d 1318
    , 1325
    (2010).
    Court No. 17-00205                                           Page 8
    III
    USCIT Rule 65(c) requires a movant for extraordinary,
    interim, equitable relief to post security in an amount that would
    be “proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party
    found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”       Having
    considered all the papers submitted herein, this court is not
    persuaded that disregard of this long-standing requirement, which,
    in effect, is what the plaintiffs seek, would be appropriate.
    Accordingly, the specific relief for which they now plead must be,
    and it hereby is, denied.
    So ordered.
    Dated:   New York, New York
    August 8, 2017
    /s/ Thomas J. Aquilino, Jr.
    Senior Judge